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ABSTRACT 
The focus of the present research is on children's commonsense reasoning in mechanics. 
The important effect of pre-instructional ideas on children's learning is now widely 
recognised and much effort has gone into investigating what these ideas are like in various 
domain areas in science in the past few years. Early researches in this area have provided 
us with a comprehensive catalog of phenomenological descriptions of various aspects of 
children's reasoning about forces and motion. A related line of research has grown over 
recent years, which attempts to probe into whether there are deeper explanations underlying 
these misconceptions. If we take scientific theories and commonsense reasoning as two 
ends of a dichotomy, then early researches in this field have predominantly started from the 
scientific end, looking towards the intuitive end, trying to find out where the intuitive ideas 
go astray. To look for deeper levels of analysis, some have since turned to looking from 
the opposite end, trying to take children's ideas seriously, in their own right and not as a 
distortion of the scientific view. This latter perspective is the one taken by the present 
research and is believed to be appropriate if an understanding of the phenomenological 
descriptions of children's intuitive ideas is to be attained. 
The present research sets out to investigate the possible cognitive models used in the 
spontaneous interpretation of and reasoning about motion by students with varying 
amounts of Physics instruction. It is hoped that the resulting models will not only provide a 
context for interpreting children's misconceptions, but also provide insight into the evolut-
ion of naive cognitive models to more scientific ones. 
The research consists of two tasks. The first is a classification task asking students to 
categorize comic strip pictures about motion and to explain their underlying reasoning. The 
second is a programming task, asking students to write expert systems about motion in the 
language PROLOG. The second task is in fact one of self elicitation of knowledge by the 
students themselves under the assistance of the researcher. The advantage of such an 
exercise is that the representation is not only open for inspection by the students but is also 
explorable. The results from both tasks will be analysed and synthesized in the thesis. 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
Now is it clear merely in The light of common sense that a 
body In the absence of any force acting on it moves 
perpetually In a straight line with constant speed? Or that 
a body subject to a constant weight constantly accelerates 
The velocity of Its fall? On The contrary, such opinions are 
remarkably far from common sense knowledge; in order to 
give birth to them, it has taken the accumulated efforts of 
all The geniuses who for two Thousand years have dealt 
with dynamics. 
Duhem (l954), 263 
1.1 The Choice of Problem 
Science as the culmination of the knowledge man has gained in his endeavours to explore 
and understand the world is undoubtedly, even according to common wisdom, superior to 
commonsense. Deciding on the desirable qualities of science graduates, the sort of skills 
and abilities that have to be cultivated, has always been a major problem in science 
education. The fact that students hold pre-instructional ideas about the physical world 
around us has not been a cause of concern in science education until very recently. 
Commonsense ideas were assumed to be either addressing different issues or to wither 
away the moment they meet school science. This intuitive assumption is possibly the root 
of the so called "tabula rasa" approach in teaching. 
Research findings pointing to the fact that a lot of students, including science 
undergraduates, still hold intuitive conceptions that are contrary to the scientific view 
brought about much surprise and interest. The first investigations started as pencil-and-
paper tests of "misconceptions" or spontaneous conceptions, initially mainly in the area of 
mechanics. Growing interest in the phenomenon led to explorations of students' ideas in 
all the major areas of science and to the development of different techniques in the 
exploration of such ideas. 
Early explorations in the area of children's ideas focussed on getting phenomenological 
descriptions of these ideas, especially from the perspective of where they departed from the 
scientific view. Results revealed largely common intuitive ideas being held by students 
across a wide age range and across different countries. Such results coupled with a general 
background of increasing reference to the constructive role of the learner in the learning 
process led many to believe that the intuitive ideas have deep roots in people's everyday 
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interactions with physical phenomena. A related line of research has grown over recent 
years which attempts to probe into whether there are deeper explanations underlying 
children's "misconceptions" in science. Here, researchers try to explore students' ideas in 
their own right and not as a distortion of the scientific view, and they hope to find deeper 
structures of cognition/ understanding that can give a more ubiquitous explanation for the 
various misconceptions recorded. The present research is an attempt to explore students' 
reasoning about motion in this same general direction. 
There are philosophical explorations of the differences between science and common sense 
(e.g. Nagel, 1961) as well as explorations of the relationship between science and common 
sense from a sociological perspective (e.g Berger & Luckmann, 1966). However, there is 
little in the literature about the relationship between these two kinds of knowledge at the 
level of the individual. Do a person's commonsense ideas about a specific domain form an 
integrated system, that is, a theory? How consistently would the same commonsense ideas 
be used under different circumstances? What roles do these ideas play when a person 
comes into contact with scientific ideas in the context of school science learning? Would 
there be attempts to integrate them or would the two just remain in co-existence, each 
coming into play under different circumstances? Under what circumstances would a person 
give up his/her intuitive conceptions? These are interesting questions that have important 
educational implications. 
In attempting to answer such questions, the present research tries to elicit and understand 
students' commonsense reasoning in a particular domain area - the physical world of 
motion. In other words, this is an exploration into students' intuitive mechanics. The 
world of motion is chosen to be the domain of exploration for two reasons: Everyone has 
to cope with motion phenomena from birth and it is inconceivable for anyone not to have 
developed intuitive ideas about it. At the same time, this is also the area with the largest 
amount of empirical data accumulated about it. 
1.2 Methodological Issues 
In defining the objectives of the elicitation exercise, the present work attempts to expose not 
just the individual ideas in the commonsense conception of motion, but also the structural 
relationships between them. This is derived from the belief that the actual organization of 
knowledge is at least as important as the elements found in it. Furthermore, as the focus is 
on the actual conceptualizations used in commonsense reasoning, it is felt that an 
exploration of the knowledge structures in declarative format is more appropriate. 
Elicitations in problem solving contexts bring in problems related to meta-cognitive skills 
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and mastery of knowledge not strictly within the subject domain, as well as the 
disadvantage of a tendency for such task contexts to cue school science knowledge. 
However, the methods of elicitation commonly employed in this area of research that do 
yield information about declarative structuring of knowledge, for example concept map or 
line labelling tasks, tend to use school science concepts/terms as starting points. What is 
looked for here, instead, is an open task that can elicit in a systematic manner students' 
declarative ideas without pre-defining a specific context or a specific set of ideas to work 
from. 
Another desirable feature of the elicitation task here is that it should probe into the more 
stable and rational aspects of students' commonsense reasoning. Elicitation strategies 
developed in this area of research, for example written tests, interview about instances, 
interview about events, repertory grids, etc., have generally been geared towards probing 
the spontaneous responses of students. The disadvantages of such methods are that it is 
not clear how strong a subject's commitments are towards the various ideas elicited, and it 
is not easy to find out how the different spontaneous ideas orchestrate together for different 
problem contexts. 
In the present research it was decided to employ a rather novel elicitation technique of 
expert system development by students, supplemented by a more conventional 
classification task. The programming task requires students to write expert systems about 
motion in the computer language PROLOG. This is an extended task where each student is 
required to work for six to eight weekly sessions in the production of an expert system 
capable of answering general everyday questions about common motion events. During 
the process of program development, the students have the chance to explore the reasoning 
ability of the expert systems built by running them and also to modify the programs as they 
see fit. This task is essentially one of self-elicitation of knowledge by the students 
themselves under the assistance of the researcher. It has the advantage of producing a 
declarative representation of the students' reasoning about motion that is open for 
inspection by the researcher and students alike, as well as being explorable. The testing 
and modification behaviour of the students when programs fail to yield expected answers 
provide important insights that are normally otherwise inaccessible: insights into the 
students' degree of commitment to various ideas and possible learning mechanisms when 
existing knowledge structures fail. 
In as much as a novel technique may bring on new developments, there is a danger that the 
results of the exploration are just artifacts of the research technique itself. It is thus 
desirable that the results of the research can be checked against those elicited by more 
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conventional methods. It was decided that a classification task asking students to put comic 
strip pictures of motion into groups according to some criteria and then to explain how the 
classification was done should be performed before the start of the programming task. The 
criteria used by students for putting motion events into groups should yield important 
perspectives for reasoning about motion events in everyday contexts. As mentioned, major 
ideas elicited from this task can be used as starting points for the students to elaborate on in 
their programming task. More importantly, conceptual frameworks used in the intuitive 
processing of motion events as elicited from analysis of the classification protocols would 
provide useful reference points for comparison with results from the programming task. 
Two groups of subjects participated in this research: a group of F.3 students (about 15 
years old) who had not received any instructions in mechanics, and a group of F.6 science 
students (about 17 years old) who had gained credits or distinctions in Physics in the 
HKCEE examination (equivalent to the GCE 0-Level examinations) and were doing A- 
. 
Level Physics. It is hoped that comparison of the performance of these two groups of 
students would shed light on the effect of school physics instruction on the conceptions of 
motion elicited. Students from different ability ranges were also represented in each age 
group so as to find out if there is any indication of different performance for the different 
ability groups. 
1.3 What This Research Hopes to Achieve 
It is hoped that this research can yield fruit on two fronts: a better understanding of 
commonsense reasoning about motion and an assessment of the viability of employing 
expert system development as a means of knowledge elicitation and cognitive modelling. 
In terms of our understanding of commonsense reasoning about motion, it is anticipated 
that this research should yield information on the parameters and perspectives that figure 
importantly in the everyday processing of motion events as well as revealing the existence, 
if any, of prominent patterns of reasoning about motion in the commonsense context. It is 
also hoped that the research findings can provide insights into the structural relationship of 
the different ideas elicited and thereby address the question of whether the commonsense 
ideas elicited can be termed "theories", and if so, in what sense. The modification 
behaviour of students in the programming task may, in addition, provide information on 
possible differences in the strength of commitment to the different ideas elicited. 
Comparison of results from the two age groups should also provide clues to the effects of 
school physics instruction in relation to commonsense ideas. 
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The explorability and modifiability of the elicited ideas in the form of PROLOG programs 
allows for a close observation of the possible cognitive responses and outcomes in the face 
of conflicts, in this case a failure of the developed programs to yield expected results. It 
has been claimed by many (e.g Hewson, 1981, 1984) that cognitive conflict leads to 
conceptual restructuring and thus learning. The programming task provides a chance, 
though limited in time duration and scope, to look into the cognitive strategies employed in 
the face of conflict and the possible modes of learning under such circumstances. Here, 
results from the two age groups, each with students from different ability ranges, can be 
compared to look at the possible effects of physics instruction and general ability on the 
different issues explored. 
The present research is novel in trying to develop a new method of knowledge elicitation. 
It may be breaking new ground in bringing artificial intelligence tools to the service of 
cognitive exploration. At the same time the results of the exploration must be given careful 
scrutiny and their validity assessed. What does expert system development actually offer 
as a means of elicitation? Are the results credible in comparison with other more 
conventional methods of exploration? PROLOG forces the elicited ideas to be represented 
as a logical system while commonsense ideas are generally believed to be fuzzy, 
fragmented and not necessarily consistent. Would it be possible that the results of the 
exploration are just products of such an "artificial" environment? Are there difficulties 
related to the administration of this method and what are its limitations? Hopefully these 
questions can be addressed in the light of the results. 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
Chapter two is a review of research in the area of children's pre-instructional ideas in 
science. The emphasis is on the philosophical and sociological background to the strong 
interest in such ideas and on the theoretical frameworks which underlie the different lines of 
approach to the problem. 
Chapter three is a review of theoretical issues in two areas: learning and knowledge 
representation. Views on learning contribute largely to the formulation of the research 
questions and to the associated theoretical framework. Knowledge representation follows 
both as a theoretical issue closely related to learning, as well as a methodological one of 
choosing appropriate representation formalisms for the results. 
Chapter four gives an overview of the different methodologies commonly used in the 
exploration of learners' conceptions. Again the emphasis here is on the theoretical 
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underpinnings of the various methods. Their relative merits are compared with reference to 
their aims and perspectives. The actual tasks used in the research are described separately in 
the next two chapters. 
Chapter five is a self contained unit by itself, describing the rationale for choosing a 
classification task as the method of exploration, the actual administrative details as well as 
presenting the results and their analysis. 
Chapter six describes the programming task in detail. First, expert systems and the 
features of the actual expert system shells used are described. The results of a pilot study 
on the viability of such a task are then reported, followed by a description of the actual 
administrative details of the task in the main study, including procedures and formats for 
the data collection and data reduction stages. 
Chapter seven presents an analysis of the knowledge structures for commonsense 
reasoning about motion as revealed by the written expert systems. The programs are 
analyzed both at the individual rule level as well as the program level, to look into the actual 
conceptions of motion they represent as well as the structural features of those ideas. 
Chapter eight analyzes the testing and modification behaviour of the students and tries to 
look at the cognitive strategies employed in response to conflicting situations. The issue of 
what possible modes of learning may be represented by these behaviour is also addressed. 
Chapter nine attempts to synthesize the results from the two tasks and tries to answer the 
questions set out in this chapter. 
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Chapter 2 REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON 
CHILDREN'S IDEAS IN SCIENCE 
The worst evil resulting from the precocious use of speech 
by young children is that we not only fall to understand the 
first words they use, we misunderstand them without 
knowing it; so that while they seem to answer us correctly, 
they fail to understand us and we them... This lack of 
attention on our part to the real meaning which words have 
for children seems to me the cause of their earliest 
misconceptions; and these misconceptions, even when 
corrected, colour their whole course of thought for the rest 
of their life. 
Emile. J.J. Rousseau, 1760. 
2.1 The Problem: Phenomenon of Children's Ideas in Science 
2.1.1 Extent of the problem. 
The concern for learners' pre-instructional ideas has inspired a whole area of research in 
science education. This trend of work started in the early '70s, gathered momentum in the 
'80s and is still a major area of research, broadening into subject areas other than science. It 
began when some researchers found to their surprise that students had not learnt what they 
were thought to have mastered (Doran, 1972; Duncan & Johnstone, 1973) with sometimes 
very low percentages of correct responses being recorded for quite simple problems. One 
early piece of research that made an important impact was that done by Viennot (1977, 
1979). She gave to students varying from last year secondary to third year University a 
paper-and-pencil test on some qualitative mechanics problems involving predictions of 
specific aspects of the motion of bodies. The test was given to students in France, Britain 
and Belgium. The result was remarkable in that despite the wide range of students tested, in 
general not more than half of the students could give the correct answers. Even more 
surprising was that there was no substantial difference in the results from the three different 
countries, nor was there any great improvement with the amount of formal education 
received. The results pointed towards the existence of widespread, common intuitive 'laws 
of Physics' which are different from the accepted scientific view and which are extremely 
robust and resistant to change. 
2.1.2 Characteristics of children's ideas. 
Alternatives to paper and pencil tests were developed to find out more about these intuitive 
ideas of natural phenomena. The following are generally agreed to be important pheno- 
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menological features of such pre-instructional ideas (Osborne & Freyberg, 1985; Confrey, 
1987) : 
1. The alternative conceptions held by students are very often related to their informal 
knowledge and the way words in science have been used in everyday language. From a 
young age, and prior to any teaching and learning of formal science, children develop 
meanings for many words used in science teaching and views of the world which relate 
to ideas taught in science. 
2. These ideas are usually strongly held, and resistant to change. They may be signi-
ficantly different from views of scientists, yet they are psychologically compelling, and 
may still be held intact by children and adults alike after having completed years of 
formal science instructions. 
3. These ideas are sensible and rational from the children's point of view. 
4. Although there is variety in the ideas children use to interpret phenomena, there are 
some general patterns in the types of ideas that children of different ages tend to use, 
and quite independent research studies have reported similar patterns of ideas held. This 
commonality found across large collections of individual constructs probably is one 
important driving incentive for research in this area - for if all we can say about 
individual constructs is that they are different and there is no predictable trend, then 
there is not much that we can do about them as science educators. 
There is one important divergence of opinion concerning the self-consistency of children's 
ideas. While some (e.g. Driver et. al., 1985) saw them as incoherent, others (e.g. Osborne 
& Freyberg, 1985; Viennot, 1979) referred to them as sensible, coherent, and self-
consistent. The lack of coherence is apparent if viewed from a scientific perspective, but 
how far such views are consistent within the children's own frame, or how far children are 
committed to logical consistency of their own conceptions is still a problematic issue. 
Differences are even more striking when one tries to get an overview of the various pieces 
of work within this area of research. As Gilbert & Watts (1983) pointed out, there is no 
general agreement on the aims of enquiry, the methods to be used, criteria for appraising 
data and the use to be made of the outcomes. Furthermore, different epistemological and 
ontological status is ascribed to the same phenomenon by different researchers, resulting in 
a diversity of descriptors: 'misconceptions' (e.g. Helm, 1980), 'preconceptions' (e.g. 
Novak, 1977), 'alternative conceptions' (Driver and Easley, 1978), and 'children's 
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science' (Gilbert, Osborne & Fensham, 1982). A lot of ground has been covered since 
then, but the lack of agreement on many of these critical issues is still characteristic of the 
present state of this area of work. 
2.1.3 The review. 
It is not the intention here to give a comprehensive review of research in this area. There are 
books devoted entirely to the discussion of extensive collections of research findings in the 
field (e.g. Driver, Guesne, Tiberghien, 1985; Osborne & Freyberg, 1985; West & Pines, 
1985), excellent review papers (e.g Driver & Erickson, 1983; Gilbert & Watts, 1983; Duit, 
1987; Confrey 1987) and bibliographies (e.g. Pfundt & Duit, 1987; Giordan, 1987). This 
review attempts to trace the main questions which seem to lie behind the conception of 
research in the field. The work on developing more effective methods of teaching that takes 
children's preconceptions into account has been deliberately left out of this review. Though 
the purpose of understanding children's ideas is ultimately to teach better, the focus of the 
present research is to learn more about the nature of these prior ideas. 
Mechanics, possibly more than any other branch of science, is a subject which everyone 
has an awareness of from birth. It is inconceivable for someone not to have some kind of 
beliefs about motion. This subject has received more attention than any other branch of 
science from researchers all over the world. Mechanics has been chosen as the subject of 
the present research because a rich accumulation of phenomenological observations of 
children's ideas in this domain already exists. 
The present review will start with a description of the main characteristics of children's 
ideas in mechanics. It will then try to locate this movement in science education research 
within the wider context of changing conceptions in philosophy of science as well as 
psychology. This will be followed by a brief overview of the variety of questions tackled in 
this area of research and the different theoretical frameworks embodied, which will show 
how the present research is to be seen in relation to other work. 
2.2 Children's ideas in mechanics 
There are several very comprehensive reviews of work done in the area of children's ideas 
in mechanics: McDermott (1984), Gilbert and Watts (1983), Gunstone and Watts (1985) 
and Jagger (1985). A wide variety of research strategies were employed in the studies 
reported, varying from pencil and paper tests to in-depth interviews and laboratory tasks. 
Even so, a very similar pattern of understanding was found. The intuitive conceptions 
reported were found to fall into five main areas. 
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2.2.1 Force and motion 
This is by far the most important area of difficulty in the learning of Newtonian mechanics 
in terms of both prevalence and persistence. There are several strongly held beliefs under 
this theme. 
i) Force is proportional to speed: the harder you push something the faster it 
moves. 
ii) Force on an object acts in the direction of motion. 
iii) There is no (net) force on an object at rest. 
iv) Motion implies a force. 
The above four beliefs very often co-exist together and pervade nearly all the research into 
the learning of mechanics. These beliefs have emerged from people all over the world in all 
age groups and often in spite of intensive instruction, (Sjoberg and Lie (1981) in Norway, 
Watts and Zylbersztajn (1981) in Britain, Viennot (1979) in France). They can easily be 
elicited by variations of the tossed stone problem (fig. 2.1), or the oscillating weight on a 
spring problem (fig. 2.2). 
?B 
OA 
A stone is thrown straight up in the air. 
It leaves the person's hand, goes up through point A, gets as high as B and then comes back down through A again. 
The arrows in the pictures are supposed to show the direction of the force on the stone. 
Which picture do you think best shows the force on the stone on its way up through A ? 
B 
OA 
0 / 
OA 
0 I 	 0 
I 8  
I No force 
I A 
0 
I 
IA 
0 
B 
0 
I 
0 
   
Explanation : 
Fig. 2.1 Question designed to elicit children's ideas about force and motion direction. 
(Watts & Zylbersztajn, 1981) 
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Are the forces acting on all the masses identical at the instants shown ? 
A 
     
R2 
  
R3 
  
         
• 
 
       
V, = 0 
  
          
Equilibrium 
position 
        
         
           
            
            
Fig. 2.2 Questions designed to elicit ideas about force, motion speed and motion direction. 
(Viennot, 1979) 
In the first case, the Newtonian forces on the moving object at the various moments 
depicted are identical while in the second case the forces only depend on the position of the 
object. However, the provision of the trajectory information seemed to be a strong 
distractor and the students found it very difficult to explain why a particle could be moving 
upwards without having an upward force. Similarly, an object coming to a stop 
momentarily during the course of motion must have no net forces acting on it at the point 
when it was at rest. Changes in the speed of the object tend to be explained by a 
corresponding change in force. For example, a common explanation for a stone to slow 
down on going upwards after being tossed was that the upward force on it decreases as it 
goes up. Following a similar line of reasoning, an oscillating object on passing through its 
equilibrium position was very often thought to be experiencing the largest force. It was 
quite inconceivable to many that a moving object could have no force acting on it. 
v)Constant motion requires a constant force. 
This is another very prevalent intuitive belief found to be held by many, from children to 
in-service teachers (Lawson, 1984). This result has been consistently elicited by various 
methods: for example by interviews (Gilbert, Watts & Osborne, 1985), pencil-and-paper 
tests (Sjoberg & Lie, 1981), laboratory tasks and computer simulations (Langford and 
Zollman, 1982). The laboratory task method of elicitation was especially illuminating. 
Lawson (1984) asked students to make a relatively massive, almost friction-free puck move 
in a straight line with steady speed by blowing it with air from a hose. The students could 
try one or more of four procedures: constant blast, steadily decreasing blast, a series of 
20 
PROBLEM 1 
PROBLEM 3 
PROBLEM 2 
PROBLEM 4 
short blasts or a single short blast. Only half of the students did it correctly at the first trial, 
though many corrected it on the second trial. However, there were some who persisted 
with blowing the puck with a constant force in the direction of the motion, and could not 
understand why they were not successful. 
2.2.2 Force and Animacy 
Many students tend to associate the ability to exert force with objects that are alive, and 
found it very difficult to conceptualize 'passive forces', for example, reaction forces of 
tables or chairs on other objects that exert forces on them. This difficulty has been reported 
by Driver (1973) and Minstrell (1982). 
2.2.3 Force and Momentum 
The words force and momentum have been found to be used interchangeably by children, 
and Sutton (1980) has pointed out that the current scientific meaning for the word 'force' 
was only adopted sometime in the nineteenth century. This difficulty with terms can also be 
related to a belief similar to the medieval 'impetus theory' of motion: An object will 
continue moving in its original manner until the initial 'force' that set it in motion is used up 
(Clement, 1982). 
Another very interesting finding (McCloskey, Caramazza & Green, 1980) was that many 
students believed that an object following a curved path somehow 'remembers' the 
curvature of the track and continues to move in curvilinear motion after emerging from a 
curved tube or after a string holding it is being cut. (fig. 2.3) It was as if the students 
believed that the moving object possessed some kind of 'curvilinear momentum'. 
These four line drawings were given on an examination. Three of the drawings represent horizontal curved tubes; 
the fourth is of a ball attached to a string and whirled in a circle overhead. 
Fig.2.3 Question on curvilinear motion: Trace the trajectory the ball would follow after 
leaving tube (1-3), or after string is cut (4). (Caramazza, McCloskey & Green, 1981) 
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2.2.4 Kinematics 
Very often, the difficulties with dynamical concepts are compounded by difficulties with 
kinematics. Piaget (1970 a, b) was probably the first to look into children's conceptions of 
time, distance and speed. He found that children often confuse the notions of speed and 
displacement, and the concept of speed as a coordination of space with time was not 
reached by most children until quite late in their development. Furthermore, speed is a more 
fundamental concept than time for young children. Trowbridge and McDermott (1980, 
1981) carried out a detailed project to investigate university students' understanding of the 
concepts 'speed' and 'acceleration'. They carried out individual demonstration interviews 
to assess students' abilities to interpret simple motions of real objects. The principal 
conceptual difficulty with speed was the inability to discriminate between displacement and 
speed, and many thought that two objects with the same displacement had to have the same 
speed, at least at that instant. Problems with acceleration were much more numerous, 
including confusion between position and acceleration, between velocity and acceleration, 
between velocity and change of velocity. Many students failed to associate a particular 
instantaneous velocity with a particular instant, and they tended to neglect the time intervals 
during which changes in velocity took place. 
2.2.5 Gravity 
There is confusion over the exact meaning of the word 'gravity'. Jagger (1985) pointed out 
that inconsistencies can be found even in a dictionary as respectable as the Concise Oxford 
Dictionary. There gravity was defined first as 'the acceleration due to the gravitational field' 
which should then be the same for all objects irrespective of mass, and secondly as 'the 
force resulting from this acceleration' which should then depend on the mass of the body 
concerned. Similar confusions can be found in students (Gunstone and White, 1981). A 
number of other investigations (Watts, 1982; Champagne, Klopfer & Anderson, 1980; 
Stead & Osborne, 1981) into children's reasoning about falling objects disclosed the 
following prominent intuitive beliefs about gravitation and free fall: 
i) Gravity needs a medium and there is no gravity in a vacuum, 
ii) Things are heavier (or lighter) the higher up they are, 
(iii) 	 Heavier objects fall faster. 
The above list of common intuitive conceptions/misconceptions in the area of mechanics, 
though by no means exhaustive, represent the most dominant phenomenological patterns 
found. Any attempt to produce an adequate theory of how such reasonings may come about 
needs to take them into consideration. 
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2.3 Wider contexts - psychological and philosophical roots of 
the concern 
The increase in attention paid to pupils' wrong ideas by researchers in science education 
was accompanied by a parallel change in attitude towards such ideas: there was an apparent 
'respect' or 'value' attached to children's ideas per se. At least two factors contributed to 
the provision of an intellectual climate for this change: changes in philosophy of science 
and in psychology. 
In psychology, behaviourism, which emphasized the passivity of the mind, lost its hold on 
cognitive theorists after the war. Piaget (e.g.1954, 1970c), in his work on genetic 
epistemology, provided ample evidence that children were actively trying to make sense of 
the world around them, actively constructing their own understanding of the surroundings, 
right from birth. The processes of assimilation and accommodation are the processes 
leading to cognitive development in the individual due to varying degrees of dissonance 
between physical reality and their own constructions. Piaget's life-long ambition was "to 
explain knowledge, and in particular scientific knowledge, on the basis of its history, its 
sociogenesis, and especially the psychological origins of the notions and operations upon 
which it is based"(1970c). As such, he was concerned with the search for fundamental 
logico-mathematical structures that were supposed to provide the cognitive basis for 
scientific development. 
Kelly, in his Personal Construct Theory (1955), used the metaphor of person-as-scientist 
and suggested that we are all scientists of a sort from a very young age in that we create or 
invent our own constructs to understand the world. 
This shift of attention to the active processing of sensory input and the person's active 
construction of his/her own understanding, as well as a search for deep cognitive structures 
that may form the basis of our cognition, is found not only in psychology. In the field of 
linguistics, two different approaches have been adopted in searching for deep structures in 
the understanding and production of language. Chomsky(1965) looked at the problem as 
essentially one of syntax and developed the theory of transformational generative grammar. 
Fillmore(1968) held that the basis of natural language understanding in humans is 
essentially one of semantics and developed the approach called case grammar. In cognitive 
science, one of the major foci is to look for possible basic forms of memory structure that 
can cope with the processing of information and learning. Rumelhart and Norman's work 
(1985) is an interesting example. In the field of artificial intelligence, especially in the areas 
of machine learning and natural language processing, the search for basic structures of 
cognition is also a very important theme. 
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In philosophy of science, there has been a general weakening of the empirical-inductivist 
tradition which holds that true discoveries can be made by inductive generalization from 
carefully made unprejudiced observations. Current philosophical perspectives (e.g. 
Polanyi, 1958; Popper, 1972; Kuhn, 1970; Lakatos, 1970; Feyerabend, 1978) no longer 
believe that existing scientific models are 'final'. There are doubts about the nature of 
'truth', 'objectivity' and 'reality' and a strong tendency to view scientific theories as 
constructions of the human mind. The following quotation exemplifies such a position: 
"Science is not just a collection of laws, a catalogue of facts, it is a 
creation of the human mind with its freely invented ideas and concepts. 
Physical theories try to form a picture of reality and to establish its 
connections with the wide world of sense impressions." 
(Einstein & Infeld, 1938) 
Furthermore, the development of scientific knowledge is less often seen as an individual 
enterprise. Paradigmatic changes take place as an outcome of the cumulative efforts of the 
scientific community. The social institutions of science are seen as having important roles 
to play in the development of the sciences. They are the mediators of scientific knowledge 
and tend to influence what is considered a problem in a given tradition. They focus on 
opinions, appraisals and criticisms. They structure the socialization of young scientists and 
provide organized outlets for the announcement and evaluation of innovations by way of 
conferences and publications. 
Thus on the one hand there is a recognition of the tentative nature of the status of our 
present scientific knowledge that scientific theories are also constructions of the human 
mind. On the other hand there is the growth of mistrust in the value of what science can 
offer, seeing that its misuse can lead to so much human misery. 
Another major development in philosophy which has a more indirect influence on research 
in the area under review, but is nonetheless extremely important, is the work on 
phenomenology which started with Husserl (1913) and Heidegger (1926). As Dreyfus 
pointed out (in Magee, 1987), Husserl's claim that the foundation of all human 
understanding is in the directedness of mental content marked a culmination of the 
Cartesian tradition which sees the fundamental human situation as that of a subject in a 
world of objects. Heidegger reacted against this strong Cartesian viewpoint and proposed 
an entirely different view of this problem which Magee (1987, p.258) describes as follows: 
"How do we as subjects gain knowledge of the objects that constitute 
the world? ... Can such knowledge ever be certain? ... Now Heidegger is 
saying that these questions are fundamentally misconceived ... it [is] a 
profound misconception to regard them as being the most important 
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questions. Primarily, in our most characteristic modes of being, we 
humans are not subjects, spectators, observers, separated by an 
invisible plate-glass window from the world of objects in which we find 
ourselves. We are not detached from some external reality which is 
'out-there', trying to relate to it. On the contrary, we are part and parcel 
of it all, and from the very beginning we are in amongst it all, being in 
it, coping with it. ... We are beings in amongst and inseparable from a 
world of being, existences in an existing world, and it is from there that 
we start." 
In Heidegger's conception, there are different modes of operation in man's daily activities, 
the most fundamental of which is that of the coping being, as described above. Then there 
is the level which man, the problem solver and rational animal, the mode of operation 
characteristic of the Husserlian subject, directing his/her mental attention to specific aspects 
of the external world. There is also a level where man deals with the predicates and laws of 
science, but this would be at third remove from the level of everyday coping. Thus 
scientific theory, which can explain context-free causal relations very well, could not be 
expected to explain the everyday meaningful world of significance that Heidegger 
describes. 
This phenomenological perspective has had a strong influence on many branches of 
contemporary thought. An important example is Alfred Schutz's work in developing a 
phenomenology of social reality, attempting to give an account of the foundations of the 
social sciences. Schutz's thought is well summarized in his posthumously published work 
"The Structures of the Life World" (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973). He started his thesis with 
the following statements: 
"The sciences that would interpret and explain human action and 
thought must begin with a description of the foundational structures of 
what is prescientific, the reality which seems self-evident to men 
remaining within the natural attitude. This reality is the everyday life-
world. It is the province of reality in which man continuously 
participates in ways which are at once inevitable and patterned." 
This reality of the everyday life-world, according to Schutz, is characterized not only by the 
taken-for-grantedness of the natural attitude but also its intersubjective foundations. The 
everyday life-world is not a private world, but rather, the world of our common 
experience, much of our knowledge of which is social and contextual. As Zaner 
(translator's note, Schutz & Luckmann, 1973) pointed out, "Knowledge and society are 
recognized by Schutz as deeply interwoven. .... the reality of the everyday life-world is a 
social reality, it possesses social structures of relevance into which everyone is born, and in 
which he lives, and 'grows older' with his fellow-men. The child in his first interaction 
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with others is included in a reciprocal motivational context with structures of relevance 
(goals, means, attitudes) that have been socially delineated and are 'taken-for-granted'." 
The phenomenological view of knowledge has made important impacts on educational 
research both in terms of the formulation of research perspectives as well as methodology, 
for example, the work of Marton and the Goteborg group (Gibbs, 1982; Marton, 1981). 
Such developments present a serious challenge to the realist tradition in the philosophy of 
science and to the traditional view of learning as a quantitative process, consequently 
producing important impacts on those involved in science and science education. Against 
the psychological background of increasing concern over the learner's own constructions, 
researchers on children's ideas differ along the dimension of 'respect' for the wrong ideas 
found in the learner. 
At one end of the spectrum there are those who draw a strong parallel between children's 
constructions and those of a scientist (Driver, 1983), allotting the status of 'children's 
science' to such ideas (Gilbert, Osborne & Fensham, 1982; Osborne & Freyberg, 1985). 
Because many of the intuitive ideas about natural phenomena held by children have been 
found to coincide with some of the ideas that appeared at various stages of scientific 
development, especially in the domain of mechanics, some researchers have drawn strong 
parallels between the two (e.g. DiSessa (1982) referred to children's ideas as Aristotelian, 
and McCloskey (1983) found strong similarities between students' intuitive ideas and the 
'impetus theory'). Such a position was usually justified with reference to the non-final 
character of scientific ideas. 
At the other end there are those who maintain that these ideas are misconceptions which 
arise mainly due to inadequacies in the learner's history of experience, and in the 
instruction which would be needed for the formation of coherent scientific concepts 
(McClelland, 1985). 
Those currently working in the area of research into children's ideas in science are 
predominantly within the 'constructivist' tradition, giving due respect to children's ideas on 
grounds of personal validity. However, there are still important differences within this 
group as to the status to be given to children's constructions. Though both science and our 
stock of commonsense knowledge of the world are seen as socially constructed bodies of 
knowledge, some hold that there are fundamental differences between the cognitive 
activities of the scientist and that of the child (e.g. Ogborn, 1987). To call children's ideas 
'children's science' is to obliterate this difference which may not be helpful towards our 
understanding of the phenomena to be studied. The epistemological difference between 
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science and commonsense knowledge (which is deemed to have the same origins as 
children's ideas) is discussed in the following section. 
2.4 Epistemological differences between Science and 
Commonsense 
Given that both the natural environment and social forces are at work in shaping the 
development of scientific knowledge as well as commonsense ones, what distinguishes one 
type of knowledge from the other? In what sense can we say that scientific knowledge is 
superior to commonsense? The way any research in children's ideas is organized and 
perceived is very much affected by the positions taken by the researcher with respect to 
these questions. Thus an attempt is made in this section to present the epistemological 
issues as they will be understood in this thesis. 
2.4.1 A difference in purpose. 
A common sense construction of the world consists of a set of dependable expectations, 
self-evidences concerning what everyone ought to know about the common and basic 
activities of everyday life. These are to ensure dependable anticipation in matters of human 
action and to insure against unanticipated surprise. It thus has a basically pragmatic 
concern. In this respect, it is very similar to what Schutz and Luckmann (1973) described 
as the world of everyday life: 
"The world of everyday life is ... man's fundamental and paramount 
reality. 	  the everyday life-world is to be understood as that province 
of reality which the wide-awake and normal adult simply takes for 
granted in the attitude of common sense. By this taken-for-grantedness, 
we designate everything which we experience as unquestionable; every 
state of affairs is for us unproblematic until further notice." 
Scientific activity on the other hand looks for a complete systematic theory of the world 
which can stand the most stringent test against reality. This aim largely derives from the 
metaphysical commitments of scientists, and from the purpose of scientific activity, which 
is the advancement of scientific knowledge as a whole. 
The very different outlook taken by scientists is exemplified in the following quotation 
from Einstein and Infeld (1938): 
"With the help of physical theories we try to find our way through the 
maze of observed facts, to order and understand the world of our sense 
impressions. We want the observed facts to follow logically from our 
concept of reality. Without the belief that it is possible to grasp reality 
with our theoretical constructions, without the belief in the inner 
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harmony of our world, there can be no science. This belief is and always 
will remain the fundamental motive for all scientific creation." 
Although the concept of reality may not be the same for different scientists, yet in all of 
them lie strong metaphysical commitments to this reality. Moreover, there is a strong 
commitment to a belief in 'the inner harmony', beauty and simplicity of our world and a 
strong desire to discover more about this physical reality. Polanyi (1958) called this 
scientific passion which "serves as a guide in the assessment of what is of higher and 
what of lesser interest; what is great in science, and what relatively slight", and argued that 
any process of enquiry unguided by such passions would inevitably fall into trivialities. 
The scientists' vision of reality, to which their sense of scientific beauty responds, suggest 
to them the kind of questions that may be reasonable and interesting to explore. It is such 
intellectual commitments that give rise to the distinctively uncommon ways in which 
scientists go about enquiring about the world around us. While we may be surprised to find 
in children's ideas myriad understandings of physical phenomena very different from the 
accepted scientific view, it is the latter and the process by which it has come to be regarded 
as such that is really uncommon, amazing and difficult to understand (Ogborn, 1987). 
2.4.2 A sociological perspective 
Because of the distinctly different purposes served by these two types of knowledge, the 
kinds of social influences in the shaping of such knowledge are quite different. 
In our non-problematic functioning in our everyday life-world, we require our own 
conception of this reality to be not a private conception but an intersubjective reality shared 
by our fellow men. The fundamental structure of this reality must be shared. We also have 
to take for granted that the significance of this everyday life-world is fundamentally the 
same for everyone in order that a common frame of interpretation is possible. This is the 
only way in which a common, communicative world can be constituted. And it is in this 
sense that the province of things belonging to the outer world is also social for us. 
Our stock of commonsense knowledge has to be non-critical by definition. In some sense, 
it develops as a result of a collusion, and indeed this is necessary to allow us to operate 
effectively in our daily business. The origin of such knowledge is diverse: besides personal 
experience, it may be derived from folklore, myths, literature, religion, morals, etc. This 
allows us to pass on the stock of life-world knowledge not only from person to person, but 
also from generation to generation through society's cultural heritage. As cultures can 
differ, the actual contents of commonsense knowledge can also differ from culture to 
culture. Another characteristic of commonsense knowledge is that a lot of this knowledge is 
tacit, and is unexposed for conscious examination. Even in those areas where this know- 
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ledge is expressible using our common language, indeterminacy is a prominent feature of 
the expression. According to Nagel (1961), there are typically two types of language 
indeterminacy in this area: (i) the terms in ordinary speech may be quite vague in the class 
of things designated and not sharply and clearly demarcated from the class of things not so 
designated (for example, water may be used to refer to a whole range of different compo-
sitions of liquids), (ii) the range of presumed validity for statements employing such terms 
usually do not have determinate limits. 
Thus, because of the social role of commonsense knowledge and its pragmatic purpose, it 
is very difficult to alter commonsense radically. This, coupled with the indeterminacy in 
everyday language, makes it very difficult to challenge commonsense ideas. 
Science, on the other hand, has developed entirely different characteristics in its pursuit of 
models of reality which give a unified systematic picture capable of accounting for a whole 
range of seemingly unrelated phenomena as well as predicting unknown phenomena and 
directing further inquiry into the world around us. Scientific activity is characterized by its 
continual conscious critical examination and testing of its own claims. This criticalness is 
not only found in the scientist as an individual, but largely reinforced by the scientific 
community. All the claims as well as the assumptions and procedures have to be made 
public and explicit. Nothing will be taken for granted, any new finding has to be 
repeatable, and new theories have to stand up to all conceivable challenges before they can 
be accepted. The establishment of a paradigm is a long and arduous process, resulting from 
the concerted critical effort of a whole community of scientists. 
The criticalness required in the development of science is facilitated by its use of formal 
representations and precision in the use of language. The use of formalism serves as a 
device to reduce vagueness, to be used both as a tool to think with, as well as a language 
for communication within the scientific community. By being very precise, statements 
become capable of more thorough and critical testing. By making claims explicit and 
specific, scientific theories are more exposed to challenges and refutations. This need for 
precision leads to very different meanings being attached to words which are common to 
both science and ordinary language. As Oppenheimer (1954) very clearly pointed out: 
"Often the very fact that the words of science are the same as those of 
our common life and tongue can be more misleading than enlightening, 
more frustrating to understanding than recognizably technical jargon. 
For the words of science .... have been given a refinement, a precision, 
and in the end a wholly altered meaning." 
Oppenheimer (1954), p.3. 
This problem of language is thus also a major difficulty which science teachers face. 
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2.4.3 Structural Differences 
Nagel (1961) suggested distinguishing scientific laws into two types: experimental laws 
and theories. The former are basically empirical findings proposed and asserted as 
inductive generalizations. Scientific theories, e.g. the kinetic theory of matter, are often 
concerned with entities which are not observable, eg. molecules. Theories are not arrived at 
by induction from experimental data, but by relating the abstract terms used to observable 
phenomena, explanations being logical deductions from the premises/axioms of the theory. 
Thus theories are fallible and experimental laws would persist. However, the former are 
much more powerful tools with which to describe and understand the world. In a 
scientist's mental conception, the most general comprehensive theory has the highest 
priority and the hierarchy of theories forms the foundational basis of his reasoning. 
It would be unreasonable not to expect some sort of structure in the organization of 
commonsense knowledge, but it remains a problem how much structure to expect. Larkin 
(1983) has found some interesting differences in problet,n solving behaviours between 
experts and novices. The main differences seem to be related to the use of different problem 
representations. Novices use what she called a naive problem representation, composed of 
objects that exist in the real world with solutions attempted by using operators that 
correspond to developments that occur in real time. Experts were found to construct a 
second mental representation, which Larkin termed 'physical', containing fictitious, 
imagined entities such as forces and momenta. Such a finding would be an expected 
consequence of structural differences between scientists' knowledge and common sense 
knowledge. 
2.5 Children's Ideas and the History of Science 
Many of the intuitive ideas about natural phenomena held by children have been found to 
coincide with ideas that appeared at various stages of scientific development. The 
comparison between children's ideas and pre-classical mechanical ideas is one that has been 
most widely noted. DiSessa(1982) and Whitaker (1983) referred to children's ideas as 
Aristotelian, while McCloskey (1983) found strong similarities between student's intuitive 
ideas and the 'impetus theory'. 
2.5.1 Comparison with the Aristotelian View 
The ideas often labelled as Aristotelian are: (i) that motion needs a force and (ii) that motion 
takes place along the direction of the force. However, this is as far as the similarity goes. 
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The most important argument against such labelling lies in the fundamental difference in the 
nature of the two sets of ideas. Children's ideas are intuitive ideas normally held tacitly for 
pragmatic purposes. The Aristotelian conception, on the other hand, was a well thought 
out, explicit set of arguments that ties into the wider context of the Aristotelian world view, 
providing support for a whole philosophy. The distinguishing characteristics of the 
Aristotelian conception of motion according to Wartofsky (1968) are: 
i) The provision of a consistent framework which orders everything in the world - hence 
the definition of a natural place for all things (the ground) leading to the division of 
motion into 'non-violent' ones which move towards this natural place and motions that 
go against this natural order which need 'violent' forces. 
ii) The employment of mathematical tools - a reliance on Euclidean geometry as a formal 
language. 
iii) The whole conception of motion is not only explicit but is a formal system in itself. For 
example the term velocity was carefully defined using the language of Euclidean 
geometry. 
Actually, Aristotle's dynamical views could almost be derived from his cosmology - the 
view that the terrestrial realm consists of four concentric spheres each with its particular 
properties. 
2.5.2 Features common to the Impetus Theory 
McCloskey (1983) argued for strong similarities between children's ideas and Medieval 
'impetus theory'. The main ideas in common are: 
i) Motion needs a cause to be found inside the moving body. When a mover sets an 
object in motion, he implants something into it (labelled 'impetus' by impetus theorists 
like Buridan and very often labelled 'force' by children) enabling the object to move in 
the direction in which the mover starts it. 
ii) Motion stops as this 'impetus' or 'force' gradually dissipates. 
iii) This 'impetus' can be increased or supplied by external agents. 
These modes of reasoning do seem to account for a large number of the departures of the 
children's ideas from the classical view. 
2.5.3 Reservations about the use of historical labels 
As discussed above, parallels can be drawn between children's ideas of motion and those 
held by philosophers and theorists in the past. Yet there are reservations against the use of 
historical labels for children's intuitive ideas of motion. 
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First of all, the historical ideas were serious, systematic attempts at developing a theory of 
motion, whereas children's ideas are just intuitive beliefs about how things are, held tacitly 
and not explicitly exposed. One example is the idea of different kinds of impetus for 
different types of motion, which do not exist in intuitive ideas of motion (Saltiel & Viennot, 
1985). 
Secondly, both the Aristotelian view and the impetus theory are very much guided by an 
overall philosophy. There is no evidence that children hold philosophical stance of the 
theorists with whom they are identified. 
2.5.4 What can we learn from comparisons with past theories? 
Comparison studies always end up with a set of similarities and a set of differences. If we 
wish to look at the differences, it may be interesting to find out why children's ideas seem 
to coincide more with the medieval impetus theory of motion than with the Aristotelian 
view. If we leave the differences aside, there are striking similarities in the conception of 
motion in the Aristotelian view, in impetus theory, and in children's conceptions of motion. 
An investigation into such similarities might offer clues to where the major conceptual 
difficulties lie. 
One major recurrent theme is that rest and motion are completely distinct states. It is related 
to the idea that motion needs a cause. As Gilbert and Zylbersztajn (1985) have described, a 
major difficulty in children's learning of classical mechanics lies in the counter-intuitive 
Newtonian concept of uniform motion and rest as being on the same ontological level. 
'Force' seems to be the single most frequently used term to describe something that is 
salient in affecting motion. 'Force' may be ascribed as external to the moving object. But 
there is also a tendency to ascribe the ability to move as coming from an internal 
characteristic - a 'force residing in the moving object'. The use of the same term 'force' to 
stand for these two different notions is reflected even in Newton's Principia (1687) -
'impressed force' used to stand for what we now call force acting on something and 'innate 
force' used to stand for the notion of linear momentum (Saltiel & Viennot, 1985). The term 
'force' was also attached to the notions of kinetic energy and potential energy as these were 
slowly worked out by scientists after Newton, and continued to be used even within the 
scientific community long after these concepts had been painfully worked out and defined. 
2.5.5 Fallacy of the children-as-scientist metaphor 
It seems inappropriate to compare children's ideas or constructions too closely with 
scientists' activities. We find that there is no exact parallel between children's ideas and 
past scientific theories. More importantly, science is a sophisticated human activity 
demanding a host of formal abilities as well as the adoption of an entirely different 
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epistemology. DiSessa (1984) gave an interesting account of how the learning process may 
differ as a result of the different epistemologies adopted by the students. Bliss, Morrison & 
Ogborn (1988) while reporting on a longitudinal study of development of dynamics 
concepts in secondary school students in which they found that some of the students' 
informal ideas changed but some persisted, and also suggested that the difficulties the 
children face in changing some of those concepts have deeper roots. The Newtonian view 
of force and motion involves a complete imaginative reconstruction of concepts of motion, 
not merely seeing motion as it is seen by another person. Evading or neglecting these 
issues would be a serious mistake if we intend to tackle the problem of why learning 
science is difficult. 
2.6 Theoretical Frameworks of this area of Research 
2.6.1 Status of children's conceptions 
Two dimensions serve to locate the large numbers of studies of children's conceptions of 
various topics in science. One is the interpretation of the nature of the phenomena and the 
status given to such conceptions by the researcher. As indicated previously, there are those 
who see the unorthodox ideas as just wrong, as mistakes in the learning process (Helm, 
1980, McClelland, 1985). However, this perspective is not shared by the bulk of 
researchers in this area of study who are all broadly classifiable as constructivists. The 
second dimension is the kinds of the research questions asked. 
2.6.2 Kinds of research questions asked 
Some researchers explore the problem within the context of science teaching, while others 
see it as related to human cognition in general. The former are engaged in two main kinds 
of investigation: identification of the various conceptions held by students in specific 
domains, and studies of models of conceptual change and of possible teaching strategies to 
bring about desired changes. By contrast, those involved in the latter kind of study 
generally believe that children's conceptions in science are in fact specific instances of 
much more general modes and structures of cognition, and see their main task as to identify 
such structures. Thus this kind of study is much more influenced by the school of 
cognition to which the researchers subscribe. Few researches in this category are empirical 
explorations into ways of promoting conceptual change, though various psychological 
schools of cognition hold implicit views on how this might be achieved. 
2.62.1 Identification of domain specific conceptions and units of analysis employed 
Studies aiming at identifying domain specific conceptions may differ from one another in 
the kind of entity they are ultimately interested in and this affects the approach taken in the 
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analysis of data. Gilbert and Watts (1983) made a comprehensive review of the different 
approaches used in the analysis of data obtained by various methods of elicitation of 
children's ideas done within this context. They propose to differentiate between three 
levels of analysis. 
The first level was that of describing "personalized theorizing and hypothesizing of 
individuals" and the label 'conception' was given for this level of analysis. They further 
proposed that "conceptions are accessed by the actions (linguistic and non-linguistic, 
verbal and non-verbal) of the person, often in response to particular questions". This level 
of analysis is normally employed in the context of case studies (e.g. Hewson, 1980) which 
have the merit of being able to gain rich data about a specific case, but are limited in 
generalizability. 
The second level of analysis is the construction of "groupings of responses which are 
construed as having similar intended meanings" and which represent an interpretation of 
statements at a functional level. This includes analyses like Osborne's (1980) categorization 
of one-line statements from interviews and Engel's (1982) categorization of students' 
answers to a particular question. This level of analysis attempts to generalize beyond the 
individual, but is complicated by the fact that a particular response may be arrived at via 
very different modes of thinking (Engel, 1982; Gilbert & Pope, 1982). 
The third level of analysis is at the level of 'frameworks', or "short summary descriptions 
that attempt to capture both the explicit responses made and the construed intentions behind 
them". These are second order constructions, "thematic interpretations of data, stylized, 
mild caricatures of the responses made by students", and are thus generalizations across 
individuals as well as across different contexts. Examples of such frameworks include 
propositional statements capturing some aspects of children's reasoning (e.g. constant 
motion requires a constant force) and descriptions of attributes given to certain entities or 
scientific terms (e.g. a reflection is an image on a mirror or surface). Driver, Guesne and 
Tiberghien (1985) suggested relating the analysis with the elements of information stored in 
the long term memory and called such elements or groups of elements 'schemes'. 
As yet, there is no consensus as to the appropriate level of analysis, though there is a trend 
towards identifying frameworks rather than analyzing data at the first two levels. However, 
it is not clear what suffices to establish a framework. A related problem is the absence of a 
general formalism for the representation or presentation of children's ideas. Results from 
empirical research are normally presented in the form of aspects of the children's ideas as 
inferred from the interviews and exemplified by quotations. There is generally no explicit 
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mention of the level or kind of analysis adopted; indeed different levels of analysis are 
sometimes intermingled. 
2.61.2 Instructional design and promoting conceptual change 
Most of the work in this area adopts a notion of cognitive conflict in their intervention/ 
teaching strategies. It generally begins by encouraging students to make explicit their 
views and understanding of the domain. The teaching stage is aimed at heightening 
students' awareness of different possible ways of looking at the domain, raising doubts 
about their own conceptions and hopefully showing the superiority of the accepted 
scientific view, employing strategies like Socratic dialogues (which might include doing 
experiments) (e.g. Nussbaum & Novick, 1981; Champagne, Gunstone & Klopfer, 1985), 
or working in computer-based learning environments (e.g. diSessa, 1982; White, 1984). 
Some of this work makes little explicit reference to a psychological model of learning (e.g. 
Nussbaum, 1985). Others have a clear commitment to a particular model of learning and 
intervention (e.g. Rowell & Dawson, 1983; Cosgrove & Osborne, 1985; Hewson, 1981). 
Results of intervention have been very mixed. As Duit (1987) pointed out, a great 
"breakthrough" is not yet in sight. 
2.6.2.3 Identification of deeper structures of cognitive processing 
As mentioned above, some work identifies possible general cognitive structures underlying 
conceptions. Some is undertaken by those whose main interest is in developing general 
theories of cognition, seeing science as an area potentially providing rich ground for 
exploration. Others have moved in this direction from a starting point nearer to the first 
position. Many have pointed out the need for a deeper level of analysis, and for some 
theoretical constructs to provide a more comprehensive description of responses to various 
questions/situations, and predictive explanatory power. 
2.6.2.3.1 A common sense theory of motion. Ogborn (1985) proposed to look for a 
'theory of the content of alternative conceptions' in mechanics to 'provide a consistent 
integrated framework, more general than a set of rules about particular cases, which could 
hope to explain the relationships between situations and responses, and to account in a 
uniform way for the various conceptions of motion that researchers have characterized.' 
Such a theory was seen as a formalized version of commonsense, following the spirit of a 
theory of naive physics put forward by Hayes (1979). The theory was not to be taken as 
describing deviant or mistaken ideas, but rather as reflecting the basic nature of intuitive 
conceptions of motion. 
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Tests of such a theory might be an assessment of the descriptive adequacy of the theory as 
an account of a range of known conceptions, or its ability to generate acceptable (by 
commonsense standards) explanations of motions. 
Two further levels of explanation were suggested to be necessary. One level was a 
'physical' one, showing how organisms living in a Newtonian world can have experiences 
that would lead naturally to their developing a non-Newtonian theory of motion. The 
second was a 'psychological' one, explaining the existence of the theory in people's minds 
in terms of a deeper level of mental functioning. 
2.6.2.3.2 Duplication schemes or Prototypes. Guidoni (1985) also proposed 
investigating 'natural thinking'. The proposed sketch is different from Ogborn's in that it 
made explicit assumptions about what kind of mental representation this type of 'natural 
thinking' is supposed to take. Another point of departure was that Guidoni held the view 
that 'a person's natural-thinking system is not a "coherent theory about the world", and if 
we try to interact with it as if it were, we shall deceive ourselves'. 
'Natural thinking' refers to the 'background' complex mental functioning that is always 
going on, inseparable from any specialized (e.g. scientific) thinking. Its function is in 
'driving behaviour within a context according to a purpose' and it is achieved through a 
'schematized duplication of the context, the purpose, and of their features which 
allows for off- and on-line efficient control of that fit, between subjective purpose and 
objective context'. Such a 'radical schematization process' is supposed to be at the root 
of our knowledge structures. The ideal structure of a resulting 'duplication scheme' or 
'prototype' should be such that it is able to incorporate the maximum number of repetitive 
features which can be handled with the minimum attention, and at the same time be so 
structured as to make meaningful 'variables' salient and to hide those which are not. It 
should also contain basic blocks which allow for easy combination and structuring so as to 
permit the handling of increasing complexity. 
Guidoni further proposed that in 'natural thinking', analogical reasoning is the basic 
reasoning strategy. A theory of 'natural thinking' should 'seek out keys to mechanisms 
which might yield patterns or correlations' and provide insight into processes of conceptual 
change. 
2.6.2.3.3 Mental models. Gentner and Gentner (1983) are also concerned about deeper 
cognitive structures, exploring the conceptual role of analogy. Analogical comparisons, 
sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit, abound in people's descriptions of complex 
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systems. The problem was: are they thinking in terms of analogies, or merely borrowing 
language from one domain as a convenient way of talking? They describe their 
'generative analogy hypothesis' in which analogies play the role of structure mapping, 
with the source domain providing a structural relationship between different elements 
which can be used for the target domain. An experiment designed to test this view is 
discussed in the next chapter. 
2.6.2.3.4 Experiential gestalt of causation. Andersson (1986) again reiterated the need 
to find a deeper cognitive basis for understanding pupils' reasoning. He proposed the 
existence of a common core to pupils' explanations and predictions in such widely differing 
areas as temperature and heat, electricity, optics and mechanics. He called this core the 
experiential gestalt of causation, an analysis inspired by Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) work 
on language and metaphor. 
According to Lakoff and Johnson, causation as a gestalt starts to be constructed at a very 
early stage. A feature common to many actions is that there is an agent which directly, with 
its own body, or indirectly, with the help of an instrument, affects an object. This 
causation gestalt also embraces related experiential generalizations such as: that the greater 
the effort by the agent, the bigger the effect on the object; that different objects resist to 
different degrees; that several agents have a greater effect than just one; and that the nearer 
the agent, the greater the effect. Andersson tries to demonstrate, using examples from a 
variety of areas in science, that many of the alternative frameworks can be explained as 
attempts to employ this experiential gestalt of causation in understanding phenomena in 
diverse areas. 
2.6.2.3.5 Phenomenological primitives - a matter of cognitive priority. DiSessa (1983, 
1985) also tries to look for general cognitive structures that are employed by novices in 
their intuitive interpretation of phenomena across different subject domains. He sought for 
small units of structure as the fundamental building bricks of cognition, which he called 
phenomenological primitives, or p-prims for short. Examples of p-prims given include 
springiness, dying away, and 'Ohm's p-prim' which postulated the relation of effect of 
effort exerted by agent to resistance encountered. 
Like Guidoni, he argues against the 'Theory theory' interpretation of children's 
conceptions, contending that children's intuitive conceptions are fundamentally fragmented 
systems, and that it is wrong to attribute theory-like status to them. He further suggests 
that the most important difference between novices and experts are not at the level of 
content but at the level of the extent and kind of systematicity in the knowledge system. 
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One important feature of diSessa's work is his commitment to the belief that children's 
intuitive conceptions are necessary starting ground for continual growth and development 
toward scientific conceptions, thus differing from the dominant view that conceptual 
conflict is the key to development. Learning was perceived as an "evolution along the 
dimension of selecting some naively recognizable phenomena for more systematic and 
general application as knowledge structures". 
2.6.2.4 Arguments against searching for general cognitive structures 
Despite these various attempts, there is no concensus that a search for more general 
cognitive structures is necessarily a positive direction to follow. 
Viennot (1985) instead proposes a much more pragmatic line of approach. She suggests 
looking for regularities in different kinds of students' productions (verbal or non-verbal 
responses to questions/situations) and inferring from them elements of mental 
organization. However, instead of looking for a single integrated framework to account for 
all sorts of conceptions in a content domain, the units of structure looked for need only be 
some sort of correlational description between situations and responses. According to 
Viennot, a set of regularities can be "explained" by different sets of "underlying reasons" or 
"mediators" and there is no clear set of criteria that can be used to decide between such 
alternatives. For example the incorrect response in fig. 2.4 may be explained by : 
i)students reasoning as if motion implies a force, ii) students employing a "spring" 
metaphor (or mediator) in reasoning - pushing on the spring (firing engine) changes its 
state, and releasing the spring (stopping engine) restores it to its original state, or, iii) 
students employing a "swimming" metaphor in reasoning - the initial motion being like a 
swimmer drifting in a river and the firing of engine evoking the idea that the "swimmer" 
now swims. 
a. The problem (Clement 1982) : 
A rocket is moving along sideways in deep space, with it engine off, from point A to point B. It is not near any 
planets or other outside forces. Its engine is tired at point B and is left on for 2 seconds while the rocket travels 
to some mist C. 
(a) Draw in the snap* of the path from B to C (show your best guess for this proolem even it you are unsure 
of the answer). 
(b) Show the path from point C after the engine at turned on. on Me same drawing. 
b. Comm and incorrect answers to rocket °cubism. 
Fig. 2.4 Rocket problem together with the correct answer and a typical incorrect answer. 
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Viennot thus argues that whether the metaphors chosen should be purely phenomenological 
accounts of a regularity or whether they should have explanatory power was deemed to be 
difficult to answer and anyway not easy to distinguish. A pragmatic attitude was taken by 
Viennot in this: "let us give up trying to sort out what cannot be distinguished, and let us 
speak simply of more or less useful 'mediators'. 
Arguments along a similar vein are proposed by Solomon et. al. (1985). They suggest that 
the personal constructions of students are better seen as an extension of a familiar life-
world way of thinking requiring neither abstract concepts nor consistency rather than as a 
scientific kind of construction. They propose that pupils do not realize the demands for 
consistent explanation made by the scientific way of thinking, and that they just pick 
whatever they want from the available stock of socially acquired knowledge in different 
situations. However, the effect of the child's own cognitive development on the kind of 
selection made from available knowledge, and how far children will attempt to weld 
together pieces of the social stock of knowledge into a more coherent generalized world 
picture, require further empirical investigation. 
2.6.3 Deep structures - what are they like? 
From the foregoing survey, there are several pertinent features common to nearly all of 
these proposals: 
i) A call for taking children's ideas seriously in their own right and not as a curious 
deviation from orthodox scientific ideas. Thus a level of description of children's ideas 
in their own terms and not in comparison with scientific terms or concepts is aimed at. 
ii) There is a general reference to some kind of relationship between children's ideas and 
commonsense or life-world knowledge. 
iii) A few of the accounts explore the nature of possible 'deep structures' with a view to 
the kind of mental/memory representation that may be at the root of our cognitive 
functioning. 
iv) Some of the accounts point to the desirability of the deep structures to provide for a 
mechanism for conceptual change. A search for deep structures should thus preferably 
be carried out with some possible learning mechanisms in mind. 
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2.8 Where does the present research stand? 
The author shares the same belief, as many others in this area do, that children's intuitive 
conceptions in science are not simply mistakes but represent outcomes of positive 
endeavors of children trying to make sense of the physical world around them. Further, 
this phenomenon is to be seen as part of a wider, more general issue in learning, and it is 
certainly possible that more general cognitive structures underlie people's intuitive 
reasonings in widely different subject domains. However, what is not clear is the 
interpretation of evidence. Most of the empirical work to date has been gathered as 
responses to specific tasks or problems and the analyses tend to highlight the prominent 
deviations from the accepted scientific views. Thus whether the intuitive conceptions do 
form a 'theory' or not has so far been a matter of conjecture without conclusive evidence 
either way. Further, because the data were gathered as on-task or spontaneous responses 
of the subjects, the higher level general conceptions are necessarily second or third level 
constructions by the researchers concerned. 
The research questions here are: 
How would students describe their intuitive knowledge about a certain subject 
domain if they are not confined by specific problem or task contexts? 
Would they come up with an intuitive 'theory' or just fragmented pieces of ideas? 
If one succeeds in identifying such conceptions, what cognitive role do these play 
in the daily processing of information? 
Further, would the students' descriptions of their intuitive knowledge be affected 
by the amount of science instruction they receive in class? 
Can any 'evolutionary' difference amongst different students' productions be 
detected? 
The research questions formulated above evidently present problems of finding a suitable 
methodology for the investigation. This will be discussed in the chapter on research 
methods. Mechanics was chosen as the subject area for investigation because this was the 
best researched area, and one in which there is evidence that people have developed a rich 
stock of intuitive knowledge. 
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Ch. 3. LEARNING, KNOWLEDGE AND 
REPRESENTATION 
3.1 Learning 
Anyone in science education wanting to deal seriously with the problem of children's ideas 
will very soon come up against the questions: How do we learn? How is it possible for 
anyone to learn new things or to change strongly held ideas? One's views on these 
questions determine to a large extent the kind of questions asked, the actual research design 
and analysis for any research in children's conceptions in science. This synopsis does not 
purport to be a complete review of the works of major theorists in this area, but rather tries 
to document the author's personal understanding of the issues concerned, as this represents 
a major dimension of the theoretical framework underpinning this piece of research. 
The word 'learning' here carries a broad reference to all learning that may take place and 
not just learning in a school context. Thus this includes both the case of informal learning 
as an individual in the everyday context, as well as learning as a social enterprise, with 
scientific development as one of its branches. 
This review begins by introducing briefly some major schools of thought on learning as an 
epistemological problem. However, as the main purpose of the review is to clarify the 
theoretical foundations relevant to the research, discussion is restricted mainly to 
perspectives that might be broadly labelled as 'constructivist'. The idea of classifying 
learning into various types will then be discussed. Finally some views on how conceptual 
changes may be effected through metaphors (including similes, analogies and models) will 
be presented. 
3.1.1 The Meno Paradox - How can we learn anything new? 
You argue that a man cannot enquire either about that which he knows 
or about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has no need 
to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not know the very subject 
about which he is to enquire. 
Plato, Meno 80E; Jowett translation 
(quoted from Petrie, 1979) 
This age old problem of how people could ever learn anything that they did not know 
before has troubled humanity ever since Plato wrote his famous paradox, and is in no way 
settled as yet. 
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The main issue at stake is how knowledge is related to experience - whether all our 
knowledge comes from experience or just that knowledge comes with experience. One 
school of thought which can be broadly labelled as rationalist (or structuralist) believes, in 
some sense, that all our knowledge is essentially a priori or innate. Plato's solution to this 
problem is a classic example of the rationalist view. He believed that the soul has gone 
through many lives and in so doing has seen all things, though it has forgotten them. Thus 
learning is just a matter of the person recollecting what he has already known before, and 
teaching then is appropriately a process of reminding. Though probably no one would 
now accept Plato's view in toto, the belief in innate knowledge is still shared by many. 
Experience is essentially seen as the occasion for our coming to know something but not as 
where we directly derive our knowledge. 
The empiricist camp, on the other hand, believe that all our knowledge comes from 
repeated exposure to experiences of a similar kind - learning by some kind of induction. 
The process itself is relatively mechanical as the repetition at one stage is thought of as 
sufficient for the development of the next. To borrow the analogy of tabula rasa as 
Hamlyn (1978) used it to describe the empiricist view, 'the growth of experience is a 
function of indentations of a given kind on the wax, so that the mind is structured 
according to the predominant role given to the deepest and therefore most prominent 
indentations'. 
Though very few of us may be classified as entirely rationalist or empiricist, the sort of 
position we take up along the dimension of this dichotomy does very much affect the way 
we think about the very nature of the research involved in explorations into learning. 
Indeed, the way cognitive theorists go about their investigations into the processes of 
learning are implicitly governed by their views on this epistemological problem. To use 
Hamlyn's (1978) characterization, the empiricist stand represents a view of learning as 
genesis without structure, and the rationalist stand represents a view of learning as structure 
without genesis. Skinner and Chomsky respectively represent these two different camps 
while Piaget might be described as taking up a middle position. 
Skinner believes that all behaviour, including verbal behaviour, is learnt through building 
up linkages between items of experience, by a process which he called operant 
conditioning. This brand of conditioning works like other brands of conditioning but 
differs in that instead of the stimulus-response link being reinforced, it is the reward-
operant link. 
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Chomsky, a linguist who sees himself in relation to rationalists like Descartes and Leibniz, 
was interested in constructing models of human linguistic competence and thereby to 
specify the 'universals' of language. He held that 'the environment per se has no structure, 
or at least none that is directly assimilable by the organism. All laws of order, whether 
they are biological, cognitive or linguistic, come from inside, and order is imposed upon 
the perceptual world, not derived from it.' (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1979). Thus he was 
convinced that language is represented in the mind in an extremely abstract fashion, in so 
called linguistic deep structures, and claimed that human inheritance specifies, or at least 
highly constrains, the rules of syntax that a child could invent. 
If we use structure and genesis as criteria for the characterisation of any epistemological 
stance, then Piaget saw the process of learning as genesis with structure. For anyone who 
would not want to accept that we have any knowledge that is innate, and at the same time is 
not satisfied with the haphazardness of association as the basis of our cognition, then 
he/she is faced with the problem of trying to explain how progressively more complicated 
structures can be built up through experience. Piaget, in his work on genetic 
epistemology, tried to build up an account of human learning as a building up of the 
necessary structures at each stage of development, with each stage providing the necessary 
structures for a subsequent stage, and the stages happening in a necessary order. Thus 
Piaget (1970c) described his own stance as follows: 
'... for the genetic epistemologist, knowledge results from continuous 
construction, since in each act of understanding, some degree of 
invention is involved; in development, the passage from one stage to 
the next is always characterized by the formation of new structures 
which did not exist before, either in the external world or in the 
subject's mind.' 
'Genetic Epistemology', p.77 
Though different cognitive psychologists have different theories of what the learning 
process is like, those that have come to be identified as constructivists share the same views 
as Piaget on the following: (i) learning is an active attempt of the individual to make sense 
of the world around him, (ii) every individual possesses the ability to build up more 
complicated knowledge structures from his interactions with the environment and his 
existing knowledge structures. 
3.1.2 Types of Learning 
We are learning new things every day, and most of the learning we do is quite 
unproblematic as well as uninteresting. I learn that the electricity charges will be raised 
next month, or that the telephone district code for my district has just been changed. We 
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take in new information all the time, and much of it we do not find difficulty in learning. 
On the other hand, there are a lot of things I find very difficult to learn, and some I may not 
be able to master at all within my whole lifetime: I don't know how to ski, I took a few 
French lessons and then dropped out, and high energy physics is (so far) beyond me. It 
would be reasonable to say that learning tasks do differ in their levels of difficulty and it 
would be helpful to examine what characterizes such differences. 
According to Piaget's (1975) latest model of learning, equilibration plays a central role in a 
person's cognitive development (or 'self-regulation' of human knowing). According to 
this theory (see Furth, 1981, 253-283), equilibration regulates the cognitive 'cycles' and 
keeps them in more or less permanent balance(equilibrium). It operates through the dual 
processes of assimilation and accommodation: during an individual's encounters with the 
environment, there is always a tendency for the individual to assimilate where and when it 
is possible by means of available cognitive schemes, and at the same time, for the schemes 
to accommodate, to make modifications in response to the specific situation. Thus schemes 
assimilate content, at the same time and considered from the other direction, schemes 
accommodate to content. Knowledge then has bi-directional tendencies: the outgoing 
direction is accommodation which assures contact with the world and thus defines the 
object of knowledge; the inward direction is assimilation which indicates the regulatory 
function through which this contact is organized and coordinated and defines the subject of 
knowledge. This prescribes a radical view of knowledge as a relational concept, relating 
the subject to the object and encompasses a truly constructive interaction between the two. 
In Piaget's model of equilibration, assimilation and accommodation, though opposed in 
direction, do not function against each other, but rather necessarily go together. 
Accommodation does not always mean the permanent change of a scheme in response to 
external pressure and may very well be an episodic adjustMent of the same scheme to the 
constantly changing contents to which it is applied. Undoubtedly, assimilation and 
accommodation do contribute to developmental changes of schemes. His latest version of 
the model hypothesized that such development is made via three types of regulated balance, 
or 'knowing cycles': within-scheme, between-scheme and totality cycles. The within-
scheme cycle considers the knowing act in its present interaction and is essentially 
concerned with positive-negative regulation, what the object is and what it is not, in the 
subject-object relation. The between-scheme cycle concerns scheme differentiation and has 
to do partly with object knowledge and partly with subject knowledge. The totality cycle 
focuses on integration of differentiated parts into structured wholes. It derives from subject 
knowledge but is abstracted. At the formal stage, this regulation is context-free. The 
whole theory is very complicated and it is not appropriate here to go into it in any detail. 
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However, a relevant point to our discussion here is that Piaget sees cognitive development 
as the building up of more comprehensive and abstract knowledge structures. 
A relatively new approach to the study of cognition is the information processing approach. 
Again, it would be inappropriate to go into great detail about it here. It suffices to say that 
the development of this branch of cognitive psychology is stimulated by developments in 
information technology, and benefited from the opportunity to test theories by machine 
implementation. Though the success of any machine implementation of a psychological 
model in no way guarantees the psychological validity of the model proposed, it does 
provide a method of testing its plausibility. Even more important in the author's opinion is 
that, for the exploitation of machine implementation, a microscopic level of analysis is 
required. The psychologist has to deal with detailed contents of the memory as well as a 
detailed account of how the particular cognitive mechanism under investigation proceeds 
and how it affects the memory. Thus it is not surprising that a variety of formalisms for the 
representation of knowledge in long term memory have been developed in recent years by 
various information processing psychologists. Such formalisms also provide us with a 
more expressive language to describe knowledge structures. 
Two information processing psychologists, Rumelhart and Norman (1978), proposed to 
differentiate between three modes of learning: accretion, tuning and restructuring. They 
used the phrase 'knowledge modules' (KM) (Norman 1978) as a neutral name for the units 
of memory structure so that their argument for the three modes of learning does not rely 
upon the particular knowledge representation formalism chosen. Norman (1978) defined 
the three modes as follows: 
"... accretion is simply the addition of of new information either within 
or guided by existing structures. There are two ways accretion might 
occur. First an existing KM may have incomplete structures (amounting 
to unfilled arguments or unspecified arguments or unfilled slots). 
Accretion in this case is simply acquiring the appropriate information 
to fill out the existing KM structure. Second, new knowledge may be 
guided by an existing KM. Thus an existing KM acts as a prototype 
module for the construction of a new KM. 
	
[Restructuring] is often characterized by new insight into the 
structure of the topic. .... if accretion is knowledge acquisition, 
restructuring is knowledge understanding. .... there need be no formal 
addition of knowledge by the student during restructuring. 
	 [For] tuning, the proper KMs and concepts are assumed to be 
present, but the structures need to be refined. Unnecessary 
computation needs to be eliminated, unnecessary variables need to be 
replaced with particular values. Some information that was previously 
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computed or inferred is stored directly. Thus, during tuning, many 
(thousands) of special cases are acquired as specialized KMs" 
It can be seen that Rumelhart & Norman do not focus on a progression in generality as the 
main criterion for learning, as Piaget does, but look at the kinds of structural change that 
take place. Accretion is the normal kind of fact learning, including our daily accumulation 
of information. The acquisition of memories of the day's events, the learning of lists, 
dates, names, telephone numbers are examples of learning through accretion. There are no 
structural changes in the information-processing system itself. 
Tuning is a more significant kind of learning through which we gain skill and proficiency 
in the performance of certain tasks. It requires more than just an addition to the database. 
It involves continual tuning (or minor modification) of the knowledge structures to bring 
them more into congruence with the functional demands placed on these structures. 
Improvement in typing speed and increase in proficiency in solving a particular class of 
problems are examples of tuning. 
Restructuring is by far the most significant and difficult process and is necessary for the 
learning of complex material, usually requiring a time scale of years to achieve. Through 
this process new structures are created. Once the appropriate structures exist, the learner 
may be said to "understand" the material. 
Learning 
Accretion 
Matching the new information with 
the previously available schemata. 
Adding to the data base of 
knowledge, but according to the 
principles contained within existing 
schemata. 
Restructuring 
When new information does not fit 
currently available schemata, or 
when the organization of existing 
data structures is not satisfactory, 
existing schemata must be 
restructured. 
Schema tuning 
Adjusting the terms to 
improve accuracy 
improve generalizability 
improve specificity 
determine default values 
Schema creation 
Patterned generation 
building new schemata based 
upon the patterns of the old 
Induction 
building new schemata by 
combining recurring patterns 
of old 
Fig.3.1 A classification of the mechanisms by which learning might occur (Rumelhart & 
Norman, 1978) 
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From the point of view of research into children's ideas in science, restructuring seems to 
be the most important aspect. Indeed, many researchers in this field acknowledge that there 
needs to be a fundamental change in the cognitive structure of the learner in order to 
dispose of misconceptions. It is important to point out here that Rumelhart and Norman do 
not see these three processes as entirely separate events, and very often all three processes 
may coexist, although one process may be dominant at any one time. 
3.1.3 Mechanisms of learning at a contextual level 
The foregoing section discusses learning from a general perspective. The kind of learning 
that is of most interest as well as relevance to the issue of children's intuitive conceptions in 
science would probably be at the level of Piaget's totality cycle or Rumelhart and Norman's 
restructuring. However, the issue about learning here is not so much a matter of general 
development but how a particular knowledge structure changes into a radically different 
one. There is a need to describe and analyse cognitive structures and their development at a 
much more microscopic and concrete level. Thus the problem of learning is not 
investigated from a Piagetian perspective and the nature of cognitive structures assumed is 
quite different. Piaget was interested in looking for the basic cognitive structures that are 
necessary for a person to be capable of the logico-mathematical activities that are required to 
carry out scientific investigations, and the temporal order in which they appear. Research in 
the field of genetic epistemology has made important contributions to our understanding of 
human cognition, probably having the most pervasive impact too. On the other hand, as 
Bliss (1986) pointed out, the limitation of Piaget's description of cognitive structures at the 
formal stage to operational schemes alone, (without domain specific references), coupled 
with the fact that the formalisms employed (propositional logic, lattice theory, etc.) are only 
capable of expressing static states rather than dynamic aspects of cognition, makes it 
difficult to be of direct use to the task at hand. 
A major strand of development that warrants our attention in looking at the possible 
mechanisms for the genesis of specific knowledge structures is work in the area of 
metaphors (or analogies) as instruments for cognitive change. Those who claim the 
cognitive importance of metaphors use it as a broad label to encompass similes, analogies 
and models as well. They vary in their views on whether metaphors are the only means for 
creating new cognitive structures. Rumelhart and Norman (1978) suggested that there are 
logically only two ways for forming new schemas: (i) a new schema can be patterned on an 
old one, consisting of a copy with modifications, (ii) it can be formed by induction from 
co-occurring configurations of schemata. The former was labelled patterned generation and 
the latter schema induction. Though they see schema induction as a possible mechanism for 
schema creation, they believed that most learning takes place through creation of new 
schemas by patterned generation. This is in fact very similar to Schank's (1986) idea of 
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creating new knowledge structures through 'pattern-based explanation' when one fails to 
find rules or beliefs that explain a given event, and this is done through attempting to find 
rules from some other domains that might fit the case at hand. Petrie (1979) also made a 
strong claim for the case of metaphors - "the very possibility of learning something 
radically new can only be understood by presupposing the operation of something very 
much like metaphors". 
To understand the cognitive role of metaphors better, it might be helpful for us to first 
examine a characterisation of metaphors from the linguistic perspective. Black (1962) made 
a distinction between the principal subject and the subsidiary subject in a metaphor. The 
principal subject is the subject (or context) of the discussion and the subsidiary subject is 
the subject (or context) from which reference is drawn. Black also identified two elements 
in a metaphor: a focus and a frame. For example, for the sentence "the chairman ploughed 
through the discussion", the principal subject is the discussion and the subsidiary subject is 
farming, the word "plough" would be the focus and the discussion is the frame. Thus the 
'frame' is the principal subject and the focus is the particular aspect(s) of the subsidiary 
subject to be focussed on. Metaphors may be used purely for stylistic reasons, and as 
condensed similes, so that the metaphor replaces an equivalent literal comparison. Black 
(1962) argued however that the richest and most interesting form of metaphor operates at 
the interaction level. This 'interaction view' of a metaphor holds that "the metaphor 
selects, emphasizes, suppresses and organizes features of the principal subject by implying 
statements about it that normally apply to the subsidiary subject". 
Petrie (1979) was interested in metaphors as learning tools and identified their most 
interesting feature to be "the use of a familiar rule-governed device for dealing with the 
material to be learned in ways which require the bending or even breaking of the familiar 
rules.... It provides a mechanism for changing our modes of representing the world in 
thought and language." 
Gentner and Gentner (1983) adopted an information processing approach to the 
investigation of the cognitive role of analogies. They gave a more detailed description of 
analogies in terms of knowledge structures. Analogies were defined as 'structure-
mappings between complex systems'. An analogy would convey that the relations that 
hold among the objects in the base domain (the known domain) can be applied in the 
target domain (the domain of inquiry). A structure mapping asserts that identical 
operations and relationships hold among non-identical things. The relational structure is 
preserved, but not the objects nor their properties. 
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Though the perspectives taken by each of the views mentioned above are not exactly the 
same, they all see metaphors as using the structural relationships in one context to structure 
an understanding of the second context. 
3.1.4 Metaphors and education 
If metaphors or patterned generations play a central role in the generation of new 
knowledge structures, then they should also figure prominently in teaching situations. 
According to Petrie (1979), this is the case and he elaborated on the mechanisms involved. 
A new schema may be produced by the use of metaphors through the process of 
'accommodation of anomaly'. This process depends very much on one important 
characteristic of metaphors: the understanding of metaphors, be it comparative or 
interactive, depends on the presupposed cognitive scheme. The same metaphor can be 
either comparative or interactive, depending on the understanding of the person trying to 
make sense of it. "The atom is a miniature solar system" is probably a comparative 
metaphor to the science teacher because s/he can recognise the similarities between the two 
systems. However, to a student just starting to learn about the atomic structure, in order 
for the metaphor to be successful, it has to be interactive. In fact, the metaphor in this case 
creates the similarity for the student. This is the same as Black's (1962) assertion that 'it 
is more illuminating 
	
 to say that the metaphor creates the similarity than to say that it 
formulates some similarity antecedently existing'. 
Thus, in Petrie's view, learning something radically new starts when a teacher makes a 
statement (understood by the student as an assertion) in the form of a metaphor, and the 
student lacks a cognitive structure sufficient to recognise it as a comparative one. In this 
case the assertion would be seen to be false if only the literal meanings are taken, and this 
creates an anomaly so great that it cannot be assimilated into the student's existing cognitive 
structure. The student may then modify his or her cognitive structure by focusing on the 
literal aspects of the subsidiary domain and slowly working out which are the aspects 
which do apply and which do not. Thus, through this process, new structures may be built 
by modelling on existing ones, breaking and modifying some of the features that do not 
apply. 
Petrie also attributed the creation of new knowledge structures in the growth of science to 
scientists' search for new metaphors or models in order to resolve the anomalies created 
when problems cannot be solved by the current paradigms. The main difference he saw 
between the scientist on the frontiers of knowledge and the student is that in the student's 
case the metaphor is provided by the teacher and so is more likely to be immediately helpful 
than the variants tried out by the scientist. 
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Gentner and Gentner (1983), adopting an information processing formalism for the repre-
sentation of metaphors, made the concept of new schema generation even more specific. In 
their structure-mapping definition of metaphors, both the base and target domains are 
viewed as systems of objects and predicates. Predicates are either relationships between 
objects or attributes of the objects. To create a new schema, the learner starts with the 
known base domain and maps the object nodes (objects represented at the nodes of a 
structural representation of the knowledge structure) of the base domain to the object nodes 
of the target domain. After setting up this correspondence of nodes, the analogy conveys 
that the relationships that hold between the nodes in the base domain also hold between the 
nodes in the target domain. This can be illustrated by the following structural representa-
tion (fig.3.2) of the analogy between the solar system and an atom. 
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Fig. 3.2 Representations of knowledge about the solar system and the hydrogen atom, 
showing partial identity in the relational structure between the two domains. (Gentner & 
Gentner, 1983, p.103) 
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There are two basic principles to be observed in Gentner and Gentner's model of schema 
creation : 
i) Preservation of relationships - it is only relationships existing in the base that have a 
high probability of being transferred to the target. Attributes tend to have very low 
probability of transfer. 
ii) Systematicity - Since interconstraining relations are particularly important in explana-
tory analogy, a relation that is dominated by a potentially higher-order relation is more 
likely to be transferred to the target system than an isolated relation. 
In the same paper they also reported on an experimental investigation to look for obser-
vational evidence that analogies do have genuine effects on a person's conceptions of a 
domain. Basically, they wanted to look for evidence that a person's reasoning in the target 
domain is genuinely affected by the analogical model they adopts, and is not just used as a 
linguistic shorthand. Thus they need to find observational evidence that cannot be derived 
from the surface features of the analogies. The domain they chose was simple electric 
circuits and the analogies they used were two commonly used analogies in teaching: the 
hydraulic model and the moving objects model. They predicted that people using the 
hydraulic model should find it easier to deal with circuit problems involving parallel 
batteries whereas those using the moving crowds model should find it easier to deal with 
problems involving parallel resistors. Their results showed systematic differences in the 
patterns of inferences in the target domain as predicted. Since such differences cannot be 
attributed to shallow verbal associations, their results do give support to the view that the 
analogies we use do affect our understanding of the domain of study. 
3.2 Learning and Knowledge Representation 
The nature of the present research is essentially one of knowledge elicitation, trying to 
explore how intuitive conceptions about motion are actually structured. The issue of 
knowledge representation arises in at least two contexts: the medium for representation of 
knowledge during the elicitation process as well as the representation used in the analysis 
of data. In fact a particular choice of representation formalism would largely determine the 
kinds of research methodologies employed. The main part of the knowledge elicitation in 
this research is done through the building of expert systems in Prolog by students, and it is 
essentially that the theoretical assumptions as well as implications in using first order logic 
(on which the programming language Prolog is built) for representation, and the effects of 
translating intuitive knowledge into a declarative program are examined. An awareness of 
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the broad kinds of formalisms available for knowledge representation, what they were 
designed for and their underpinning psychological assumptions, would also be helpful in 
the development of a formalism for representation in the final analysis. The review is not 
to justify the formalisms employed in this research in the sense that they are the best (and 
indeed the criteria for the best is arguable and dependent on the context of use), but to find 
out which are the resources available that could reasonably be employed. 
3.2.1 Knowledge Representations used in science education research 
In discussing the problem of knowledge representation, one important issue that needs 
clarification is the locus of the knowledge that is to be presented: is it the domain 
knowledge as a body of public knowledge for an established discipline, or is it the private 
understanding of certain individuals in a certain domain area as a psychological entity? 
Some of the problems faced by these two kinds of representations would be quite different, 
and it is the latter type that is more difficult and complex. The main problem here is that 
public knowledge tends to be much better defined and accessible whereas private 
understanding tends to be idiosyncratic and illusive. Another difficulty is the criteria for 
choice of appropriate representations. For representation of public knowledge in a certain 
discipline, it is easier to judge whether a certain representation is suitable by finding out 
whether it serves a particular purpose, e.g. solving certain kinds of problems. For 
representation of private knowledge, how such representations could be utilized is 
debatable, and the issue of assessment is even more difficult. 
3.2.1.1 broad categorizations - a third order perspective 
Attempts to represent children's intuitive conceptions in science broadly fall into two 
categories. Many of the first investigations into children's conceptions tend to broadly 
categorize the elicited conceptions according to representative viewpoints, prominent 
characteristics, or certain dimensions of the knowledge structures. These are third order 
perspectives in the sense that they are the researchers' categorizations on their 
interpretations of what the students' conceptual structures are like. In all such cases, an 
important justification for the categorization is the compelling need for reduction of data, to 
produce a generalised, manageable and meaningful reduction of the data by trying to 
encapsulate the essential features of the conceptual structures. Necessarily, how such 
reduction should best be done depends largely on the assumed characteristics of cognitive 
structures, which in turn are determined largely by the underpinning psychological model 
adopted. 
White (1985) proposed reducing interview protocols into nine 'dimensions' of cognitive 
structure: extent, precision, internal consistency, accord with reality or generally accepted 
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truth, variety of types of element, variety of topics, shape or form of organization of 
cognitive structure, ratio of internal to external associations and availability of knowledge. 
This proposal was based on a static model of cognitive structure developed by Gagne and 
White (1978). 
Whilst White's proposal focused mainly on the contents and properties of the knowledge 
elements, Pines (1985) proposed analysing cognitive structures in terms of a taxonomy of 
conceptual relations, which gave sole consideration to the kinds of relation existing 
between knowledge elements. His thesis for the value of such a taxonomy is that it 
emphasizes the primacy of relations in all meaning and this is justified because symbolic 
relations play a central role in human cognition. Pines illustrated his idea by giving 
examples of how two powerful conceptual relations: set-element relationships and whole-
part relationships can be used to explain a lot of the domain knowledge in biology as well 
as in some areas of human knowledge. This is an admirable attempt and is similar to 
efforts of some computer scientists in their attempt to develop knowledge representation 
languages for the construction of computational models of intelligent behaviour. However, 
this task is dauntingly formidable: whilst the task of developing a language for representing 
well-defined domain knowledge for computational purposes is still a major research issue 
in the area of artificial intelligence, the apparent idiosyncracy of knowledge in everday 
cognition makes one doubt whether it is possible, at least theoretically, to reduce all of 
human cognition to a few basic conceptual relations. The ultimate success of such an 
attempt would depend very much on whether commonsense conceptions essentially form 
hierarchically structured and logical systems. 
Many of the data reductions made by researchers in the analysis of data about children's 
conceptions in science tend to be less bound to particular psychological models, and are 
focussed at highlighting the actual viewpoints typically found in a group of respondents. 
For example, Gunstone and Watts (1985) identified five distinctive types of understanding 
concerning the use of the word 'force'. The categories developed from the interview data 
were intended to encapsulate the main ideas found in the form of 'conceptual frameworks'. 
This kind of categorization is helpful in providing an overview of the main conceptual 
viewpoints for a particular population group. 
Data reduction is important and useful in any kind of research, and research in the area of 
children's conceptions is no exception. However, it is very often insufficient to just 
represent or report on third order perspectives without giving due attention to the second 
order perspectives - the individual subject's actual conceptual structures as perceived by the 
researcher. These are important for several reasons. First of all, there are very often rich 
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and subtle differences between individual's conceptions belonging to the same category. 
Such differences would be even more important if we want to investigate the evolution of 
ideas: how some students have managed to change their intuitive conceptions into more 
scientific ones whilst others have not, all starting from roughly similar conceptions. 
Secondly, research attempts differ from one another in terms of techniques employed, 
dimensions of categorization as well as in the actual categorization elements developed. It 
is sometimes very difficult to understand the rationale and value for a particular 
categorization without gaining access to the actual conceptual structures that the researcher 
generalized on. 
3.2.12 Representations preserving knowledge elements and structure 
Some of the work in the area of children's conceptions in science tried to explore ways of 
representing children's knowledge so that both the contents of the knowledge elements and 
the relations between them are preserved. Some tried to elicit the conceptual structures by 
asking students to draw a concept map of their own ideas (e.g. Novak et al., 1983), while 
others (e.g. West et al., 1985) tried to work out the structure used by students from 
interview protocols. One of the main difficulties in developing such knowledge structures 
is in providing for 'conceptual anchors' to initiate the knowledge elicitation process, and 
most of the research in this category start off from textbook knowledge of the domain that 
the students have to learn and may thus not be able to represent how the individual actually 
think about problems in that domain in a spontaneousfuituitive context. 
Bliss, Monk & Ogborn (1983) developed a relatively context free knowledge representation 
formalism for the presentation of qualitative data that may also be employed in representing 
children's knowledge. 
If we ignore the problem of elicitation for the moment and focus on the problem of 
representation formalism, much of the work in this area is inspired by developments in 
artificial intelligence and language research. It is helpful to review briefly the main types of 
knowledge representation formalisms. 
3.2.2 Some knowledge representation formalisms 
The advent of digital computers presented the possibility of creating mechanical models of 
the mind. By treating all information processing, human and otherwise, as a formal system 
that can be studied without reference to the physics or biology of the system carrying them 
out, computation offers a powerful metaphor for thinking about human cognitive 
processes. This computational metaphor is also the main theoretical basis of cognitive 
science, a newly developed discipline trying to understand cognitive phenomena, which 
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views the human mind as a complex system that receives, stores, retrieves, transforms, and 
transmits information (Stillings et al., 1987). 
In the context of knowledge representation, though we can see two perspectives for the 
problem: "What kind of representation do people use?" and "What kind of representation is 
best for machine intelligence" (Winograd, 1975), there is as yet no clear distinction 
between these two questions. 
Representational formalisms were first developed to deal with representation at the concept 
and sentence levels, and these can all be classified as semantic type representations. 
Subsequently, there was pressure for development of formalisms that can provide for better 
mechanisms for structuring of concepts, and for supra-sentential structuring of knowledge 
to cope with complex tasks. The ensuing two sections will discuss briefly these two broad 
classes of representation formalisms. 
3.2 2.1 Semantic nets type representations 
Knowledge representation formalisms started as networks of nodes with linking lines (or 
links for short). Though more and more sophisticated formalisms are continually being 
evolved, and some of them do not look like networks anymore, they can still be viewed as 
consisting of nodes and links, only that the nodes and links themselves have acquired more 
complicated structures. This is the only feature that is common between all the various 
formalisms that have evolved; whilst the actual semantics of the formalism, that is, what the 
nodes and links represent are different from formalism to formalism. 
The idea of a semantic network representation for human knowledge is generally 
acknowledged to have originated from Quillian's work (1967,1968) to build a semantic 
memory model of the human long term memory. The focus of the representation was on 
word concepts. This network model has two important features: a superclass-subclass 
taxonomic hierarchy and the description of properties for each class deriving from the two 
link types, one indicating a "subclass" relationship and another indicating a "modifies" 
relation. Thus properties true of a class are assumed true of all its subclasses except for the 
modifications. Consequently, the superclass chain extending upwards from a concept 
embodied all properties true of that concept. These features lead to the notion of inheritance 
of properties in a semantic net (see fig. 3.3 for details). The plausibility of a hierarchical 
model for human memory seemed to be supported by results of reaction time studies 
(Collins and Quillian, 1970). 
Fillmore's work on linguistic case structure (1968) helped network development to focus 
attention onto a particular class of concepts - verbs, thereby stimulating developments for 
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Fig. 3.3 A simple semantic network, chosen so as to illustrate the use of inheritance. 
(Rumelhart & Norman, 1985, pp.25) 
the unit of knowledge representation to be raised to the level of a sentence. An example of 
network formalism that incorporated case structures was that of the LNR group (Rumelhart 
and Norman, 1973). It can be seen from fig. 3.4 that links coming out from the verbs 
were all case pointers. This was an attempt towards defining a limited set of unambiguous 
link types. 
rSHORT-TERM MEMORY 
SEE 
ACT 
	
< ) 	 
L 	  
	  GIRL 
WITH 
THE 
> TELESCOPE 
1 
YOU 
AGENT 
Fig. 3.4 A semantic network representation of the sentence "I see the girl with the 
telescope". The links coming out from the verbs are all "case pointers". (Rumelhart 
& Norman, 1973,pp.456) 
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Further developments in semantic net type representations include the search for knowledge 
primitives (e.g. Schank's conceptual dependency representation, 1973), and the search for 
a logically adequate formalism (e.g. Schubert & Cercone's propositional network, 1975). 
32.22 Higher level units of knowledge structuring 
So far, the representations discussed were at the lexical and sentential level and no 
provisions were made to express the relationships between such small units of knowledge 
as larger chunks, nor knowledge at the supra-sentential level (Rumelhart and Norman, 
1985). Furthermore, these earlier notations all employ uniform formats of expression so 
that all link types were at the same level and processed in the same way. Such 
representations prove to be inadequate for the expression and processing of more complex 
knowledge required for more intelligent tasks. This inadequacy is with reference to a 
different level of demand than those discussed above. The nature of this inadequacy was 
clearly expressed by Minsky : 
"It seems to me that the ingredients of most theories both in Artifical Intelligence and in 
Psychology have been on the whole too minute, local, and unstructured to account - either 
practically or phenomenologically - for the effectiveness of common-sense thought. The 
"chunks" of reasoning, language, memory, and perception ought to be larger and more 
structured; their factual and procedural contents must be more intimately connected in order 
to explain the apparent power and speed of mental activities." 
(Minsky, 1981, p.95) 
Several formalisms focussing on higher level units of knowledge were put forward at 
roughly the same time: Minsky's Frames, Rumelhart and Norman's Schema, Schank's 
Script and Abelson's Plan. Though these notations differ in their representational format, 
there were a number of pertinent features common among them. 
Each unit of knowledge at the highest level (with their names as highlighted above) in some 
sense represent the stereotypes of some aspects of the outside world: events, actions and 
sequences of actions, etc. The processing of information was equivalent to finding the unit 
that best fits the incoming information. The configuration of such higher level units 
together form the interpretation of the input. They all share these same features: 
i) These units have variables, which have default values, so as to capture a lot of the 
knowledge which we may term as "experience". Thus each unit may be thought of as a 
packet of information containing variables which may be assumed to take on the default 
values unless specified. 
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ii) Such units can embed, one within another to form bigger and more complex units. 
iii And as a result of the embedding of units, these notations may be used to represent 
knowledge at all levels of abstraction. 
iv These formalisms were developed with a common underlying view of the human 
memory - we have episodic as well as semantic memory. The latter is some sort of 
definitional knowledge of the concepts whereas the former represents the facts and 
relationships we know about those concepts and which may be personal. These higher 
level units were representations of episodic memory more than semantic memory. 
Thus these units in a sense really represent our knowledge as opposed to definitions. 
These higher level units of representation provide a much richer syntax as well as a 
mechanism to deal with information at different levels of specificity. However, the 
specificity of these formalisms bring with them an associated difficulty: to employ such 
formalisms one has to be sure that the nature of the knowledge to be represented is of the 
same type as that which the formalism is designed for. 
3.2.3 Problems of knowledge representation for the present research 
As mentioned in an earlier section, it is hoped that in this research, children's 
commonsense ideas about motion can eventually be analysed in the form of sets of 
metaphors/mental models that they employ in their thinking. Thus it is possible that some 
sort of semantic net or schema/frame type repesentation will be used in the representation of 
the final analysis. However, it is not possible at the outset to pre-determine which 
formalism would be more appropriate, given that the essential features of the knowledge 
structure to be explored is largely unknown. The fact that Prolog programming is used as 
the main activity for eliciting students' ideas requires a formalism for the representation of 
the programs developed. The systemic network notation developed by Bliss, Monk & 
Ogborn (1983) for the representation of qualitative data differs from the formalisms 
reviewed above in that it does not impose any particular node or link type nor structure on 
the knowledge to be represented. It is thus considered to be an appropriate formalism for 
the first level representation of the PROLOG programs developed by the subjects. 
Representations for more structured conceptualizations would probably have to be 
developed on the basis of deeper levels of analysis done on the data collected. 
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CHAPTER 4. METHODS OF ENQUIRY 
4.1 Review of techniques for investigating students' conceptions 
With the growing interest in finding out what the learner knows, in the belief that it has a 
strong relevance to teaching, many techniques have been developed to investigate 
children's conceptions. The development of each technique has been guided by some 
theoretical considerations - mainly psychological. Very often, the purpose of the research 
determines to a large extent the nature of the data collected. What sort of data can be 
collected is as much dependent on the technique chosen as on the aim of the research. 
Thus, before we can sensibly ask the question "What are the strengths and weaknesses in 
each of the different techniques used?", we have to first look at the underlying theoretical 
commitments and the purpose of the investigations they were used for, rather than the 
techniques per se. 
Research methods used for exploring into learners' conceptions can broadly be classified 
into two categories: those that have a clear focus on exploring structural relations in the 
learners' conceptions, and those that do not have such an intention. Different techniques 
have been developed for different purposes in the former category by researchers 
subscribing to three different theoretical traditions, the associationist, Ausubelian and 
information processing approach. Techniques in the second category are used by many in 
the area of research into children's learning in science and it is difficult to classify the 
theoretical frameworks they subscribe to beyond the fact that they are all broadly 
constructivists. The first two sections of this chapter give a review of the main techniques 
in these categories in terms of their respective research interest, and the nature and 
characteristics of the data collected. The final section discusses the main methodological 
considerations in the present research and gives the broad rationale for the actual research 
design. 
4.1.1 Research Methods that Explore into Structural Relations in Learners' 
Conceptions 
Implicit in any research methodology for exploring knowledge structures is the underlying 
assumption of what knowledge structure is, and there is certainly no widely accepted 
definition for knowledge structure. Three psychological inclinations can be identified 
amongst those who have made efforts to define and measure cognitive structure: 
associationist, Ausubelian and information processing approach. 
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4.1.1.1 Techniques to measure structure as strength of association 
For associationists, allegedly derived from the behaviorist school (Stewart, 1980), 
relationships between concepts only differ from each other in terms of the strength of 
association between the concepts, and the nature of such relationships is not an issue for 
consideration. Here, to find out the learner's knowledge structure means to measure the 
'semantic proximity' (Shavelson, 1971) for the concepts to be explored. Furthermore, 
within such a psychological framework, it is not evident that the learner's pre-instructional 
knowledge would have any influence on his/her subsequent learning beyond the fact that 
the semantic proximity of some concepts may not be the same as what would be desired. 
Thus the main motivation for exploring into learner's knowledge structures by this school 
is to answer the question "To what extent does cognitive structure mirror instructional 
content for a given topic area?" 
Different techniques can be employed for measuring semantic proximity, depending on the 
number of pre-defined concepts that is to be explored (Shavelson, 1974). A free word 
association task gives stimulus words to the subject and ask him/her to list related words 
under a given context. A controlled word association task works in a similar way, only 
that the list of related words would be limited to a given number, say 5, thus presetting the 
maximum semantic distance to be explored. In a tree construction task, a subject is given a 
list of concept labels, and directed to pick 2 closest in meaning, connect with a line, label 1, 
continue with remaining labels 2,3,4, etc. until all labels are used up. 
The utility of using semantic proximity as a measure of cognitive structure is very doubtful 
since two different cognitive structures could produce identical or nearly identical responses 
to such tasks (Stewart, 1979). The proximity of concepts does not reveal anything about 
the nature of the meaning in the relationships, nor does it handle inter-relatedness above 
that of a link between two nodes. 
4.1.1.2 Techniques for arriving at a graphic display of cognitive structure 
Techniques to construct graphic representations of learners' knowledge structures have 
been developed by those subscribing to the Ausubelian belief that the "most important 
single factor influencing learning is what the learner already knows" (Ausubel, 1968). 
However, the concern with the starting point of learners here is mainly in relation to the 
structuring and logical prerequisites in the learning of a particular curriculum. The main 
obstacle to learning is seen as the absence of essential conceptual building blocks on which 
the target learning materials are built. Thus investigation normally starts by analyzing the 
school curriculum to find out a logical sequence of concepts to be learnt and how they 
should be related together. Then tasks are set for the learner to compare what s/he knows 
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with what s/he has to learn in terms of conceptual structures. These tasks result in 
declarative representations of the students' knowledge structure in the form of concept 
maps, semantic networks, etc. in which the relations between the concepts are explicitly 
labelled. 
The most popular techniques within this category include the concept relations task and 
concept map (or line labelling) task. The concept relations task asks the subjects to give the 
definitions for a given set of concepts, and then to describe how any pair of concepts can 
be related. The concept map (or line labelling) task is similar to the tree construction task 
described above except that the subjects have to explain the relationship between 2 linked 
concepts. These two are highly structured tasks, confining the exploration to a given set of 
concepts from the school curriculum. A less structured task, clinical interview about 
concrete phenomenon, can also be conducted to ask subjects for descriptions, explanations 
and/or predictions about the phenomenon, and the graphic representation can then be 
constructed by the researcher from the interview protocol. 
Unlike the case of measurement of semantic proximity, techniques in this category do 
provide qualitative data on the nature of the relationship between concepts. However, 
because the elicitation is confined to a set of narrowly focussed concepts, the resulting 
information reveals only the subject's understanding with reference to school curric ar, 
and not understanding in the subject's own terms. Thus it is not clear how realistic the 
elicited model of the subject's knowledge structure is in terms of the subject's actual 
understanding of the particular subject domain investigated. Furthermore, the elicited 
model does not provide information about how this knowledge structure would be used by 
the subject under any particular context. 
Amongst the set of techniques in this category, the extent to which the elicitation is 
confined and structured can be most easily altered for the clinical interviews. This 
technique can thus be modified for use in probing into subjects' intuitive understanding. 
The disadvantage of this technique, however, is that the form of the graphic representation 
of knowledge resulting from an analysis of the interview protocols is very much up to the 
interpretation of the researcher and is much less well-defined. 
4.1.1.3 Techniques for probing into dynamic aspects of knowledge structure: 
organization of knowledge for problem solving 
A very different line of research into knowledge structures is carried out by those 
subscribing to the information processing approach in cognitive psychology. Here, 
analogy is drawn between human intelligent behaviour and the way computers work. The 
analogy is normally not held as a strong psychological position, especially for those 
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engaged in explorations in the area of education. Rather, such an analogy promotes the 
expression and exploration of the human cognitive system as a formal system, and the 
computer can also be used as a medium for testing psychological models of cognition. 
Possibly because computers have conventionally been used for problem solving and 
execution of tasks, most of the explorations into knowledge structures by those subscribing 
to such an analogy is in the area of investigating problem solving behaviour, looking at the 
skills, processes and strategies in the performance of such tasks. 
Verbal data collected from the subjects about the actual cognitive processes going on during 
the problem solving process forms the main source of data for all investigations in this 
category. These are collected either as think aloud protocols while the subject is actually 
performing the problem solving task, or by stimulated recall immediately after the task is 
completed. The latter method of protocol collection has the advantage of eliminating the 
possible disturbance that may arise due to the need to handle the extra talking process while 
performing the task, but the protocol so collected may suffer from being a rationalized 
account of what is thought to have happened on retrospect. Transcripts of the protocols 
collected can then be analyzed to arrive at a plausible process model of the problem solving 
process, comprising i) current knowledge of problem, (ii) actions for developing problem 
representation, and 	 an interpreter for the selection of rules for processing. 
In contrast to the methods of elicitation described in the previous sections, investigations 
into problem solving behaviour yield procedural representations of the subject's 
knowledge, revealing what concepts and how they have been used by the subject in 
arriving at a solution for a particular problem context. In many cases, models of the 
cognitive processes hypothesized to have taken place have been implemented on the 
computer, and the intermediate outputs from the computer compared with the protocols 
collected from subjects during the problem solving process. Such investigations have 
succeeded in showing that experts may not differ from novices in terms of the declarative 
knowledge they possess about the subject domain, but in other aspects. For example 
experts have access to other related knowledge required for arriving at the solution, use 
different representations for problems, and possess search strategies other than a general 
search (Larkin, 1983; Larkin & Rainard, 1984). 
Results from investigations in this category have generally been rigorous and persuasive 
and have provided illuminating insight on some issues, for example why some very hard-
working students still find problem solving difficult. One important limitation of this type 
of investigation is that the elicitation has to be confined narrowly within the context of the 
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problem solving task, and cannot be used for probing intuitive ideas (in declarative format) 
about a broad domain area. 
4.1.2 Methods of exploring into learners' conceptions without focussing 
on structural relations between concepts 
In terms of psychological inclination, those who have investigated into learners' 
conceptions without displaying a clear focus on exploring structural relationships between 
knowledge elements can all be broadly classified as constructivists. They all share the 
common belief that learning is a constructive process involving the active participation of 
the learner, and that the pre-instructional, intuitive ideas held by learners have important 
effects on learning. However, two main research interests can be identified within this 
broad categorization: There are those who use the scientific concepts as reference points 
and try to find out specific instances where intuitive ideas differ from scientific 
conceptions. Others believe in the possession of integrated intuitive/commonsense 
frameworks of understanding by learners about phenomena in a particular domain area. 
They try to find means of probing into learners' understanding in their own terms and are 
thus concerned that the subjects would not be cued into adopting a particular mode of 
reasoning during the course of elicitation. 
A variety of techniques has been used to find out how intuitive ideas depart from scientific 
ones: Carefully designed tests of misconceptions (for example, Viennot, 1979; Sjoberg & 
Lie, 1981) consisting of multiple choice or short questions can be used to show up a 
subject's misconceptions, and these are normally used for confirmatory rather than 
exploratory purposes. Open ended essay tests (for example, Bell, Brook & Driver, 1985) 
asking subjects for explanations of certain phenomena provide a means of exploring 
subjects' understanding, but suffer from the inability to gain interactive feedback from the 
subject and consequently present problems for data interpretation. Clinical interviews 
about instances (Gilbert , Watts & Osborne, 1981) or events (Osborne & Gilbert, 1980) 
can be used to explore subjects' understanding of a scientific term or principle, or their 
reasoning about given phenomena. Such interviews provide rich information on the 
intuitive reasoning employed if well structured and carefully conducted. The main 
disadvantage of these interview techniques is that they prescribe a set of concepts or 
phenomena for the elicitation and may not reflect the actual priorities in everyday reasoning 
contexts. 
Two methods of probing into commonsense reasoning patterns can be identified as having 
made explicit efforts to avoid giving any cues to subjects in the elicitation process: A variant 
of the clinical interview about events, interview about comics (Bliss, Ogborn & Whitelock, 
1990), may be more useful in eliciting intuitive reasoning by asking subjects about events 
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that may not be possible in real life. The repertory grid technique (Fransella & Bannister, 
1977) can also be adopted for exploring intuitive conceptions. Here, a subject is given or 
asked to choose 3 objects and then to choose 2 from the 3 that resemble each other and 
different from the third and to say how they are different. This creates a list of bipolar 
dimensions which reflects the criteria the child is consciously or unconsciously using to 
make sense of the phenomena represented. 
4.1.3 Comparison of the two broad categories of techniques 
It is interesting to note that of the research trying to explore children's ideas in their own 
terms (rather than in contrast with textbook knowledge), relatively few attempts were made 
to explore these conceptions in terms of a coherent conceptual structure. On the other 
hand, most of the work in exploring children's learning of given subject domains, whether 
they be starting from an associationist, information processing or Ausubelian stand, attempt 
to explore the possible knowledge structures of the learner. 
Another notable observation is that all explorations into knowledge structures have adopted 
more directive (suggestive) techniques, trying to find out the learners' knowledge structure 
in relation to given scientific terms and principles in the curriculum, which may not 
necessarily reflect the most crucial aspects of their 'true' understanding. 'True' here refers 
to the degree of spontaneity of that particular structure being employed in their normal 
everyday reasoning. In fact, it is fair to say that all these techniques tend to prescribe a set 
of concepts and then investigate how the learner may possibly relate them under the context 
set by the investigation (but as understood by the learner). 
The above two observations are probably related. As mentioned in the previous chapter on 
knowledge representation, it is much easier to explore knowledge structure starting from 
some ground concepts and much more difficult to evolve into comparable structures 
starting from less structured starting points. 
Within the group of explorations into knowledge structures, research in the area of problem 
solving is particularly interesting. Typical in such research, an explicit, testable model of 
the solver's knowledge, as well as the rules it uses to search for the solution is given. The 
advantage of such an approach offers a unique means of assessing the plausibility of the 
proposed psychological model. Moreover, it provides a relevant, meaningful context for 
the structuring of the concepts for the individual (it is believed that the cognitive structure of 
a person is not static but changing with time as well as with the context). Moreover, the 
interest in metacognitive skills by researchers in this area is well founded. It would be 
interesting to see how such metacognitive skills develop and how they may affect a 
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student's learning. The disadvantage of this approach is that it tends to cue textbook 
knowledge and offers no mechanism for asking about intuitive ideas. 
Techniques employed by researches in children's ideas, on the other hand, have mostly 
adopted more naturalistic approaches to data collection. The most commonly used tech-
nique is clinical interview. This form of data collection is costly in terms of time and thus 
puts severe limits on the possible sample size investigated. The data collected is purely 
qualitative, and is not easy to analyze. Yet this seems to be the most suitable way of 
exploring into the deeper levels of cognitive functioning, especially in terms of common-
sense reasoning. Interview about events seems to offer good potential for exploring into 
how children reason spontaneously about different physical situations, given that it tends to 
go with a more relaxed setting and children tend to feel less on the spot. Another technique, 
the use of a repertory grid, provides another form of probing into children's conceptions. 
One major difference of this method from interview about events is that instead of 
focussing the interviewee's attention on specific aspects of an event, the subject is free to 
choose which aspects s/he wants to talk about. The bipolar dimensions chosen reflect the 
most pertinent aspects of the situations that show up in the person's interpretation of the 
situations. Moreover, the order in which the dimensions are chosen reflects the priority 
unconsciously assigned to these various aspects in the person's reasoning and interpreta-
tion of the situations. Another very important advantage of this technique is that the task is 
free of any judgement about how to respond to the elements from the side of the researcher. 
There can be no right or wrong answer to what sort of dimensions may be picked up, and 
so release the subject from possible anxiety of being judged in his performance of the task. 
An important issue in research of this kind is the validity of the claims. How far are the 
conceptual structures found in the investigations affected by the research design is a 
question that has to be answered. In some investigations, multiple methodologies have 
been employed to provide a cross reference on the results. 
4.2 Considerations in the design of the present research 
As was clarified in the earlier chapters, the main interest in this research is to probe into 
deeper structures in children's commonsense reasoning about motion and, to find out if 
these intuitive views do in any sense form an integrated and consistent whole. Technically, 
the task is one of knowledge elicitation and representation. Issues related to the latter 
aspect was discussed in the previous chapter. The remainder of this chapter will be 
devoted to issues related to elicitation. 
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There are four main methodological considerations in the design of the knowledge 
elicitation task(s): 
i) the task should be aimed at eliciting the kind of reasoning used by subjects in everyday 
commonsense contexts, 
ii) it should not prescribe any particular types of motion or aspect of motion for elicitation, 
iii) it should not in any way suggest any particular line of reasoning or focus for the subject 
to follow, 
iv) as an in depth study of children's reasoning, it should provide opportunities for the 
researcher to follow up on particular points coming up in the process to seek further 
clarification in a non-threatening, non-judgemental setting. 
It is considered to be more appropriate for the purpose of the present investigation to focus 
on elicitation of declarative knowledge as problem solving contexts tend to cue textbook 
knowledge, and it is not evident that the issues considered in such contexts do coincide 
with people's major considerations when reasoning in a commonsense context. 
As can be seen from table 4.1, existing methods for exploring declarative conceptual 
structures need 'conceptual anchors', that is, the research has to specify the focus and a 
starting point for the elicitation to start. This introduction of a pre-determined set of 
parameters for elicitation is not desirable for the present work. Furthermore, these methods 
tend to elicit static aspects of children's views. The dynamic aspects of the elicited 
conceptions, that is, how these conceptions are actually applied for solving everyday 
problems, their relative priority and how they work together are not accessible to the 
researcher. 
Some of the methods listed in table 4.2, for example, interviews and repertory grids, have 
the merit of being able to probe into aspects of children's understanding as seen from their 
own perspectives, in their own terms. However, the direct data normally do not yield any 
comprehensive picture of a particular child's conceptions and the reported findings are 
normally third order perspectives (c.f. Gilbert & Watts, 1983 & discussion in chapter 2). 
One important consequence of this is that only the most prominent aspects of the subjects' 
reasoning used in specific situations can be generalized in these types of investigations. 
One cannot find out easily using such methods how the various conceptual frameworks 
coordinate or orchestrate together in their actual application, nor whether they do 
orchestrate. 
A good context for eliciting in-depth reasoning under non-threatening contexts would be 
one in which the subject plays the role of a teacher. This has proved to be a successful 
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mode of elicitation in exploring children's knowledge in arithmetic (Johnson, 1983). In 
Johnson's study, the subject acted as the teacher, trying to explain to the researcher how 
s/he solved certain arithmetic problems. The researcher played the role of the student, 
trying to understand the knowledge that has been passed on, and she tried to ensure that her 
understanding matches the intended meaning by re-explaining what she thought was 
explained and the process repeats until both are satisfied that they have reached the same 
understanding. This technique is attractive as it provides a very good context for feedback 
and clarification on elicited ideas. Further, the focus is on how the subjects actually think 
and work and they are under no pressure of being judged on the validity of their 
knowledge. However, this method was employed for elicitation of procedural knowledge 
and there is great difficulty in employing this for elicitation of declarative knowledge. It is 
not easy to find out what someone actually means by a declarative statement without seeing 
how that particular statement is actually used in specific problem situations, that is, finding 
out the dynamic aspects of the declarative knowledge. 
The advent of expert system shells creates another possibility for the realization of a 
teaching context. Conceptually, a computer with an expert system shell running on it is 
like an intelligent being without any worldly knowledge, but ready to learn. Thus instead 
of teaching human beings, subjects can teach such computer systems. In so doing, they 
can also find out how well this machine 'learner' has mastered the concepts taught by 
asking it to answer queries in the domain of interest. Such a computer learner has several 
advantages over human learners because of its mechanistic nature. First of all, the 
knowledge taught to the learner is always open to inspection both by the teacher and the 
learner. Secondly, these learners are entirely free from any domain specific knowledge of 
their own. Consequently, if the subjects externalize their ideas in the form of generalizable 
rules, they can then explore the logical implications of these ideas. Furthermore, if they are 
not happy with any of the externalized ideas, whether 'because the ideas are not well 
expressed, or because they have changed their minds, they can always change them and be 
sure that the learner can always 'unlearn' when required to. The researcher can also have 
further access to the thinking processes during the teaching process through discussing 
with the subject. (For details see Law & Ki, 1987 (appendix 1) and Law, Ogborn & 
Whitelock, 1988 (appendix 2)). 
One possible objection to employing such a technique for the present investigation is that 
the way such a computer system handles knowledge is very different from what is 
commonly believed about how human beings operate in commonsense everyday contexts. 
The computer here only accepts knowledge in the form of rational logical statements, and it 
treats the complete set of knowledge statements entered as one formal system. On the other 
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hand, commonsense ideas are believed to be fuzzy, possibly fragmented, pragmatic and 
possibly not logical. 
The above objection essentially boils down to the fact that this mode of elicitation imposes a 
particular format onto the elicited knowledge. This objection, though valid, is true also for 
other techniques employed in the exploration of children's ideas in science. For example, 
concept map construction forces subjects to express their ideas in the form of networks of 
nodes and links. The particular ideas elicited via repertory grid technique may be 
influenced by the actual elements chosen, and the elicitations tend to highlight contrasts 
amongst the elements. On possible advantage of the expert system development technique 
(with the metaphor of teaching the computer) over many of the other techniques in this 
respect is that it provides an environment for the explorations of the dynamic aspects of the 
externalized knowledge. Thus while subjects may not be aware of the consequences (if 
any) of a concept map in terms of its utility, or the semantics of the network formalism 
itself, subjects developing the expert systems can find out whether they think the computer 
actually reasons the same way as they themselves do (or as they expect it to), and the 
researcher can have access to their reactions concerning this. 
Because of the advantages of expert system development as a knowledge elicitation 
technique listed above, it was employed as the main method of investigation in the present 
research. However, because of its novelty, it would be helpful if another more 
conventional technique is employed to provide some form of cross-referencing. An 
interview based on a classification task was used to provide some general perspectives on 
how students reason generally about motions. Results from the interviews will be analyzed 
independently in their own right, as well as providing starting ideas for the expert system 
development task. Details about these two tasks are described in the following two 
chapters. 
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Chapter 5 THE CLASSIFICATION TASK 
5.1 Objectives of the task 
As was discussed in the last chapter, none of the commonly used techniques in the 
elicitation of children's ideas in science is entirely satisfactory for the purpose of exploring 
the commonsense reasoning of children in the area of mechanics, though some of the 
techniques have certain attractive features. In a review on the different methods used in the 
documentation of conceptual frameworks, Driver and Erickson (1983) placed the different 
methods employed by researchers in this area along a conceptual-phenomenological 
continuum. Conceptually framed tasks like word associations and concept mapping were 
obviously unsuitable as the present study was not interested in finding out what students 
understand by certain conceptual labels. Contextual tasks like rule assessment and 
observational studies of students' theories-in-action are designed to probe the 
commonsense spontaneous knowledge of students, but are very much tied to the 
operational aspects of the specific situation under investigation. The aim here is to explore 
the in depth reasoning used by children without biasing them by pre-determining the 
concepts/terms with which they have to use to express their reasoning. Thus, to use the 
conceptual/ phenomenological distinction in the classification of techniques, the elicitation 
strategy needs to start from open discussions about phenomena to elicit the concepts/ terms 
subjects naturally use in their everyday commonsense reasoning about motion, which can 
be used as starting points to explore into the detail reasoning they use. 
It was decided that deep case studies would be the appropriate level to work at for the 
purpose of the present research and a programming task (to be described in the next 
chapter) was chosen as the main elicitation task for exploring into students' commonsense 
reasoning about motion. However, there is a need to do another task prior to the 
programming task to provide some initial exploration into the terms and features about 
motion that figure prominently in commonsense reasoning. This would form a worthwhile 
investigation in its own right as well as feeding useful information for the execution of the 
programming task. 
This chapter reports on a classification task administered for the purposes just described. 
Its objectives are to fmd out the perspectives taken and parameters looked for by children in 
their daily perception of motions. The design for this task is a modification of the repertory 
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grid technique. Instead of asking subjects to dichotomize a set of objects, they are free to 
put them into two or more groups according to a single criterion. The specific research 
questions for this study are: 
What are the main issues of interest for children in their everyday perception of 
motion? 
Can we identify a common pattern or framework' of perception employed by the 
students? 
Does age or amount of physics instruction received affect a child's everyday 
perception of motion? 
5.2 Administration of the task 
The task. The method of investigation used in this part of the study is a classification task. 
Each subject was shown nine to ten pictures depicting different kinds of motion and told to 
put the pictures into groups according to one consistent criterion. After the classification 
was completed, the subject was asked to explain how the classification was done until the 
interviewer was satisfied that she understood the detailed workings of the criterion used. 
The subject was then asked to re-group the same pictures again using a different criterion. 
This process was repeated until no further different classification could be done. The 
whole process was audio-taped and the recording was translated and transcribed for 
analysis (the interviews were conducted in Chinese). 
Materials. The pictures used in the classification task were all taken from children's comic 
books. This ensures that the situations depicted were all easily comprehensible everyday 
situations of interest to children, and that they would not resemble textbook examples and 
unduly direct them onto using learnt terms and concepts. Further, the performance of a 
classification task does not require in depth reasoning or analysis about any particular 
situation but rather demands a certain degree of generalization across situations. 
In order to find out whether the outcome of the investigation depends on the particular 
situations depicted in the pictures, three different sets of pictures (Appendix 4) were used in 
this classification task. Set A were all pictures of 'bouncing' motions where the moving 
objects follow a more or less parabolic trajectory, set B were pictures of motions in the air, 
and set C were pictures of either falling/tripping motions or motions in water. Each student 
was only required to categorize one set of pictures and any systematic difference in the 
resulting categorization schemes due to the choice of pictures could then be detected. 
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Subjects. As one important point of interest for the present investigation is to find out 
whether or not the commonsense frameworks of perception employed by the subjects 
depend on their age and on the amount of physics instruction they have received, two 
groups of students were used as subjects. The first group of eleven Form six students 
were about 17 years old, all of whom had completed an 0-Level course on Physics and 
were receiving instructions in A-Level Physics in their school. These eleven students were 
chosen so as to represent different levels of Physics attainment in their 0-Level examination 
results. The second group of twelve Form three students were about 15 years old and had 
not yet received any formal instructions in mechanics. They were selected to represent a 
range of different overall academic attainment according to their order of merit score 
obtained in the last school examination. 
5.3 Classification as a cognitive task 
The nature of this classification task is essentially one of categorizing motion events. The 
main reason for choosing a categorization task is that as a cognitive activity, it is 
somewhere between perception and thinking (Neisser, 1987). Gibson (1979) described 
perception as 'resonating' to the invariants in the objectively existing information, giving 
rise to the direct recognition of the real state of affairs. Categorization, whilst being often a 
spontaneous act, goes beyond the direct perception of objective information and rests on 
our beliefs about the world. Keil and Batterman's work on developmental change in 
categorization behaviour (1984) showed that there is a characteristic-to-defining shift in the 
transition from naivete to expertise at any age. He also demonstrated that such a shift is 
related to a change in the subject's beliefs about the nature of the entities being categorized 
(Keil, 1986). Furthermore, though such underlying theories and beliefs can easily be 
inferred unambiguously, they are very often held tacitly by the subjects themselves. This is 
considered to be an appropriate level to start the exploration. 
Rosch (1978) proposed that there are two general and basic principles underlying the 
formation of categories. The first is the principle of cognitive economy and is concerned 
with the function of category systems. It asserts that the task of category systems is to 
provide maximum information with the least cognitive effort. This is in line with the 
commonsense notion that, as an organism, what one wishes to gain from one's categories 
is a great deal of information about the environment while conserving finite resources as 
much as possible. To categorize a stimulus thus means to consider it, for the purposes of 
that categorization, not only equivalent to other stimuli in the same category but also 
different from stimuli not in that category. The second is the principle of perceived world 
structure and is concerned with the structure of the information so provided. It asserts that 
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unlike the sets of stimuli used in traditional laboratory tasks, the perceived world is not an 
unstructured total set of equi-probable co-occurring attributes but rather comes as structured 
information. Combinations of what we perceive as the attributes of real objects do not 
occur uniformly: some pairs, triples, etc. are quite probable; others are rare; others logically 
cannot or empirically do not occur. However, the perceived world structure is not just the 
metaphysical world without a knower: the kinds of attributes that can be perceived are not 
only species-specific, but also culturally dependent. 
According to these two principles, it is reasonable to expect that the schemes used in the 
categorization of motion events would reflect the kinds of general questions children ask 
when encountering motion events in everyday life, the features they judge as important and 
the parameters they would wish to be able to predict in such situations. 
There is little in the literature about studies in.the actual categorization of events, but a 
number of studies pointed out the relationship between the categorization of objects and the 
perception of events (Nelson, 1983; Fivush, 1987). Some studies indicate that young 
children have a preference for grouping objects together on a functional or thematic basis 
(Denney & Moulton 1976; Mandler 1979). Thus candles, cakes and party hats go together 
because they belong to the same event: the birthday party. This is a possible indication for 
the primacy of event representations in the conceptual development of children, and that 
thematic and functional categories have their basis in children's representation of events. 
Furthermore, experiments on children's memory performance (Lucariello & Nelson, 1985) 
show that hierarchical categorical organization is not readily available to young children, 
and that categorical structures possibly emerge and develop from a conceptual knowledge 
base initially organized schematically around items that can be used interchangeably for the 
same function in similar events. It is hoped that the present study could also contribute to 
an understanding of events as a unit of cognitive/knowledge structure. 
5.4 Scheme of analysis 
Both groups of students found it easy to categorize the pictures. All of them could find 
more than one possible categorization scheme for classifying the set of pictures given to 
them, though some failed to always adhere to one single criterion in a particular attempt. 
An analysis of the detailed contents of the categorization schemes reveals that they can be 
labelled as either descriptive or causal. Descriptive schemes are those that classify pictures 
according to physical features of the motion, e.g. descriptions about the moving object, the 
shape of the trajectory, speed of the motion, how does the motion develop, etc. Causal 
schemes are those that classify motions according to analyses of the causes, e.g. the agents 
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involved, the forces causing the motion, etc. Descriptive schemes are thus schemes that 
attempt to answer the 'what' and 'how' questions about the motions while causal schemes 
are those that attempt to answer the 'why' questions. The former are thus concerned with 
issues roughly within the domain of kinematics while the latter deals with dynamical issues 
of motion. 
It is possible to further subdivide each of these two broad groups of schemes into three 
different levels of categorization. The descriptive schemes can be classified as: (i) D1 -
non-physical, pragmatic concerns, (ii) D2 - physical and holistic, or (iii) D3 - single 
physical parameters. The causal schemes can be classified as: (i) Al -causal agency 
(concrete or abstract), (ii) A2 -characteristics of causal agency, or (iii) A3 - mechanism for 
producing the motion. A detailed list of the categorization schemes belonging to each of 
the above subdivisions is given in table 5.1. 
It can be argued that in doing this classification task, the categorization schemes the 
students use actually derive from the kinds of questions they would naturally ask 
themselves about motions as they encounter them in everyday life. Close examinations of 
the schemes should provide crucial insight into what are the most important questions to be 
considered in commonsense perceptions of motion. 
5.4.1 Descriptive Schemes 
Of the 37 different categorization schemes identified, about two thirds are descriptive ones. 
These are roughly evenly distributed amongst the groups D1, D2 and D3. This shows that 
non-physical, pragmatic concerns like purpose of the motion, intention of the moving 
objects and the social situation under which the motion occurred are as important as 
considerations of the physical aspects of the motion even for the group of Advanced Level 
Physics students. (However, such pragmatic concerns rarely come into classroom 
discussions during mechanics lessons.) 
Another interesting observation is that of the schemes concerned with physical descriptions 
of the motions, about half were concerned with global descriptions, mostly in the form of 
assigning global labels/identifiers to the motions. Some of the global identifiers used were 
labels for 'types of motion', i.e. words we use in everyday language for naming different 
kinds of motion, like: bouncing, falling, flying, slipping, tripping, swinging and rising. 
These are similar to the stereotypical motions identified by Ogborn, Bliss & Whitelock 
(Ogborn, 1989). From the students' elaborations in the classification protocols on how the 
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Table 5.1 List of all categorization schemes grouped under subdivision titles 
CATEGORIZATION SCHEME 
I. Descriptive schemes [D1] 
(i) pragmatic concerns, non-physical aspects 
* intention of moving object 
• ability of object to control the motion 
• social situation in which the motion occurred 
• motivation for the object to perform the action 
• feelings of the objects involved in the motion 
• moving object's reactions to the situation 
• suitability of object's orientation for reacting to the situation 
• purpose of the motion 
• whether the pictures together form a tangible story 
(ii) physical and holistic [D2] 
* type of motion 
• shape of trajectory 
• motion direction 
• type of position change 
• likelihood of event happening 
• expected development of event 
• change in type of motion? 
(iii) Single physical parameter [D3] 
• nature of the moving obj.,e.g. animate/inanimate 
• speed 
• motion involves a turning of the object? 
• change of speed during motion? 
• shape of object 
• height reached by object during motion 
• duration of motion 
• location of motion 
II. Causal Schemes 
(i) Causal agency [Al] 
* concrete causal agent 
* abstract causal agent, e.g. forces involved 
* agency for change in motion 
(ii) Characteristics of the causal agency [A2] 
* type of agent, e.g. self, ext. obj., ext. forces 
* causal agent also moving? 
* object carried along by agent? 
* agency required for the motion? 
• number of forces involved 
(iii) Mechanism for producing the motion [A3] 
• analogical/theoretical model of the motion 
• how motion occurred in relation to gravity 
• motion resulting from diff. rel. dir. of forces 
• motion resulting from interaction of forces 
• effect of the phy. configuration of system 
• effect of own action on motion 
INSTANCES 
F.3 F.6 
2 3 
1 2 
2 1 
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 
0 1 
1 
6 7 
0 4 
1 2 
0 2 
1 1 
1 0 
0 1 
3 1 
1 2 
1 1 
0 1 
0 1 
1 0 
1 0 
0 1 
2 1 
1 2 
0 1 
5 4 
0 1 
0 1 
0 1 
0 1 
3 2 
2 2 
0 1 
0 1 
0 1 
0 1 
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categorization schemes worked, it was evident that these words carry very rich meaning for 
them. They seem to stand for mental representations of prototypical motion schemas stored 
in their long term memory. The basic contents of such schemas would include the follow-
ing items: likely instantiations of the kind of object involved, location of the motion, shape 
of the trajectory, agents for the motion and likely course of development. 
The extract from student S's classification task protocol below illustrates the rich meaning 
behind one such label used - 'bouncing': 
S. (about the group of pictures 7,10) ... I find that things seem to be bouncing 
up and down 
(about the group of pictures 2,3,4,8) ...something is being thrown out. 
There is a person ... some object which give it a force by which the object 
is ejected or thrown out. 
I. What about the group of pictures 6 and 9 (the group she classified as 
jumping earlier? 
S 	 These two seem to be done by themselves. Seems to be more natural. 
I. More natural? I do not understand. 
S. I mean, they do it themselves and not that somebody makes them do it. 
Things happen and things will naturally develop in that way accordingly. 
	
 for the horse, since there is a fence in front, it will jump over it. 
I. How about the group of pictures 1,5? 
S 	  It seems that it meets something and then it bumps outwards. At first, it 
appears normal but then it suddenly meets something, crashes or hits on 
something, then it has another kind of motion ... that is, it should be in a 
sequence, but something makes it change. 
This example also shows that during the process of categorization, the students were 
actually trying to map each of the motions in the pictures onto a typical motion prototype. 
In other words, they were trying to place them under some already existing representation 
schemas. Furthermore, such schemas are higher level, holistic units roughly at the level of 
complexity similar to Rumelhart and Ortony's (1977) schemas, Schank and Abelson's 
(1977) scripts and Minsky's (1975) frames. The protocols collected during the 
classification task seem to reveal that each representation schema comprises a set of 
parameters (or slots) that may be instantiated differently according to the kinds of motion 
involved: the kind(s) of object involved, location for the motion, shape of the trajectory, 
direction of motion, likely subsequent development of the trajectory, whether the motion 
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involved sudden changes from an expected course of development, probable causes for the 
motion and agents for the motion. Categorization schemes using global identifiers as 
described above can be interpreted as categorizing according to labels/names for the motion 
schemas. 
These representation schemas as inferred knowledge structures will be referred to as 
'scripts' in the ensuing discussion to avoid confusion with the actual classification schemes 
used by the students. There is, however, no intention that these 'scripts' are to be 
interpreted strictly in the way Schank defines them. 
Some global physical categorization schemes do not use 'types of motion' labels for the 
scripts. Instead, certain labels for single physical parameters like trajectory shapes, motion 
directions and types of positional change involved were named as categorization criteria. 
Thus at first sight, these schemes look like D3 schemes - i.e. they look as though the 
categorization was made according to the value of a single physical parameter. However, 
careful inspection reveals that in many cases this was not true and that these parameters 
were actually used as script labels for global categorization schemes. For example, student 
BS, when categorizing the picture set B (App.4), used 'direction of motion' as the 
categorization criterion in one of her schemes. Pictures Bl, B2 and B5 were put into one 
group - the group of horizontal motions. However, B1 was a plane moving in the air and 
B2 was a bird flying and it was not evident from the pictures that they were moving 
horizontally. B5 was about a ball being thrown out by a boy and the expected path should 
be a parabolic one. BS's explanation for putting them into this group was: 
'In B5, it is pushed out, a horizontal motion. In B1 and B2, they use their own 
force to rush forward. So they are similar.' 
It thus seems that she put these three together because they were all 'pushing' motions and 
not because of their actual motion directions. Similarly, in the same scheme, pictures B3, 
B4 and B8 were put into the group of downwards motions but only B3's motion was 
strictly vertically downward motion. The motions in the other two pictures had parabolic 
paths. BS explained: 
'....(B4 & B8) have instruments to help them to spring up, and they sprang up 
before coming down. ... They go up and down, not horizontally. In 3, the 
motion is downwards, so I place it together with the one involving the planks.' 
However, the boy in picture B6 was also moving up and down - and doing so repeatedly 
as illustrated. She placed it in the group of 'rising' motions. The actual criterion used for 
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the downwards motions group was probably that they were all motions that eventually 
went down - they were 'falling' motions. 
Some categorization schemes belonging to the holistic physical descriptive type (D2) were 
not concerned with assigning script labels. Rather, they were concerned with expectations 
about the motion, e.g. likelihood of the event happening, the expected course of 
development of the motion, and whether the picture depicted a sudden change in the motion 
type. This seems to reflect a very pragmatic concern in our everyday encounters with 
motion - our cognitive system must be able to formulate anticipations about the likely 
development of the event very quickly and efficiently so as to be able to react adequately to 
the situation. If the motion is classified as a 'normal' or 'natural' motion (many students 
use these as category labels), this means that the motion falls into one of those stereotypical 
motions for which there are ready, packaged scripts that hold default values for the various 
slots, including possibly one on the optimum reactions appropriate for dealing with the type 
of motion at hand. Thus the cognitive resources required for the handling of the event in 
such cases are minimal. This is in line with Minsky's (1975) justification for looking for 
larger and more complex units of representation than semantic nets - to account for the 
effectiveness of commonsense thought. On the other hand, if there is a sudden change in 
the expected development of the motion, the cognitive system would have to go into an 
alerted state and make greater efforts to make sense of the new situation and to formulate 
appropriate reactions. Here, we can actually see the inherent relationships between the D1 
and the D2 schemes: the D2 schemes reflect our need to ask the 'what' questions (what is 
the motion like?) in order to formulate answers to the 'how' questions (how should one 
deal with the situation for the purposes in hand, i.e. the current context?). It is a reasonable 
expectation that our long term memory representation schema (or scripts) for the motion 
events should be able to handle the pragmatic concerns of the 'how' questions. 
Another indication of the importance of being able to give a holistic description to the 
motion by way of cognitive understanding of the phenomena is the fact that only 5 out of 
the 23 subjects do not use at least one D2 type scheme in all their categorizations and 10 
subjects used it as the first categorization scheme. 
The third kind of description based categorization is those that categorize according to the 
instantiations (i.e. expected or default values) for one of the slots (parameters) in the 
motion scripts as described above. The most popular categorizations in this group are 
those that classify according to the nature of the moving object or according to the speed of 
the motion. Other less popular categorization parameters are: whether the object spins 
during the motion, whether there was a change in speed, the shape of the object, maximum 
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height reached by the object, duration of the motion and the location of the motion. These 
physical parameters correspond to the slots that appear in the script representations for the 
motion events and thus represent important aspects to pay attention to in one's everyday 
encounters with motion. 
It is interesting to note that the most popular slot for categorization concerns the animacy of 
the moving object (whether it is animate or not, etc.) rather than parameters relating to the 
motion itself. If the main concerns of everyday cognition are pragmatic, then the kind of 
moving object and the rough magnitude of the speed are possibly the most crucial aspects 
one has to take into account when considering how best to react to the situation. For 
example, one's reactions on seeing a baby fall from a table would be quite different from 
the reactions on seeing a parcel of similar size and weight falling from the same place. 
Such differences however, do not figure in the Newtonian view of motion where only the 
physical attributes (like weight, density distribution, size) of the moving object would have 
any effect on the motion and the animacy of the moving object is irrelevant - an object 
would still be falling with the same acceleration whether it is a stone or a person. 
The reason for some students to give serious attention to the animacy of the moving object 
can be explained by the following extract from Student Y's protocol when he tried to 
explain the difference between the motion of dead (inanimate) objects and living (animate) 
objects: 
"Living objects can control their own movement but the dead objects are 
controlled by man. 	  [For the inanimate group] there is no specific rule to 
change their own motion. Like (pointing to picture C5) .. he pushed the ball, 
the ball has to follow the force to move, then the force decrease and it fell 
down following a parabolic path. 	  
The living object can generate force but the dead object can't." 
Thus one main difference is in the ability to control the course of development. Inanimate 
objects cannot have control over their own motion and one would therefore be able to 
anticipate what the motion would be like unless some animate objects intervene. 
Another reason for considering the nature of the moving object is to facilitate decisions 
about how best to handle the situation. For example, one of Student H's categorization 
schemes (used on picture set C) was prompted by such considerations. Picture set C 
comprised 10 pictures, 7 of which are about some kind of falling or tripping motion while 
the rest are objects moving on the water surface. Student H put the pictures into three 
groups: the first group are those where the moving objects are doing something to protect 
themselves against possible damage arising from the motion, the second group are those 
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that could not protect themselves because of the circumstances of the situation and for the 
third group, the question of protection is irrelevant. Clearly, the question of trying to do 
something to protect oneself from danger would be irrelevant only for inanimate objects. 
Moreover, the same kind of motion, falling, would be classified into different groups under 
this pragmatic concern of safety. To decide on what one has (or does not have) to do when 
confronted by a moving object, one needs to know not only what type of motion is 
involved but in many cases also the kind of object involved. Thus the importance of this 
'nature of the moving object' slot in the representation schema is probably not for its role in 
identifying the script type but for possible instantiations of the expectation slot and for 
identifying the reaction required to handle the situation. 
5.4.2 Causal Schemes 
As mentioned earlier, one third of the identified categorization schemes classified pictures 
according to analyses of the causes. These analytic schemes seem to be answering 
questions about why the object/system was moving the way it did and most of these 
schemes were about some aspects of causal agency. 
In the Al group of categorization schemes, students classify pictures into groups each 
involving a different causal agent. The agencies so named may be abstract, e.g. naming the 
forces responsible, or concrete, naming the actual object causing the motion. This seems 
to be the lowest possible level of explanation that can be offered - one tries to explain away 
something by simply pointing out that this is the kind of motion that would result in 
instances where the same agencies are involved. For example, student L categorized 
picture set C into 3 groups according to the causes involved: 'smoothness', 'obstructions' 
or 'wetness'. The following extract from her protocol illustrates her reasoning. 
'This group (pictures 1,2,6) they fell down, they ... the floor surface is very 
smooth. The supporting force is not very good, ..: it is smooth, so it is easy to 
slide over.... 
This group (pictures 4,5,7) is just the opposite, there is something blocking 
you, obstructing you. 
The last group, my feeling is that they are related to water. Three of these 
pictures got water in them. ... I would think that water is even more smooth 
(making it easier for things to fall through).' 
This explanation for the categorization scheme in terms of causal agency does not offer 
further analysis of the motions other than what a D2 type scheme in terms of types of 
motion offers. However, this act of labelling the cause of motion as a prominent feature of 
the situation reflects the cognitive desire to look for causal relations in motion events. That 
is, there is a cognitive desire to seek explanations for why a motion is developing the way 
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it is when one meets it. Schank's (1986) work on the nature and kinds of explanations 
provides a helpful framework for understanding the causal schemes generated by the 
students. He proposes that there are three types of explanations. The first kind are those 
that are made for the sake of others, to tell them what one already knows. Such 
explanations are almost always present in the mind of the explainer before the explanations 
are given and he calls those canned explanations. The second kind are those intended to 
explain-away a phenomenon by showing it to be another example of something that is 
already well-understood, and he calls these explaining-away explanations. The third 
kind of explanations are those that are intended to add knowledge by the process of 
explanation and are thus critical to learning, and he calls them additive explanations. He 
believes that the first two kinds are much easier to generate and that an explanation is likely 
to be additive only if something important rests on the creation of an explanation. Thus 
when no real need is driving an explanation, it is likely that explanations created will have 
as their primary intention to explain away the phenomenon. In other words, we do not try 
hard to understand deeply unless there is a strong need to understand. 
When seen within this framework, explanation in terms of naming the causal agencies 
concerned does satisfy the explanation need to the level of explaining-away the problem. 
Abstract constructs can also be used as labels to explain away the causes for the motions, 
and the favorite constructs in this category are adaptations from scientific terms - labelling 
(very often creating them at the same time) various kinds of forces as the responsible 
agencies. For example, student C, in classifying the same picture set C, put them into three 
groups. The following is an extract from the protocol: 
C. The group 1,2,3,5, they all involve the kind of force when things go from a 
high position to a low position, that type of force that is going downwards. 
Yes, that's it, why does it fall down? It is because the ground has force of 
gravity and the object has weight-force, when it is in mid-air with nothing 
attached, then it would fall down. This is the force going from high to low .. 
is this called 'falling force'? 	  
I asked her to explain the criterion for putting 4,6,7 together. 
C. This group are all about being slipped or tripped by something. All 
because while walking or moving, you meet an obstructing force from 
outside and tripped. 	  
The last group of pictures was 8,9 and 10 and she said they belong together 
because they were all about 'floating force, all about water. 
Again this categorization here is not too different from a D2 scheme that classifies the 
pictures into downward motions, slipping or tripping motions, and motions in water. The 
only difference is the application of a 'canned explanation' (Schank, 1986) to the motions 
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at hand. The 'canned explanation' is in the form: motion is caused by force, motions are 
different from each other if the forces involved are different. The quality/nature of the 
explanation does not seem to be different whether concrete or abstract agency is used and a 
few of the Al schemes actually employ both kinds of agency for the groups. 
The categorization behaviour of the students seems to demonstrate a strong desire to give 
causal explanations for motion phenomena. This desire is evidenced by the fact that there 
are only 3 out of the 23 students participating in this task who did not offer any analytic 
categorization scheme. Thus, adhering to the earlier assumption that to make sense of a 
motion one encounters in everyday life, one needs to recognize the type of motion involved 
(to search for an appropriate event script), the above observation points to the primacy of 
causal agency as an essential slot in the memory representation of motion. 
One of the Al type categorization schemes deserves special mention. Instead of looking 
for the agents causing the motion, Student V categorized the pictures according to the 
agents responsible for the change in course of motion. Though she still grouped them 
according to the concrete agents involved, it was an extremely important step forward to 
look for (even when performing such a casual, non-academic task) agency for change 
rather than the agency for the maintenance of a motion. Her implicit classification of 
motion is not Newtonian: rather than using a uniform motion - acceleration motion 
distinction, she distinguished between motions that followed a natural course of 
development and those that had a sudden change in the course of motion. This 
classification highlights the kinematic observation that an object's trajectory would be 
completely defined if the initial conditions and acceleration are defined. According to her 
explanation, a moving object can only change its course of motion (which need not be a 
uniform motion) by an external agency, and this is valid even if the moving object is 
animate. The following extract from her protocol illustrates her reasoning: 
V. In B5, a child throws a ball out and I feel that the ball once thrown out 
cannot change its own motion. It cannot increase its speed or change its 
direction... Once it flies out, then it has to fall according to the law of 
nature. 
In B1,B,2,B3 & B9, what is peculiar is the use of air. Without air, 
parachutes cannot come down and kites, planes and birds cannot fly. .... 
They can control the direction of inclination, to change the course of 
motion. 	  
The parachute can be controlled by the person carried on it. .... As for the 
kite, though this child is pulled upwards suddenly, not of his own accord, 
he can still, like people gliding in the sky, by the movement of his body 
control the direction of flying. The common point here is that, they can only 
fly with the help of the air current. 
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I. asked her if the dog in B4 can control its own course of motion. 
V. It can when it is not yet thrown up, but once it is thrown up it cannot. .... It 
can only have action but nothing can give it a reaction. Unless it knows 
how to unbuckle its neck belt and to throw it away, then because there is 
an action, it would have a reaction. ....' 
It can be seen that she was trying to adopt Newton's first and third laws of motion and was 
applying them correctly and creatively to these common everyday motions. It is interesting 
to note that in this process, while still recognizing the difference between animate and 
inanimate objects in their motions, she confined that distinction to the ability of animate 
objects to 'control' parts of their own body, but whether this could lead to a change in the 
course of the motion would still be subjected to the same physical laws as inanimate 
objects. She has succeeded in mastering the scientific laws and principles to the extent that 
she can recognize the general applicability of these laws to the motion of both animate and 
inanimate objects, while still being able to explain for the differences that exist between 
them using the same principles. This is a rare attainment and she is the only one who has 
gone so far in clarifying such views in this classification task. 
The second kind of analytic schemes (A2) categorizes motion according to certain perceived 
characteristics of the causal agency. The most popular A2 type scheme (accounting for 9 
out of the 13 instances, and is the largest single categorization within the analytic schemes) 
was to categorize according to the nature of the causal agent, distinguishing mainly between 
self and external objects/forces as causal agency, or sometimes between animate and 
inanimate causal agents. For the latter categorization, the reasoning is actually the same as 
that used in the D3 scheme which categorizes according to the nature of the moving object. 
The main focus here was again on whether the motion can be changed at will. Student J 
(categorizing picture set B) explained this point very clearly in the following extract: 
'For the smaller group (pictures Bl, B7 and B9), the motions are caused by 
general factors like wind, the power of the balloon or the movement of the 
machine that caused the motions. 	  
The motions (for the other pictures) are acting according to his own will. .... 
There is the idea of an animal. .... The action can change whenever he likes 
because he can do whatever he like. But it is difficult in the case of inanimate 
things, they can't change voluntarily.' 
This is essentially the same as the reasoning given by student Y quoted above. 
For those categorizing causal agents into self and external agents/forces, the motivation is 
two-fold. There is a pragmatic concern of whether the motion occurred according to the 
intention/wishes of the moving object. In this respect it is similar to the concerns of the 
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most popular D1 type scheme, 'intention of the moving object', and as such is also related 
to the D3 scheme that classifies motion according to the animacy of the moving object. 
Another motivation behind this categorization was to predict possible changes in the 
subsequent motion. For example, extracts from Student Ts protocol below show that the 
motions that are grouped as those assisted by external agencies have motion characteristics 
that would otherwise be unexpected. The other two kinds of motions in this categorization 
are actually self-initiated motions and motions due to 'natural circumstances'. The need to 
identify causes of motion was in line with the pragmatic need to identify the type of motion 
script (as exhibited also in the D2 categorizations) and to be able to anticipate subsequent 
developments of the motion encountered. She named 'potential energy' as the reason for 
motion in the third group, but actually 'potential energy' was only used as a label. 
T. (About 1,2,4,7,9,10) .... the actions are all assisted. Say, this man in the 
chair (picture C9), he would not move by himself, it is the boat, the string 
and the chair all put together that assisted him to have this motion. 
I.asked T. to explain further the role of the external 'assistance'. 
T. You can just stand there and move your arms about. Yes, you can swim, 
but you can't move in the same posture with the same movement as he is 
now. 
(About 6 and 8) These are actions coming out from themselves. 
(about 3 and 5) They themselves have the ability to move. They have the 
ability to move, they have the potential energy, 	 anyway they can move. 
Categorization schemes in the A3 group go into deeper levels of causal analysis. Though 
six categorization schemes were identified, there were basically only two forms of explana-
tion: causal explanation in the form of analogical models or as the aggregate effect of 
forces. 
Schemes in the first category attempt to offer analogical/operational models for the 
underlying mechanisms responsible for bringing about the motions. The schemes normally 
identify certain physical components as playing the crucial causal role which is analogous 
to certain common mechanical devices, e.g. springs, obstacles, levers. Some subjects went 
even further to build up theoretical models of the kinds of forces at work in such situations. 
For example, Student W theorized that some objects bounce up and down repeatedly on 
hitting obstacles because they possess 'elastic force': 
'Objects (that can bounce after falling to the ground are those) that have the 
ability to expand and contract, the object possesses elastic force. 	  Just 
like the ball, there is elastic force inside and it is not that heavy. 	  It (the 
object that possesses elastic force) can receive forces. If it is just placed 
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there, it can't move, but if you hit it, then because of your force, it touches the 
ground, so it bounces.' 
Thus an object that possesses elastic force can receive a force and re-use it time and again 
even after hitting obstacles while another object that dclnot possess elastic force will stop 
after hitting an obstacle. Elastic force does not enable an object to start a motion, but would 
affect its subsequent motion once it has been started by receiving a force. Here a property 
of the material of the object is also classified as a kind of force. A possible reason is that 
the literal translation of elasticity in the Chinese language is 'elastic force'. 
Another example of this kind of explanatory theory proposed was the 'transmission of 
rushing (impulsive) force'. Objects moving at great speed possess 'rushing force' which 
may be passed onto other objects during collisions. However, some motions may require 
an intermediate device to transmit this force from the causal agent to the other object (like in 
the case of lever systems). 
The second form of explanation was built on the basic belief that motions occur in the 
direction of the aggregate effect of the forces acting. How exactly the aggregation takes 
place is not clear if the forces do not act along the same line, and rotation seems to demand 
additional turning forces. If however, the forces are acting in opposite directions, then a 
model of contention (the strongest force will rule) is frequently adopted so that the larger 
force 'wins' and the object then moves as a result of the winning force and the weaker 
forces would fail to produce any effect unless the balance of forces changes. Furthermore, 
gravitational force is seen to be an all pervasive force and would cause objects to fall unless 
there is a large enough contending force to act against it. Student KC's protocol (while 
categorizing picture set B) illustrates this kind of reasoning: 
"KC. For the group 4,5,8, they only stay in the air for a short period of time. 
They will fall down very soon. 	  Because of gravity 	  (The other 
group can stay for a long period of time)because there is something that 
resist against gravity.... 
L 	 How about the bird? How can the bird resist against gravity? 
KC. It can fly by itself." 
One of the A3 categorization schemes stood out uniquely against the others both in terms of 
the question it poses and in the solution it gives. In one of her schemes, Student F 
classified picture set C according to whether the motion will be affected by actions on the 
part of the moving object. 
'The first group is 8 and 10. For these two, in order to continue their motions, 
the people here have to move part of their body in a different way 
Whereas in the other group 	  But if he (the man in picture C9) wave his 
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arms about, it would still not affect his motion. The same situation for this man 
who is falling, and the same for the rest of the pictures.' 
What is even more remarkable is his comment on the classification task as a whole: 
F. I feel that quite a lot of my classifications are very vague (he did 7 different 
categorization schemes in all). They look different but as you think more 
clearly about it, they are more or less the same. 
I. Can you give an example? 
F. The nature of their motion does not really differ much. Say in my second 
way of classification, the one about force, ... actually, it should be that 
anything that moves does so because it is pushed by other forces. If you 
say that you want to push a force out, that is not very reasonable. When 
you push something, the other thing also has a reaction and so pushes it 
back. So it seems that a lot of the classifications are very superficial, and 
also very vague 
L Do you feel that you'can cancel the second set of classifications? 
F. Not exactly. It still has its value. 
I. Where does this value lie? As you said, everything depends on some 
external force. 
F. It depends on how you look at it. From a very fundamental perspective, 
most motions are of the same type. But you can go to a more complex 
level and classify it further into different motions. For example, turning is 
one type of motion, or linear motions is another. You can say about 
anything that if you push it, it would move. So if you say that anything that 
moves when pushed is in one group, then you would only end up with one 
group. But if you want to do it in greater detail you can subdivide it much 
further into many groups. 
I. Do you find a more detailed classification meaningful? Just now you said 
that they belong very much together. 
F. Yes. When things move in different ways, you would wish to know their 
past movement and how their motion would develop in future, then this is 
useful. But if you ask why they move, they are more or less the same.' 
I. For the pictures 10 and 8 you said that he moved his arms in order to 
maintain this situation, while for the other group they do not rely on 
themselves. Is this distinction important? 
F. Yes. It means that one can use one's own ways to influence one's own 
motion. Say, in everyday life, when you are running, you can use more 
efforts to run quicker. 
One striking feature coming out from the above protocol is that Student F recognizes that all 
motion are caused by external forces, and that the dynamics for different motions are the 
same, the main difference is only at the kinematic level. 
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5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Comparison between the two age groups 
Despite the fact that the three sets of pictures depicted very different kinds of motions, there 
seems to be no significant difference between the picture sets in terms of the total number 
of categorization schemes that each student can come up with. However, the older group 
of students consistently produced larger numbers of different categorization schemes. On 
average the older group of students produced 4.6 categorization schemes each, nearly 50% 
more than the younger group which only produced an average of 3.1 schemes each. One 
possible explanation is that the older group of students employs different (and possibly 
complex and differentiated) cognitive schemas in their processing of information about 
motion events. Another possibility is that the older students have a broader knowledge 
base about motion and can thus come up with more ways of categorizing them. 
Table 5.2 Total no. of categorization schemes resulting from the classification 
task for each group of students for the three sets of pictures 
Picture Set F.6 	 F.3 Total for picture set 
Set A*  14 (4.7)# 10 (2.5) 24 (3.4) 
Set B 19 (4.8) 14 (3.5) 33 (4.1) 
Set C 19 (4.5) 14 (3.5) 33 (4.1) 
Total 52 (4.7) 38 (3.2) 90 3.9) 
# The figures inside brackets denotes the average number of categorization scheme per student 
* There are only three students in this group while there are four in all the other groups 
An examination of the distribution of categorization schemes over the different scheme 
types for the two age groups reveals where the main differences lie. As Table 5.3 
indicates, not only is the ratio of descriptive schemes to analytic schemes 	 essentially the 
same, but even the percentage distribution for the six finer scheme types are comparable for 
the two age groups. Thus there is reason to believe that the structure of the cognitive 
schemas for the processing of motion events are very similar for both groups. The largest 
difference in the number of instances of occurrence is in scheme type D2. If we try to 
examine the D2 schemes as listed in table 5.1, we can see that most of the subjects in the 
younger group could only give a holistic physical description in terms of giving a label to 
the 'type of motion'. However, for the older group, 'type of motion' schemes accounted 
for only 7 out of a total of 17 D2 schemes resulting from the categorization task. 
Parameters like trajectory shape, motion direction and type of positional change are familiar 
to the older group, as these are the kind of parameters that one would expect them to use in 
their study of mechanics in school, but these descriptions do not come to the younger 
group naturally. A frequency count from table 5.1 shows that of the 38 different schemes 
resulting from the categorization task, the F.6 students came up with 31 of these schemes 
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whereas the F.3 could only come up with 21 different schemes, giving a similar ratio as the 
total number of categorizations. As discussed in the previous section, schemes within the 
same type normally reflect similar concerns and perspectives and the differences between 
them are usually nominal. Thus a reasonable conclusion from the figures is that the older 
students have more means to elaborate and express their ideas than the younger group, but 
there do not seem to be fundamental differences in their cognitive schemas. 
Table 5.3 Distribution of classificatory categories over the scheme types for 
the two age groups 
Descriptive 
D1 	 D2 	 D3 
Sub-total 
Al 
Analytic 
A2 	 A3 
Sub-total Total 
F.3 9 9 7 25 3 5 5 13 38 
24% 24% 18% 66% 8% 13% 13% 34% 100% 
F.6 8 17 7 32 4 8. 8 20 52 
15% 33% 13% 62% 8% 15% 15% 38% 100% 
Both 17 26 14 57 7 13 13 33 90 
groups 19% 29% 16% 63% 8% 14% 14% 37% 100% 
5.5.2 Comparison of performance between the two sexes 
There is no major difference in the performance of the categorization task between the two 
sexes, averaging 3.8 and 4.1 categorizations per student respectively for the female and 
male students. However, careful scrutiny shows that female students produce many more 
D1 type schemes than male students while male students produce a much higher percentage 
of A3 schemes. The more humanistic categorizations in the D1 type schemes are nearly all 
produced by the girls, e.g. the categorization criteria like feelings of the objects involved in 
the motion, the motivation for the motion, the social situation in which the motion occurred 
Table 5.4 Distribution of classificatory categories by sex 
Descriptive 
D1 	 D2 	 D3 
Sub-total 
Al 
Analytic 
A2 	 A3 
Sub-total Total 
F 12 14 7 33 4 7 5 16 49 
24% 29% 14% 67% 8% 14% 10% 33% 100% 
M 5 12 7 24 3 6 8 17 41 
12% 29% 17% 59% 7% 15% 20% 41% 100% 
Both 17 26 14 57 7 13 13 33 90 
sex es 19% 29% 16% 64% 8% 14% 14% 36% 100% 
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and whether the pictures together form a tangible story. These categorizations probably 
could not be produced just on the factual information given in the pictures alone but were 
possibly done on imagined social situations, possibilities extending from the pictures. Male 
students on the other hand seem to exhibit more interest in working out mechanical/ 
analogical models for the motions depicted. 
5.5.3 Effects of picture set used on categorization behaviour 
In analyzing the results of this classification task, one obvious question to ask is whether 
the categorization behaviour of the students is dependent on the picture set used. It is not 
possible to give a definite answer to this question from the results of the present research as 
the number of cases involved are relatively small and no attempt has been made to make the 
three groups of subjects comparable (table 5.5). 
Table 5.5 Age group and sex distribution of subjects by picture set 
Picture set 
M 
F.6 	 F.3 
F 	 M F 
Set A 2 1 2 2 
Set B 0 4 3 1 
Set C 3 1 0 4 
However, results in table 5.6 do seem to indicate some differences in the categorization 
behaviour produced by the different picture sets. Set A pictures are all bouncing motions 
and they all possess similar trajectories while pictures in the other two sets are more varied 
in this respect. The smaller number of total categorization schemes arising from set A may 
be due to the strong similarities among the pictures. 
Table 5.6 Distribution of classificatory categories by picture set 
Descriptive 
D1 	 D2 	 D3 
Sub-total Analytic 
Al 	 A2 	 A3 
Sub-total Total 
Set A 4 7 4 15 (63%) 2 2 5 9 (37%) 24 
Set B 2 11 6 19 (58%) 2 8 4 14 (42%) 33 
Set C 11 8 4 23 (70%) 3 3 4 10 (30%) 33 
Both 17 26 14 57 (63%) 7 13 13 33 (36%) 90 
sexes 19% 29% 16% 8% 14% 14% 100% 
Another difference in categorization behaviour evident in table 5.6 is that set B is producing 
many more A2 schemes and set C is producing many more DI. schemes. Set B pictures are 
all 'flying' motions, that is, motion in the air while set C pictures are all 'falling' motions. 
Ogborn (1989) proposed a model for the origins of ideas of the causes of motion which 
90 
identified 'effort' and 'support' as the two basic categories for thinking about motion. 
Falling and flying came out as two important stereotypical motions in his model. Falling is 
very special in that it is caused by a lack of something (in this case, support) and not by the 
presence of something (generally, effort). For flying to be possible, both effort for the 
flying motion as well as the source of support (possibly as a result of own effort) has to be 
accounted for. Such a model implies that there is a much greater inherent cognitive need to 
look for causes of motion for flying than for falling in the commonsense context. This may 
account for the much larger number of causal schemes arising from set B and the relatively 
few causal schemes from set C. Set C pictures tend to describe more dramatic situations 
many of which put the objects in motion into rather dangerous positions. This may explain 
the much larger number of D1 schemes arising from set C. 
5.6 Summary 
The categorization schemes produced by the students on motion event comic strip pictures 
reveal that students have two main kinds of concerns in the intuitive processing of motion 
events in everyday encounters: the need to give a broad and rough description as to what 
kind of physical motion script it is and the need to find out how the motion is 
effected/caused. In most of the cases, the explanations given by the students revealed that 
processing was not done by means of logical derivations according to rules relating the 
various parameters of motion, but rather involved a search for prototypical motion scripts 
like falling, bouncing, etc., that could be suitably applied to the motion at hand. This 
seems to support the idea that knowledge about motion events are stored in units that are 
larger and more structured than semantic nets. Such knowledge structures are likely to be 
at the level of complexity similar to Schank's (1975) scripts or Minsky's (1975) frames. 
They serve the purposes of dealing with the pragmatic concerns of trying to anticipate how 
the motion will develop and to search for strategies to handle the situation. The important 
distinction between animate and inanimate objects in commonsense considerations of 
motion can also be explained within such a context of looking for suitable strategies to 
handle the situation. The advantage of using such large and complex structures for 
memory storage is that the processing time can be much reduced since each script would 
hold default values for most of the motion parameters (slots). 
Another interesting finding from the present study is that older students who have received 
more instruction in physics have more ways of describing and analyzing motions than their 
younger counterparts. However, there is no evidence that the two groups possess 
fundamentally different structures in their script representations, nor is there a difference in 
the pragmatic outlook for the two groups of students. 
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Though there is no fundamental difference in the performance of the subjects from the two 
sexes, girls seem to exhibit more humanistic concerns and to play more on their 
imaginations in their processing of motion events. They produce a much higher proportion 
of thematic classifications which focus on people's intentions, the social circumstances of 
the motion, etc. On the other hand, boys seem to be more inclined towards constructing 
analogical/ theoretical models to explain for the causal mechanism of the motions. 
The A3 type schemes, that is, those schemes that try to propose causal mechanisms for the 
motions at hand, indicate attempts by the students to tackle the problem of causal agency 
beyond simply giving it a label, be it a concrete agent or an abstract one. There is an 
attempt to generalize across various specific agencies some general underlying mechanism 
whereby the causal effect takes place. The availability of such mechanisms in the 
knowledge structure about motion enables the cognitive processing about motion in 
everyday life to go beyond pattern matching and searching for an appropriate script to fit 
the event into. It represents some bootstrapping procedure where one 'can try to reason 
logically about the behaviour of a system even when no exact script for handling it is 
available. The level of explanation provided by this kind of schemes is thus deeper than a 
mere labelling of the causal agent and provides a link towards the scientific study of 
motion. 
Two of the schemes produced by the older group of students do exhibit a creative 
application of the scientific principles learnt to the solution of everyday pragmatic concern 
of causal analysis and anticipation. The main conceptual jumps taken were that causal 
agency is only required to effect a change in motion, and that though animate object may be 
able to influence their own course of motion by moving parts of their own body, they still 
have to succumb to the same physical laws of motion. 
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Chapter 6 THE PROGRAMMING TASK 
6.1 Introduction 
The main concern of the present research is to build up an in-depth cognitive model of 
children's conceptions of motion, including how they reason about them in everyday 
circumstances. The review in chapter 4 points out that the method of elicitation affects the 
quality and nature of the knowledge elicited as the nature of the task determines the mode of 
access to the long term memory and the depth of processing of the information. The 
classification task, described in the foregoing chapter, was chosen because it is a cognitive 
task requiring spontaneous reactions, and appealing to the subjects' direct perception of 
motion events. This suffices to provide some insight into the pertinent features of 
children's long term memory structures and reasoning patterns about motion events. 
However, this research also intends to probe into features of deeper modes of processing 
about motion events: How do children reason about everyday motion events when they are 
required to operate at a formal, rational level? Commonsense knowledge is typically fuzzy, 
largely tacit and there is no general agreement as to the intra-personal consistency in the 
choice of rules in dealing with motions in different contexts. What if children's ways of 
reasoning about motion are explored as an explicit externalization from them instead of as 
implicit deductions from their responses to certain tasks? What if we look for more 
considered, rationalized responses instead of spontaneous ones? Would we see any 
difference in the reasoning so elicited? 
To answer the above questions warrants the setting up of another task which can lead to a 
more explicit elicitation of ideas and presents a context for the researcher to probe deeper 
into the application of the elicited ideas to various situations. The task chosen was a 
programming task: subjects were invited to write PROLOG expert systems which would be 
capable of commonsense reasoning about motion. This method of knowledge elicitation 
was inspired by developments in cognitive science research. The basic idea here is that the 
subject plays the role of a teacher and the computer that of a learner. In the course of 
teaching the computer, the subject is obliged to externalize his/her ideas. Once these ideas 
and intuitions have been externalized, they become in some sense accessible to reflection. 
The resulting expert system encapsulating the externalized ideas thus 'freezes' the subject's 
ideas at a certain instant, allowing him/ her to use it to explore the logical consequences of 
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the externalized knowledge and at the same time to support easy modification when this is 
deemed necessary. 
6.2 Expert Systems 
In cognitive science research, it is common to use production systems to build cognitive 
models of human reasoning in various domains (Newell & Simon, 1972). Production 
systems are rule-based systems that generally comprise the following elements: 
A set of rules (productions) of the form 
If 	 condition 1 	 and 
condition 2 	 and 
then action 1 
action 2 
The 'if part determines the applicability of the rule and the 'then' part describes 
the action to be performed if the rule is applied. 
* One or more databases that contain whatever information is appropriate for the 
particular task. Some parts of the database may be permanent, while other parts 
of it may pertain only to the solution of the current program. 
A control strategy that specifies the order in which the rules will be compared to 
the database and a way of resolving the conflicts that arise when several rules 
match at once. 
(For an introduction to production systems, see Rich, 1983 or Winston, 1984) 
Apart from being used extensively to model human problem solving by information 
processing psychologists, production rules are also very popular as a form of knowledge 
representation in the creation of expert systems. The DENDRAL project (Feigenbaum et 
al, 1980) and the MYCIN project (Buchanan & Shortliffe, 1984) are two of the successful 
examples. An expert system is essentially a computer program capable of performing 
some tasks normally performed by a human expert (e.g. programs that can perform 
medical diagnosis or geological analysis). These tasks require a great deal of specialized, 
and very often empirical, knowledge that normally only experts have access to and most 
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people do not possess. Such programs are useful because there is usually a shortage of 
qualified human experts. Users normally consult an expert system when they have certain 
specific problems in mind. They put queries to the expert system, asking for advice or 
analysis as the case may be. When necessary, the expert system may query the user on 
certain pieces of information about the specific situation of the current consultation if such 
are needed for determining the answer to the user's query. Some expert systems also 
provide an explanation facility on how the answer to a query is arrived at. 
Technically, expert systems are usually built through a joint cooperation between a 
knowledge engineer and a domain expert. The knowledge engineer tries to elicit the 
knowledge that the domain expert uses when solving problems and to put this knowledge 
into the form of a program that can answer queries from the user and if necessary generate 
queries to the user about specific information relevant to the problem in hand. The expert 
system as an operational program thus comprises two kinds of knowledge: the domain 
knowledge characteristic of experts in the specific problem area and the capability to make 
inferences and deductions from the given knowledge base, an ability characteristic of 
general human intelligence. 
Every one of us can reasonably be called an expert in the domain of commonsense 
operations in the world of everyday motions: The fact that we have been faced with myriad 
different types of motion for years and been able to cope successfully with them justifies 
such a claim. What features can we find in the knowledge structures of these motion 
experts? How do such knowledge structures differ from the general rules and principles of 
Newtonian mechanics? 
The present investigation tries to elicit children's intuitive ideas about motion through 
asking them to write expert systems reflecting their own knowledge about motion, and 
observing their interactions with their own knowledge so expressed. 
It was anticipated that the secondary school students participating in this research would 
have little or no programming experience (it would be extremely undesirable to use 
programming experience as a criterion for selection of subjects for the purpose of the 
present research). As the subjects are expected to write expert systems reflecting their own 
expertise in the handling of everyday motions, they have to play the roles of both the 
domain expert and the knowledge engineer. To play the first role should present no 
problem, but to play the second role requires the skills of both knowledge elicitation and 
programming. In order that this task will not present insurmountable difficulties to the 
subjects, the choice of a suitable programming environment is of critical importance. 
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The software used for this task was the micro-PROLOG programming language (McCabe 
et al., 1985) together with an expert system shell, APES (short for Augmented Prolog for 
Expert Systems, Hammond & Sergot, 1984). PROLOG is different from the more familiar 
programming languages like BASIC or LOGO in that it is a declarative language whereas 
the latter are procedural ones. Programs written in procedural languages specify actions to 
be performed. They are geared to the description of what is to be done in order to achieve 
the desired result. Programs written in a declarative language on the other hand describes a 
set of relations or functions to be computed. A PROLOG program can be seen as a set of 
propositional statements containing facts and rules which then constitute a 'world' from 
which consequences can be generated when the program is executed. A PROLOG 
program is executed when a query is posed to the system. For example, a small PROLOG 
program describing the state of certain objects and the concept of support may read as 
follows: 
X rest-on Y if 
X on Y 
X rest-on Y if 
Z on Y and 
X rest-on Z 
X supports Y if 
Y rest-on X and 
X strong-enough-for Y 
book on table 
table on ground 
Mary on chair 
chair on ground 
ground strong-enough-for table 
table strong-enough-for book 
table strong-enough-for chair 
chair strong-enough-for Mary 
It can be seen that the first three statements in the above program are rules (with the first 
two defining a recursive relation 'rest-on') while the rest are facts. To find out from the 
program whether the book is supported, a query can be posed in the following format: 
is (table supports book) 
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and the program would respond YES. Alternatively, the program may also be asked to 
give a list of objects that are supported by the ground using the following query: 
which (x: ground supports x) 
and the program would respond with the following answer: 
book 
table 
Mary 
chair 
No (more) answers 
A distinguishing feature of the PROLOG language is that answers to queries like those des-
cribed above can be computed without explicit instructions inside the program about how 
the solution has to be computed. The reason is that PROLOG has built-in goal-resolution 
mechanisms based on first order predicate calculus and may thus be visualized as a logical 
inference engine (Clark & McCabe, 1984). Consequently, it is capable of performing 
logical inferences based only on input "knowledge" in the form of propositional statements. 
Furthermore, the processes of program development and execution can both be done as a 
form of dialogue: adding statements and querying the program can be done at any time. 
An inspection of the above program shows that the rules represent a relatively general way 
of looking at support whereas the facts statements are just specific data concerning a parti-
cular situation. Presumably the same program can be used to answer queries about support 
for other situations provided the relevant facts are entered into the program. In many expert 
systems, the program has the ability to ask the user about pieces of empirical information 
required during the process of computing the answer. Another attractive feature of many 
commercially available expert systems is that they can explain how they have arrived at the 
answers put forth by the program. 
APES is a program written in micro-PROLOG which extends the programming environ-
ment so that both the query-the-user facility and the explanation facility are available. A 
sample dialogue in the APES environment about the same problem of support can go on as 
follows: 
User: 	 X rest-on Y if X on Y. 
X rest-on Y if Z on Y and X rest-on Z. 
X supports Y if Y rest-on X and X strong-enough-for Y. 
User: 	 confirm (ground supports book) 
Computer: Is it true that book on ground? 
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User: 	 no. 
Computer: Is there any Y such that Y on ground and book on Y? If so, name the Y. 
User: 	 table. 
Computer: Is ground strong-enough-for book? 
User: 	 yes. 
Computer: I can confirm that ground supports book. 
User: 	 why? 
Computer: I can confirm that ground supports book because book rest-on ground and 
ground strong-enough-for book. 
User: 	 why (book rest-on ground)? 
Computer: I can confirm book rest-on ground because book on table and table on 
ground. 
User: 	 why (table on ground)? 
Computer :You told me (table on ground). 
From the above dialogue, we can see that the main advantage of using APES is in the 
execution of the program. When a Prolog program is used in APES environment, the 
computer is capable of asking the user for missing information or facts required for the 
inferences demanded. For example, a medical expert system should be able to ask the 
patient for specific information in order to arrive at a diagnosis. Furthermore, the computer 
is capable of explaining how it arrives at the inferences made using the facts and rules put 
in. 
APES belongs to one type of programming environment often referred to technically as an 
expert system shell. It is called a shell because the environment itself does not hold any 
explicit knowledge about the world whether in the form of facts or rules. However, upon 
entry of declarative information about a particular domain in the form of logical 
propositions, it can perform the functions of an expert system. 
There are a number of advantages in using expert system development as a knowledge 
elicitation and cognitive modeling task. Firstly, it forces the subjects to make explicit their 
ideas as to be able to put them into a formal system. Secondly, the resulting knowledge 
base is explorable by the subjects and can thus provide a feedback to them on the cognitive 
consequences of their own elicited models. Thirdly, this provides an opportunity for the 
subjects to modify and test their ideas in a non-threatening context, and at the same time 
leaving a traceable record of the changes that have taken place. Moreover, the task 
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requires the subjects to work for a number of one and a half hour sessions over an 
extended period of several weeks, thus providing a good context for the researcher to probe 
into the reasoning structures employed under different situations. 
6.3 The Pilot Study 
Building an expert system is a novel task for a secondary school student and this may thus 
be able to sustain their interest for a considerable period of time. However, it is a novel 
technique that has not been employed for similar purposes, so the feasibility of such a 
technique poses serious problems. A pilot study was carried out to answer the following 
questions: (i) Can a secondary school student with no programming experience learn to 
write such an expert system? (ii) What kinds of ideas about motion can students write 
when given such a task context?-. Would this. task prove too restrictive to the students for 
describing everyday conceptions of motion? (iii) What are the difficulties that one would 
encounter in this process? If such a task is practicable at all, what procedures should be 
adopted for it to be useful as a means of scientific enquiry into the subjects' conceptions 
and reasoning? 
All of the students who participated in the pilot study of the classification task were invited 
to take part in the programming task as well. As these were all form six students (from the 
same class), they represent the most intellectually capable section of the population in 
secondary schools. If the task proved too difficult for them, there would be no hope of 
success with subjects coming from lower down in the schools. As it was near examination 
time, two out of this group of four students declined this offer though they did think the 
task interesting. Of the two students who participated in this pilot study, one was the best 
student in the class and so the examination posed no threat for him. The other student was 
amongst the weakest in the class, but as he had already made up his mind at that time to 
quit school after the summer vacation, the examination again posed no hindrance. 
As the task was intended to elicit the ideas held by individual students, each of the two 
students worked separately. The students were told that the purpose of the exercise was to 
assess the friendliness and power of the expert system shell: whether it can be used by 
people with no training in computing to teach the computer some commonsense everyday 
knowledge. They are the ones to give the computer system the test by trying to teach it 
something about motion in the everyday world of human beings. After the exercise they 
would be requested to give their assessment of the system. Thus, the task as described to 
them focussed on the programming environment. This was to ensure that the participating 
students would not feel that they were being challenged or judged on their Physics 
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knowledge. However, as the task was to build an expert system capable of reasoning like 
the student himself/herself about motion, it provided a context for serious introspection on 
the part of the student. 
To start with, they were given an introductory session on programming in PROLOG. 
They were told that PROLOG programs consist of rules and facts. Only the infix format of 
PROLOG statements (available in APES) was introduced as this bears closer resemblance 
to natural language. To help them understand more about the working of the system as an 
expert system shell and the possible forms of interaction, a simple expert system on 
biological classification was used as an example. They started writing their own program 
in the second session. No guidelines were given to the students as to what they should 
write and they all found it difficult to pin down any ideas to write about at the start. To 
help them break the ice, it was suggested to them that they might like to start by writing 
rules about the ideas they had used'for classifying the motion comic pictures. 
The students worked on the programming task for five sessions, each lasting for about one 
and a half hours. Several observations were made in this process: 
i. The students found it easier to first jot down their ideas on paper before attempting to 
type them in as PROLOG rules. This was especially true for the weaker student. 
ii. As Taylor & du Boulay (1985) and Dean (1986) pointed out, the close resemblance 
of the PROLOG syntax to natural language is deceptive. Students found it easy to 
transform their ideas into PROLOG syntax. However, they tended to forget that 
what the computer does is actually pattern matching, a purely mechanical task, and 
that the computer does not understand the contents of the rules the way humans do. 
They did not appreciate the need to structure the rules to use exactly the same relation 
name when the meaning is the same. For example, they wrote 'motion needs a-force' 
on one occasion but 'running needs-a force' on another. To leave the rules exactly as 
they wrote them is not desirable because they could not see the full consequence of 
their ideas when queries were executed, since not all relevant rules could be invoked. 
However, intervention from the researcher was not always desirable. In many cases, 
it was difficult to tell whether the similar but different relations actually referred to 
slightly different ideas and intervention at this stage could unduly affect and shape the 
students' ideas. 
The student with the higher academic performance picked up the importance of 
structuring his rules very soon, and also began formulating hierarchically related 
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rules. The weaker student never realized the crucial difference between PROLOG 
statements as a formalism and ordinary natural language statements. 
iii. The students seemed to be more interested in expressing their ideas than in testing 
them out. Since the kinds of queries they intended to ask were on the whole simple 
ones, the restrictions of the PROLOG syntax did not pose a serious hindrance to 
them. 
iv. Both students found no serious difficulty in starting to work in PROLOG after the 
initial session. Sometimes errors arose which they could not debug by themselves. 
However, as the researcher was present all the time during the sessions, such 
difficulties could be sorted out without too much problem and no undue proportion of 
time was spent on the technicalities of the programming language. 
v. PROLOG forces the students to express their ideas in the form of general rules. It 
may thus be argued that this distorts commonsense ideas about motion because they 
are by nature fuzzy, informal, very often situated, context dependent, and may even 
be tacit. However, the PROLOG formalism forces them to reflect more deeply about 
what are the key issues and parameters concerned in different situations. 
Furthermore, the resulting program gives a relatively 'objective' record of the 
students' thoughts, an objectivity that is normally unavailable by probing through 
other means. The objectivity here refers to the fact that the elicited ideas are not just 
something written up by the researcher, but something written by the subject, open 
for inspection, reflection, exploration and which is capable of providing feedback on 
the operational consequences of the knowledge base, so that s/he can determine 
whether such a representation is satisfactory or not. 
vi. PROLOG syntax is sparse and inexpressive. Sometimes, it is difficult to appreciate 
the full meanings the students wanted to express just by reading the program. 
However, the programming activity provided a good context for communication 
between the students and the researcher and it allowed the researcher to probe deeper 
into the thoughts of the students under the pretext of trying to find out whether the 
rules do actually reflect their own ideas. 
vii. The contents of the programs written by the students reflected everyday, 
commonsense concerns which are not the subjects of discussion in school physics 
lessons, indicating that the programs do offer an insight into the students' intuitive 
beliefs about motion. At the same time, both students' programs also incorporated 
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terms and ideas learnt from school physics, indicating the possibility that knowledge 
from these two domains are interacting, and perhaps becoming integrated. 
viii. There were qualitative differences between the final programs produced by the two 
students. At the structural level, as mentioned earlier, one was much more 
hierarchical, forming an integrated whole, while the other program displayed much 
less inter-relationship between the rules and the whole program stood as an assorted 
set of statements. At the content level, the two programs reflected different levels of 
adherence to common misconceptions about motion, with one of the programs 
incorporating some Newtonian ideas. However, it is very difficult to directly 
compare the two programs as they wrote about different motions with different 
emphasis. 
The above observations from the pilot study results indicate that the task of asking students 
to write expert systems in PROLOG is technically feasible. The programs do provide an 
alternative means of probing into students' conceptions of motion, and that this technique 
offers a special kind of 'reflexivity' as described above which may be valuable to our 
understanding of commonsense conceptions of motion. The pilot study also provided 
valuable experience in the kinds of problems and difficulties encountered in employing 
such a technique, and demonstrated the need to adopt more formalized procedures in order 
to analyze and compare the elicited ideas from different subjects. 
6.4 The Programming Task in the Main Study 
6.4.1 Objectives of the Investigation 
As the report on the pilot study in the previous section indicates, expert system 
development in PROLOG is a potentially valuable experimental technique for probing into 
students' conceptions of motion. The technique was employed in the main study with 
some further specific objectives: 
i. To find out how features of the schemas for commonsense interpretation of motion as 
elicited in the classification task relate to the schemas elicited when a student is required 
to rationalize about the logical relations between different aspects of motion. 
ii. To find out how learnt physics concepts are incorporated into such schemas. 
iii. By investigating into the above two problems to seek insight into the difference in 
knowledge structures between high achievers and low achievers in physics and 
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between two age groups. Hopefully, this may also yield interesting information about 
the possible learning processes involved in the learning of mechanics. Differences in 
performance between the two age groups may be due to intellectual maturation with age 
or the amount of physics instruction received. No attempt is made in this investigation 
to explore these two factors as independent variables. 
6.4.2 Subjects 
The two variables that are of interest in this present investigation are the amount of physics 
instruction (especially mechanics) the student has received and the general ability of the 
student. Twelve students participated in the programming task for the main study: six 18-
yr-olds and six 15-yr-olds. The former were sixth form students studying science, and 
each of them had gained a grade C or above in 0-Level Physics. The latter were third form 
students who had not received any instructions in mechanics yet. The six students in each 
group (three girls and three boys) were representative of the high, average or low abilities 
in their respective classes. 
6.4.3 Administrative Details 
The following procedure was formalized and adhered to for conducting the programming 
task in the main study: 
i. Each participant was asked to participate in the classification task described in the last 
chapter. This generated some parameters/features to act as starting points for the 
building up of the expert systems. 
ii. Each group of students attended an initial session which introduced PROLOG 
programming and interaction with APES. This was the only group activity they had 
and it was done in this format to save time. Each student was given a handout on 
how to start working with the system (App. 5). 
iii. At the first programming session, each student was given a summary of the 
classification types used by that group of students during the classification interviews 
(App. 6). This provided some starting ideas for the students to develop their 
programs on, making it unnecessary to suggest ideas otherwise and thus eliminating 
the possibility of the researcher unknowingly biasing the students towards certain 
ideas. 
iv. The students were encouraged to put notes on paper about what they wanted to write 
before typing them into the computer so that they did not have to worry about the 
syntax at the first instance. For particularly complicated statements, the researcher 
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sometimes helped the students to transform them into PROLOG syntax on paper first, 
and asked them if that actually represented their thoughts, before asking them to type 
the rules in. 
v. In order that the results from the programming task could be easily compared, it 
would be desirable if they were all concerned with roughly the same aspects of 
motion. However, it was considered not suitable to ask the students to write on any 
particular theme right from the start so as to allow them greater freedom in the 
exploration of the system and to arouse interest. From about the third session, when 
they had finished with their first set of ideas and began to think of new topics to write 
about, it was gently suggested to them that they might like to write some rules on 
what affects motion, causes of motion or control of motion. Which of these three 
topics they did write about was entirely up to them. Each student worked for six to 
eight sessions on the programming task, each session lasting for about one and a half 
hours. 
vi. During the programming sessions, whenever there was a discourse between the 
researcher and the student clarifying the contents and meaning of the rules and how 
the students actually thought about motion, the conversation was audiotaped. 
vii. At intervals, when the students had finished typing in a set of rules, they were 
encouraged to test the programs using different concrete situations. This posed no 
serious problem because, normally, the students would already have in mind some 
situations when they first made up the rules: Syntactically the rules were general 
rules, but often they were actually anchored to very specific situations when they 
were first formulated. Thus they normally did the tests using the anchoring 
situations and these usually produced acceptable results. It was considered desirable 
to confront students with situations which produce conflicting answers to queries so 
as to provoke students to reconsider seriously what they had already written. When 
the students became reasonably pleased with the answers from the test questions, the 
researcher would suggest different, and possibly, more stringent test situations for 
the programs. 
viii. Most of the activities during the programming sessions were initiated by the students. 
However, it was sometimes necessary for the researcher to act as initiator, e.g. when 
she spotted a syntax error or when she wanted to suggest a test situation. Notes were 
taken to record the initiation of all the activities. 
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ix. Screen dumps of all computer interactions during the programming sessions were 
recorded. Brief notes were also taken during all the sessions to record the develop-
ment of events and the main ideas expressed. These were then re-organized to pro-
duce the diary notes on each of the sessions shortly after they had taken place (see 
next section). 
x. There was a slight technical difference in the organization for the younger group of 
students. Instead of using APES as the expert system shell, another shell written in 
PROLOG Professional (McCabe et al., 1985), MITSI (Briggs, 1984), was used. 
MITSI is a shell very similar, slightly less powerful but much more friendly and easy 
to use when compared with APES. It also supports the infix format, query-the-user 
facility and offers explanations for answers. This change in software did not affect 
the comparability of results between the two groups of students and the change was 
necessary in order to make the task less technically threatening for the younger group 
of students. 
xi. In the original planning, after the students from one age group had completed the 
programming task for some time, each of them would be invited to test all the final 
programs from their own group with standard test objects and give a written 
assessment of the performance of each of these programs, including their own. The 
purpose of this exercise was to find out how public, that is, how generally acceptable 
the reasoning elicited from these programs are. However, because of difficulties in 
time arrangements, only the 18-yr-olds completed this exercise, and only on a very 
limited scale. 
6.5 Data Collection and Preparation 
For each programming session, there were four sources of data collection: 
i. Written notes by students about ideas they would like to put into the program. 
ii. Screen dump of all computer interactions. 
iii. Notes taken by the researcher during the session, recording the development of activi-
ties, the initiators of the individual activities and the main development of ideas. 
iv. Transcripts of parts of the conversation between the student and researcher for clarify-
ing the ideas they were writing on or sometimes about how they reasoned about every-
day motions. 
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In order to facilitate systematic analysis of data, these four forms of data needed to be 
collated. Upon inspection, it was found that each programming session could be subdivid-
ed into episodes, there being essentially four kinds of episodes: writing notes on ideas, 
addition of rules into the knowledge base, testing of the program or modification of rules. 
It was decided that diary notes for each of the sessions containing a description of what 
happened, the development and exposition of ideas, collated from the researcher's written 
notes and transcripts of conversations, alongside a record of the program development 
would be a clear and useful format to adopt for the data preparation. Such diary notes, an 
example of which is shown in table 6.1, were compiled shortly after each programming 
session from the above four sources of data, and these formed the basis for the further 
analysis of data. 
Table 6.1 Sample diary notes for one of the programming sessions. 
DIARY NOTES FOR PROGRAMMING SESSION 2 
BRENDA 
September 29th, 1986. 
EVENT 
1 She asked me about the key words 
confirm and find - how they should 
be used in the program. I then tried 
to clarify the three different hats that 
she is wearing alternately, stressing 
their relationship and when she 
should wear which - the first hat is 
that of the expert, when she is trying 
to extract her own commonsense 
knowledge about motion; the second 
hat is that of the knowledge engineer/ 
computer programmer, when she is 
trying to put her own thoughts into a 
Prolog program; and the last hat is 
that of a user who wants to solve 
some problems using the finished 
expert system,when she is testing the 
program with "find" or "confirm". 
2. She tested the rules she put in last 
using the apple as the testing object. 
She seemed to find the response 
acceptable. 
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT 
TESTING 
find (_force: apple experience _force) 
->air-current (reason:moving upwards) 
->gravity (reason:travelling paraboli-
cally) 
-> no more 
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EVENT 
3. I then suggested using the tape-
recorder as the object. The response 
- that the tape-recorder does not 
experience gravity is obviously 
wrong to me, but she was not 
bothered. 
4. She looked at the screen for a 
moment and then went on to test the 
program with a kite. 
5. After she finished, I asked if she is 
happy with the result. She only said 
that it is too small to really know 
much. I asked if she is satisfied with 
the respon-ses so far from the 
computer. She said she think they 
are o.k. I then referred back to the 
response to the case of the tape-
recorder and asked if she thought that 
was reasonable. At that point she 
said it was wrong because tape-
recorder should also experience 
gravity. I asked her again if she is 
really sure that the tape recorder does 
experience gravity, to which she 
responded to the affirmative. I then 
asked her to make amendments to 
take account of this and she added a 
further rule in. 
6. Because "is", a reserve word for 
PROLOG, was used in the program, 
a syntax error occurred and we made 
the appropriate amendment and tested 
it with a book. That was o.k. 
7. I then suggested we should give 
more tests on the program and 
suggested to use the case of the kite 
that she used earlier. She proceeded 
to do so, without actually anticipating 
that the result would be that it does 
not experience gravity. After she has 
read the explanation, she immediately 
said that it was wrong and that she 
should cross out the condition saying 
that the object should be still from the 
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT 
TESTING 
confirm (tape-recorder experience gra-
vity) 
-> No 
TESTING 
find(_force: kite experience _force) 
-> air-resistance 
-> centripetal-force 
-> no more 
ADDITION 
_object experience gravity if 
_object has weight and 
object is still 
MODIFICATION 
the relation name in the last condition 
was changed and the amended rule reads: 
_object experience gravity if 
_object has weight and 
_object stay still 
TESTING 
confirm (book experience gravity) 
-> Yes (reason: book has weight and 
stay still) 
TESTING 
confirm (kite experience gravity) 
-> No (reason: not travelling paraboli-
cally and not stay still) 
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EVENT 
rule. I asked if there would be any 
difference whether the object is still 
or not and she said that there should 
not be as far as gravity is concerned. 
I then asked her why she added that 
condition in at the first instance. 
B: Actually all objects are affected by 
gravity. But I wanted to write a rule 
specially for still objects. I wanted to 
specify that it stays still. But after 
have put that in, then it gives me a 
result that I don't agree with. But if 
!now add in a condition for kites, that 
it can move and still have gravity. 
That seems to be rather contradictory. 
What should I do? 
I: When you put in the condition about 
stay still, what was in you mind? 
What did you want to express? 
B: I was all along talking about things that 
are moving. So I wanted to put in a 
rule that can talk about objects that 
stay still. 
I: But actually, would there be any 
difference between moving and non-
moving objects? 
B: No difference. For gravity. As long as 
it has weight, then it would be affected 
by gravity. 
I: But you must be thinking of something 
when you added that condition in. So 
there should not be no difference at 
all. Or else you wouldn't have added 
that in. 
B: Yes,.. 
I: So, what were you thinking then? 
B: 	 It was talking about the tape 
recorder in particular. I wanted to 
specify that it is staying still. 
8. She then decided to eliminate that 
condition. Then she tested the chang-
ed program with the kite again. 
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT 
MODIFICATION 
eliminated last condition on rule to 
become: 
A object experience gravity if 
_object has weight 
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EVENT 
9. She then went on herself to test the 
program with the case of a bird. I 
couldn't quite understand why the 
bird was moving upwards, in a circle 
as well as parabolically. 
B: It sometimes moves in a circular 
fashion, sometimes it would move 
down. There are different cases. For 
somebody coming along to use the 
system, he would look at the case of 
the bird very generally, so it would 
some-times move like this, sometimes 
move like that, and so on. 
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT 
TESTING 
find (force: bird experience _force) 
-> air resistance (reason: travelling up-
ward) 
-> centripetal force (reason: moving in 
a circle) 
-> gravity (reason: travelling paraboli-
cally) 
-> air-resistance(reason:same as above) 
-> gravity (reason: has weight) 
At the end, I asked her to comment 
on the behavior of the program. She 
again said that it is a bit too small, 
but the responses are quite reason-
able. The task for the next session 
was agreed to be working on control 
of motion or cause of motion in the 
form of 
_object motion-controlled-by 	  
if 	  
or 
_object motion-caused-by 	  
if 	  
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CHAPTER 7 ANALYSIS OF THE PROGRAMMING 
TASK RESULTS 
7.1 A General Description of Performance 
As was found during the pilot study, the students in the main study did not find it difficult 
to write PROLOG rules about motion. Though the programming environment forced them 
to write their ideas down in a formal syntax, their interpretation of the task at hand was 
much less formal. This was especially so with the younger group of students. They tended 
to see this as an opportunity to express their own ideas and seemed to have stronger 
confidence in the rules they wrote down. As was explained in the previous chapter, there 
are basically four kinds of episodes taking place in a programming session: writing notes 
on ideas, addition of rules into the knowledge base, testing of the program and modifica-
tion of rules. Table 7.1 shows the number of instances of each of the three kinds of 
programming episodes: addition, testing and modification of rules, for each of the two 
groups of students. The episodes of notes writing were left out because it was essentially a 
pre-writing exercise, trying to formulate ideas. 
Table 7.1 Statistical counts of the different activities during program 
development. 
(a) Distribution by student 
Episode 
F. 6 
Students 
F. 3 
wong evon lin bren sand fong cheng schan ychan cheul Ieung wat 
Addition 27 	 18 3 37 12 41 50 	 34 	 48 	 51 36 35 
Testing 16 	 39 39 31 37 26 3 	 29 37 28 16 5 
Modification 11 	 19 13 12 9 22 2 	 10 12 14 7 6 
(b) Distribution by student group 
Episode Student group 
F.6 	 F.3 
Addition 148 (35%) 254 (59%) 
Testing 188 (45%) 128 (30%) 
Modification 86 (20%) 51(12%) 
Total 422 (100%) 433 (100%) 
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Results from the table show that the F.6 students tended to be more reflective, devoting 
about half the total number of episodes to the testing of rules, whereas the F.3 students 
devoted 60% of the episodes to the adding in of new rules. The greater reflectiveness of 
the F.6 students also resulted in many more modifications made to the rules. This also 
resulted in a sense in a higher "productivity" of the F.3 students, producing 67% more 
rules than the F.6 group, though the total number of episodes for both groups were 
roughly the same 
Besides a general difference in reflectiveness, the older group also displayed greater 
systematicity in their program development. Students in the F.6 group all started working 
by adding in rules describing various features and parameters about motion. Once they had 
taken up the suggestion to develop rules on the cause or control of motion, they would 
work on the problem with focussed attention, trying to work out various possibilities under 
the same theme before switching to another. None of the F.3 group displayed the same 
order of systematicity.' Even after they had agreed to write rules on cause or control, their 
pattern of working was not much different: The themes for the rules kept changing all the 
time, switching back and forth, suggesting that they were trying to put down whatever they 
thought about at that time. They did not display the same level of mental discipline as was 
evident in the older group. 
7.2 Organization of the Analysis 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the PROLOG programming environment offers a 
medium for the students to externalize, reflect on and explore their ideas. The analysis of 
the programming task data is divided into two main parts. The first part of the analysis 
focuses on the programming task as an externalization process. As such, it can also be 
viewed as a knowledge elicitation process, offering a means to look into the students' 
conceptions of motion and to compare the results with those obtained in other researches on 
intuitive physics, employing other methods of elicitation. The second part of the analysis 
focuses on the testing and rule modification processes. Because the written rules are 
'runnable', the externalized knowledge base was open to exploration, reflection and 
modification. The analysis examines the students' behaviour during the testing and 
modification episodes, how the students faced conflicts presented in the program testing, 
the cognitive strategies employed in the resolution of such conflicts and how such a process 
may affect the genesis of the students' ideas. 
The rest of this chapter will be devoted to the first part of the analysis as described above: 
an analysis based on the content of the rules developed by the students. This will be done 
1 1 1 
first by looking at the content and structure of the rules: what the students were writing 
about. The rules will also be analyzed to find out the sort of physics of motion they reflect 
and thus to explore one of the main objectivesof this research: what the programming task 
data can tell us about intuitive conceptions of motion, and how the amount of formal 
physics instruction affects such understanding. Next, a deeper level of analysis will be 
attempted: the rules will be classified into groups according to the kind of explanation or 
prediction that they offer, so as to be able to make inferences about the level of the 
students' cognitive functioning in their performance of the programming task. 
The second part of the analysis will be discussed in the next chapter. 
7.3 A First Level Analysis: Contents and Structure of the Rules 
At the content level, the rules written by the students fell into four clearly identifiable areas: 
i) rules relating different attributes and aspects of motion, 
ii) rules relating to causes of motion, 
iii) rules about control of motion and 
iv) rules providing definitions for terms. 
The first group constitutes the largest single group of rules for both the F.3 and the F.6 
students, accounting for nearly half of the total number of rules. The figures in table 7.2 
indicate that the relative distribution of the different broad content areas of the rules are very 
similar for the two groups of students. However, a careful scrutiny of the finer distribution 
amongst the different rule structures in each broad rule group shows that the important 
differences between the two age groups are such that a more careful analysis is warranted. 
Table 7.2 Content distribution of rules. 
Content type Student Group 
F.6 F.3 
About motion 59 (40%) 124 (50%) 
About cause 33 (22%) 60 (24%) 
About control 28 (19%) 11 (4%) 
Definitions 15 (10%) 19 (8%) 
Miscellaneous 13 (9%) 33 (13%) 
Total 148 (100%) 247 (100%) 
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Most of the PROLOG statements written were in the form of production rules with the 
following syntax: 
goal statement (conclusion)if 
condition 1 (premise) and 
condition 2 and 
This raises two problems. The formalism is very rigid, and in addition the whole set of 
rules should form a logical system. These students had had very little experience of work-
ing with logical propositions, and none had had the chance to do so in the context of build-
ing up a formal system about a specific domain. Thus, for example, what relations should 
go as premises and which should go as conclusions were not clear to them. Out of the total 
of about 400 rules written by the students, only about 10 distinctly different kinds of relat-
ions can be identified. Most of these relations can be found taking up positions of premises 
in some rules and conclusions in some others. Sometimes we may even be able to find 
both 
p(x) if q(x) 	 and 
q(x) if p(x) 
as two separate rules in the same program, with p(x) and q(x) definitely not seen as equi-
valent relations from the associated discussions with the students concerned. Very often, 
the logical implication was only treated as a means to indicate a high reliability of co-occur-
rence, and not a causal sequence. 
Table 7.3 lists the distribution of rules for each student, with each broad content group 
subdivided into finer subgroups taking the structures of the rules into account: each 
subgroup having one particular composition of relations in the premises and conclusions 
ends of the rules. It can be seen that the older group of students exercised much greater 
caution in their choice of formats and that they showed a better understanding of what a 
logical proposition is. Of the 25 finer subgroups of rules, the F.6 students' rules were 
distributed amongst 13 of them, whereas the F.3 students' rules were distributed over 20 
subgroups. 
7.3.1 Rules about aspects and attributes of motion 
The largest content group of rules is the set relating to different aspects of motion, titled as 
'about motion' in tables 7.2 and 7.3. This group can be subdivided into 8 smaller 
subgroups of rules. The two most popular subgroups are of the format 
motion type if 
observable physical conditions 
and 
motion attribute (abstract) if 
observable physical conditions. 
1 1 3 
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The former subgroup tries to deduce the kind of trajectory type from the observed physical 
conditions of the motion. Some of these express concerns very similar to those found in 
kinematics in the study of classical mechanics, for example: 
motion type falling if 
motion due to gravity and 
motion moved downwards and 
motion will reach ground and 
motion speed increasing. 
More often, however, the first subgroup of rules represents empirical correlations between 
motion type and physical observables like whether something is supported or the type of 
object that is moving. The popularity of this kind of rules may be taken as another 
indication that knowledge about motion events is stored in the form of encapsulated 
complex schemas, or scripts, as described in chapter 5. Each rule in this category tries to 
express the encapsulated knowledge in the form of reliable coexistence of parameters, that 
is, default values for the slots, for a prototypical motion script. Two examples of such 
rules are: 
thing will fall if 
not (thing supported by other thing). 
thing move upward if 
thing is living thing and 
thing has wings. 
The latter subgroup tries to make deductions about some abstract attributes of the moving 
object, for example about force or energy, from the observable physical conditions. This 
coincides with the concerns of dynamics. An example of this kind of rule is: 
thing move upward and then downward if 
thing has limited energy in upward direction. 
These two most popular subgroups had rules from both F.3 and F.6. Of the rest, one sub-
group had rules from F.6 only, and all rules in the other subgroups from F.3 only with the 
exception of one rule from the F.6 group in one of them.. 
The group to which only F.6 contributed is the subgroup 
expected trajectory if 
some conditions. 
This subgroup tries to deduce whether the subsequent motion/trajectory of the object can be 
anticipated or not, and this is the only subgroup which is absent from the F.3 students' 
work. As noted in the analysis of the classification task data in an earlier chapter, to be able 
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to anticipate the subsequent development of a motion is one of the most important 
pragmatic concerns in the everyday processing of motion related information. Some of the 
older students thus exhibited the ability to externalize this pragmatic concern, a concern 
which is commonly held implicitly. In the formal study of kinematics, students would be 
required to work out the variations in displacement and speed with time. This formal 
physics training might also have prompted the older students to put in rules of this kind. 
As mentioned above, the other subgroups are essentially only found in the work of the 
younger students. A careful examination of these five subgroups suggests that this differ-
ence in their production also relates to the two groups' different background in formal 
physics training. These five subgroups will be discussed in turn below. 
i) motion attribute (concrete) if motion type 
It is understandable that if the type of motion is known, many features of the motion 
can be predicted. However, to the older group, such features or attributes reside 
already in the definition of the type of motion and such a rule does not portrait anything 
interesting. 
ii) motion attribute (concrete)if observable physical conditions 
Again for the older group, the primary problem was to deduce from the observable 
physical conditions the type of motion involved. Once that is determined, the motion 
attributes would be known. 
iii) motion attribute (concrete) if nature of object (animistic) 
The essential message in such rules were just expressions of animism, for example: 
things cannot do more than one action at a time if 
thing is a dead object. 
iv) motion type if motion attributes (abstract) 
The rules here express the belief that different types of forces would be required for 
different types of motion. For example: 
thing path shape parabolic if 
thing has bounce force. 
The older group of students are more used to justifying assumptions about forces from 
observable physical conditions. 
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v) motion attribute (concrete) if abstract motion attributes 
These rules essentially express the belief that larger forces (or sometimes energy) lead 
to higher speed, greater movements, while friction would slow things down. For 
example: 
thing distance moved big if 
thing force great. 
Such statements are explicitly in opposition to what the older group of students have 
learnt in mechanics. However, their not putting them down in the form of explicit rules 
does not mean that they do not hold such beliefs implicitly. 
7.3.2 Rules about causes of motion 
The 10 subgroups of rules concerning causes of motion (refer to table 7.3) broadly fall into 
three types according to their function. Five of these subgroups try to predict the causes of 
motion for some given conditions. The next two subgroups try to predict the attributes of a 
motion when the causal agent is known. The last three subgroups try to enumerate and 
describe possible causes of motion. 
An examination of the conceptions of causation reflected in the rules brings out several 
striking features. Firstly, the younger students saw two basically different kinds of 
motion: autonomous and non-autonomous motions. The former were seen to be performed 
only by animate objects and the rules in the subgroup 
control agent i 	 <- 	 nature of object 
reflects such ideas. An example of such a rule is 
thing caused to move by itself if 
thing is a living object. 
The older students' work on causation did not reflect such a distinction and they did not 
have rules in this subgroup. 
Another prominent feature of these rules is that all the rules on causation, with the excep-
tion of the ones about autonomous motions described above, conform to one single general 
form, which is expressed diagrammatically in fig. 7.1. Such a general form can also be 
labelled a "gestalt" in the sense used by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and the general form 
depicted here is similar to Andersson's (1986) 'gestalt of causation'. 
In the rules for the prediction of causal agency, the F.3 students did not make explicit 
reference to any necessary mediation for causation, (that is, there were no rules identifying 
forces as causal agents or necessary conditions for motion to occur,) and their rules 
expressed a pragmatic, a theoretical correlation between likely causal agents and observable 
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act on (cause) 
Fig. 7.1. Diagram showing the general form (gestalt) of causation expressed by the students' 
rules. 
features of the motion. These rules again seem to be anchored on specific stereotypes of 
motion and the premises in the rules specify prominent features of that type of motion. An 
example of such a rule is: 
motion caused by wind if 
motion occurs in sky. 
Some of the older students gave more elaborate descriptions of the causal mechanism in 
their rules. Many of their rules refer to forces being required as a necessary mediation for 
agency, and some identified specific forces as the causal agents concerned. Thus they 
produced rules of the following forms, 
concrete causal agent i 
	
force required for the motion 
and 
abstract causal agent(force) 	 observable physical conditions. 
Examples of these two types of rules are: 
object-A motion caused by object-B if 
object-A initially in contact with object-B and 
object-A force supplied by object-B. 
object-A motion caused by reaction force if 
object-A involved in collision and 
object-A recoiled after collision and 
object-A collided with object-B 
not (object-A embedded in object-B). 
These two forms of rules taken together express a model of causation as described in fig. 
7.2. 
The F.6 students also distinguished between two possible kinds of agency, physical agents 
and circumstantial factors such as the origins of the forces causing motion. The following 
two rules are examples of such a distinction. 
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receive affected 
object 
has has has 
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infer 
object motion caused by reaction force if 
object involved in collision and 
object recoiled after collision and 
not object embedded in the object it collided with. 
object motion caused by gravity if 
object moved in gravitational field and 
object moved downwards and 
not controlled by object in motion and 
affected by mass of object in motion and 
object speed increasing and 
object in motion will reach ground. 
mediating causal agent 
E 	 —I 
Fig. 7.2 The general form of causal mechanism as evidenced by the rules written by some 
F.6 students. 
Though most of the F.3 students did not label forces directly as agents, they share the same 
fundamental general form or gestalt as depicted in fig. 7.1. The important role force plays 
in their causal "gestalt" of motion can be seen in the last four subgroups of rules on 
causation. These include rules like: 
thing given force by other-thing if 
thing movement helped by other-thing. 
thing caused by move by something if 
something is a kind of force. 
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thing caused to stop if 
thing is a living object and 
thing has no force. 
The main difference between the two age groups in their conception of causation is that for 
the older group, force plays a much more central role in the causal process and this is 
reflected by their labelling force as the cause of motion, whereas the younger group 
separates force out clearly as the necessary ingredient for motion, and the status of agency 
is attributed to physical objects only when discussing particular motion situations. 
7.3.3 Rules about control of motion 
Ideas about control seem to be more varied across individuals than those about causation. 
Four main conceptions of control can be identified. 
First, there are those who used control more or less as a synonym for cause, writing 
exactly identical rules for both cause and control: 
object motion controlled by water current if 
object moving up and down in water, 
object motion caused by water current if 
object moving up and down in water. 
A second conception of control was to link control with those causal agents that are capable 
of exercising intentions and will-power, for example, 
motion controlled by object in motion if 
motion deliberately done by object in motion and 
motion can change on will of object in motion. 
A third conception was to attribute control to the dominating factor amongst a number of 
influences on the motion. An example of such a rule is 
motion is controlled by self if 
object moving is B and 
external force acting on B and 
external force less than maximum force exertable by B and 
B can respond to stimulation and 
B can be aware of occurrence of motion. 
Curiously, all the above three conceptions of control of motion were absent from the 
younger students' rules on control. They did not look for agents of control. Instead, when 
they did write about control, they wrote about control as a possible state of a moving 
object, and they attributed control only to animate objects. Examples of such rules are 
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thing can control own motion if 
thing is living object, 
thing motion under control if 
thing is dead(meaning inanimate) object and 
thing used by animal. 
Here again, we can see an explicit expression of concern for autonomous motion as a 
separate category by the younger students. 
7.3.4 Rules offering definitions 
Most of the students, at one point or another, felt the need to clarify the meanings of certain 
terms to ensure against ambiguities in the programs. Most of the 'definition' rules were of 
this type. However, some of these rules can also be seen simply as programming devices. 
For example, one of the rules in this group was 
thing state at rest if 
not thing is moving. 
This rule was put in not for clarifying the rest state to the human user, but for the benefit of 
the computer in its goal resolution process. Such rules were normally put in when the 
students realized that the computer did not understand natural language and could not 
resolve certain queries because some statements carrying the same meaning had been 
entered in a different syntax. 
7.3.5 Miscellaneous rules 
Those rules not classifiable in the above four categories roughly fall into two groups. They 
are either highly particular descriptions of features of particular classes of objects or 
interactions not directly relating to motion, or they are more abstract relations about force 
and energy. These are respectively labelled as concrete relations and abstract relations in 
table 7.3. Examples of these are: 
thing may be damaged if 
thing crash with another thing. 
thing force increase if 
thing energy increase. 
The ideas reflected by these rules that are relevant to motion are found in the other types of 
rules already. 
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7.4 Patterns of Agency 
Analysis of the programs as elicited knowledge would not be complete without going 
above the individual rule level. Each of the students' programs paints a conception of the 
world of motion and it would be valuable to try and map what they seem to be. This 
section attempts to achieve this by looking at the conceptions of agency described by each 
program and to compare their features. 
As Piaget (1974) has pointed out, the primacy of action and motion as an essential part of 
our experience from the beginning of life provides the experiential basis for the 
construction of causal concepts. It was thus no surprise that the notion of causality was a 
consistently important theme coming up in the classification task protocols, and that most 
students found little difficulty in writing rules about causes of motion. Most of the 
programs had the main chunk devoted to the explicit elaboration of conditions for 
determining the cause or control of motion. However, one of the programs did not contain 
any rules explicitly on causes of motion -Fong explicitly refused to write about the cause of 
motion, giving the explanation that the task was too difficult. Nevertheless, he did embark 
on building a program around the problem of control of motion. 
On closer examination, it is found that most of the programs could not distinguish clearly 
between the two concepts 'cause' and 'control'. Further, irrespective of whichever of these 
two concepts they were writing on, the ultimate concern was with agency for the motion. 
Thus it was considered appropriate that a representation of the causal conceptions be 
extended to include the notions of control. One of the programs, Cheung's, did not 
explicitly use words like cause or control in the rules. However, an examination of this 
program reveals that the ultimate concern for the whole program was still the problem of 
agency for the motions. The present analysis thus tries to compare the main stories the 
programs presented by looking at the different 'gestalts' (patterns, structural forms) of 
agency for motion they reflected. 
7.4.1 Development of a formalism for representation 
In order to extract the conceptions of agency from the programs, it is desirable to develop a 
scheme of representation that can highlight the causal relations between entities. This 
imposes two constraints on the design of such a scheme. First, despite differences in the 
detailed contents, there must be some features that are invariant among causal conceptions. 
It would be highly desirable for the representation to retain these invariances. Another 
constraint is that not all the contents of the rules should be represented. Only those ideas 
relevant to the present focus of concern, agency of motion, ought to be represented to 
eliminate unnecessary distractions. 
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As was pointed out in chapter 3, knowledge representation formalisms can be classified 
into two broad categories: semantic net types of representation which are essentially very 
open, and can be used for representing any structure with entities (nodes) and relations 
between entities (links); and encapsulated knowledge structures like scripts and frames that 
are used for representing specific kinds of knowledge having well-defined structures. In 
the context of the present task, the former type of formalism, namely semantic nets, is more 
appropriate as it allows for the flexibility needed to accommodate the different ideas from 
all twelve subjects. What is needed here is a representation that can handle entities and 
different types of relations, and encapsulated script type structures may be imposing 
unnecessary (and possibly undesirable) restrictions onto the knowledge to be represented. 
The first step in the development of the network formalism was to identify the entities/ 
concepts to be represented. Two entities must be there by definition: object and its motion. 
Three other major items are cause, control and force/energy (force and energy are collapsed 
into one entity here since those students mentioning both in their programs did not distin-
guish between them in any clear way). For ease of comparison, it was decided that these 
major entities should occupy fixed locations in the representations. 'Motion' and 'object' 
are respectively placed at the top and bottom of each network. 'Cause' and 'control' are 
respectively placed on the left and right hand side of the net when they do appear in the 
program. The position of the entity 'force/energy' is left floating, to be placed at different 
positions in the representations for different programs in order to reflect more appropriately 
the actual role played by it in each instance. The network is constructed by recording 
relations directly concerned with cause, control or force/energy. Relationships concerning 
the moving object or the motion are also recorded if they relate to the issue of agency for 
the motion. 
7.4.2 The network notation 
Nodes 
There are five different node notations. 
The thick circle is reserved for the four main entities motion, 
object, cause and control. 
Thin circles are for representing events, concrete objects or 
relations. A thick oval is used to represent the main concept 
'force' or 'energy'. 
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Thin ovals are used for representing abstract attributes and 
instances of force/energy. 
A small circle attached to a line is used for representing 
properties of a certain entity. 
Links 
There are six kinds of links in the network. 
This represents a process relating two entities, e.g. produc-
tion, participation. The exact nature of the process would be 
labelled against the arrow sign. 
The line coming out of the process arrow is used to link the 
process with entities that are produced in the process. 
This is to link instances of a concept to the concept itself. 
The small circular terminator end of the link resides in the 
higher level concept. 
This is to relate an entity with its subsets. The end of the link 
terminated with an empty square resides in the superset 
entity. 
This is to link entities with their properties. 
This is to indicate a correspondence, a relationship, between 
the two links attached to each of the two entities at the two 
ends of the dotted line. 
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7.4.3 Main structural forms of the agency gestalt 
Several notable features can be identified from the networks. First of all, causality or 
agency is a main organization concept for motion and the students used it equally for all 
kinds of motion, from autonomous, to non-autonomous and to those motions where no 
observable physical agent could be identified, e.g. falling or rolling down an incline. 
'... the simplest causal relationship between an agent and a recipient of 
the action presupposes the transmission of something - movement, 
force, etc.' 
Piaget (1974), p.12. 
The above statement lucidly describes the essence of all the networks depicting the agency 
'gestalts' of the students. However, there is no uniformity in the nature (kind) of entities 
that are perceived to be the main causes of or agencies for motion. In some instances, the 
agents referred to were concrete entities like physical objects, natural phenomena (wind, 
water current), etc. It is difficult to tell, in these cases, whether any mediating transmission 
was pre-supposed. In most other cases, concrete agencies played a lesser role and some 
mediation (normally referred to as force or energy) was hypothesized for the causal 
process. 
Another dimension of difference between the networks lies in the perceived roles of the 
agent and the affected. In most of the networks, there is a clear distinction between the 
two, the agent being the active party and the affected the passive one. This distinction in 
role is, a fortiori, to be found in all the networks where the causal processes depicted are 
immediate transmissions. Even in the networks where mediation is hypothesized, most 
perceive the agent as the provider of the mediating entity and the affected as the recipient of 
this same entity. The following rule from Evon's program is a good example of this line of 
reasoning: 
object-A motion caused by object-B if 
object-A initially in contact with object-B and 
object-A force supplied by object-B. 
However, in two of the programs, the mediating entity was not expressed as directly 
provided by the agent, but through an event, an interaction, where both the agent and the 
affected partake. In these cases, the role difference between the agent and the affected 
seems to dissolve to a large extent and the relationship between the two parties start to look 
symmetrical. Furthermore, it can be seen from these networks that the agent would also be 
affected, and that the process would be reciprocal. Fong's program is a good example 
showing this kind of reasoning and a few rules extracted from his program are quoted here 
as an illustration: 
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object-A has a motion controlled by object-B if 
object-B move along path-C and 
object-A plan path-C and 
object-A has the power to influence motion of object-B. 
object-A has the power to influence motion of object-B if 
object-A directly influence motion of object-B. 
object-A directly influence motion of object-B if 
object-B attracted by object-A. 
object-B attracted by object-A if 
object-B is affected gravitationally by object-A. 
object-B is affected gravitationally by object-A if 
object-B has mass and 
object-B near object-A and 
object-A has huge mass. 
It can be seen from the above program lines that though it is still possible to distinguish 
between the agent and the affected, both parties would be affected by the gravitational inter-
action and if object-A does directly influence object-B, object-B also influences object-A. 
According to the two dimensions discussed above, that of media-tion and reciprocity, the 
networks can be classified into three distinct categories. The following analysis will treat 
each as a kind of 'gestalt', that is, an organized expectation about types of entity and 
relationship. 
7.4.3.1 The unmediated agency 
Three of the networks (fig. 7.3 - 7.5) made no explicit reference to mediated transmissions. 
The agents referred to in the rules were all concrete physical agencies, e.g. man, wind, etc. 
In Leung's program (fig. 7.4), though some mention was made of force and energy, these 
two entities were not seen as related to the causation process. The agency gestalt for 
Brenda's program is more difficult to classify. In Brenda's network (fig. 7.5), abstract 
terms like tension, gravity and elasticity appear as control agents. Further, events like 
'collision', 'a push' also take up the role of cause agents. However, a careful scrutiny 
suggests that this network probably belongs more appropriately to this category. In the 
rules: 
object motion controlled by elasticity if 
object moving up and down vertically with decreasing amplitude 
and 
object motion controlled by tension if 
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object suspended when moving, 
though the agents involved are forces, elasticity and tension, there is no evidence from the 
program that she sees any difference between these and concrete physical agents. For 
example, one of her rules about physical agency was as follows: 
object motion controlled by water current if 
object fluctuating in water. 
It seems she might well be using elasticity and tension to stand as a label for the concrete 
agents that possess particular physical properties. In any case, there is no indication of 
ascribing a mediating role to the abstract entities as something going between the physical 
agent and the object in motion. 
Similarly, Bren's rules 
object motion caused by collision if 
object bumping into agent before moving 
and 
object motion caused by a push if 
object initially at rest 
indicated more of a wish to specify the necessary situation for the motion to take place than 
one of hypothesizing an event for mediation. 
produce 	 direct 
Fig. 7.3 The agency gestalt as evidenced by Sandra's program. 
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Fig. 7.4 The agency gestalt as evidenced by Leung's program. 
Fig. 7.5 The agency gestalt as evidenced by Brenda's program. 
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force / energy 
7.4.3.2 Mediation as a central feature of agency 
More than half of the networks fall into this category (fig. 7.6 - 7.12). These reflect two 
different conceptions of mediation. One subgroup (fig.7.6 - 7.10) still sees the agent as 
concrete physical entities, but imposing a constraint that they be the providers of a 
mediation, normally force, which is a necessary ingredient for the sustenance of motion. 
One common feature of this subgroup of networks is that they tend to classify the 
mediations, attributing different categories of mediations to different characteristics of the 
resulting motions. For example, greater force/energy is attributed to greater motions or 
faster speeds. Similarly, 'external forces' are attributed as responsible for non-autonomous 
motions, while 'own force' or 'internal force' accounts for autonomous ones. 
Another subgroup (fig. 7.11, 7.12) within this category discounted concrete physical 
agents altogether in their direct references to agency. The mediation, force or energy, is 
seen as the essence for the explanation of agency. It is interesting to note that Wong 
explicates a clear distinction between the two agency concepts 'cause' and 'control'. He 
attributed causal agency to force and agency for control to concrete physical entities. 
Furthermore, there is nothing conceptually deviant from the Newtonian framework in his 
agency network since he clearly confined the need for a cause to changes in motion rather 
than for motion itself. 
Fig. 7.6 The agency gestalt as evidenced by Schan's program. 
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Fig. 7.7 The agency gestalt as evidenced by Ychan's program. 
Fig. 7.8 The agency gestalt as evidenced by Evon's program. 
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Fig. 7.9 The agency gestalt as evidenced by Lin's program. 
Fig. 7.10 The agency gestalt as evidenced by Wars program. 
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direction 
Fig. 7.11 The agency gestalt as evidenced by Cheng's program. 
Fig. 7.12 The agency gestalt as evidenced by Wong's program. 
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7.4.3.3 The symmetrical agency 
Two of the networks, one from each age group, are quite exceptional in that they present a 
conception of causation which encompasses a notion of reciprocity. This was accom-
plished, as mentioned earlier, through two steps. First, both assumed a priori the central 
role of a mediation. Second, both focussed on an event and held that as directly respon-
sible for the production of the mediating entity, rather than the physical objects perse. One 
special feature of this conception of agency is that it encompasses the role of physical 
agents (as opposed to the second subgroup in the previous category, confining the causal 
conception to abstract entities), and at the same time did not have to attribute the mediation 
as something to be possessed by and resident in a physical object. This feature is evident 
in Fong's work as discussed earlier. The same is found in Cheung's program: 
thing give force to other-thing if 
other-thing touch thing. 
thing give force to other-thing if 
other-thing hit thing. 
thing give force to other-thing if 
thing placed on other-thing and 
thing affected by earth. 
thing give force to other thing if 
other-thing placed on thing and 
other-thing affected by earth. 
other-thing give force to thing if 
thing hit other-thing. 
Though Cheung still used words like "give force to", he clearly and explicitly identified the 
"giving" in each case to be in the context of an event, a situation, whereas in the other 
programs, the "giving" was mentioned purely as a transaction between the agent and the 
affected, paying no attention to the situation for the interaction. 
Doubtless, the most prominent feature of these two networks is the encapsulated notion of 
reciprocity: it is implicit in the networks that the two objects involved in the event 
producing the mediation are both affected by the event. This change is in fact a big step 
forward towards a Newtonian conception of motion. Commonsense intuitions normally 
associate agency with a strong notion of potency and an active role. The symmetrical role 
of objects participating in an event producing the mediating entity for motion as depicted by 
these 'gestalts' exhibit a detachment of the agent from an active role. It is possible that 
such a conception of agency is more congenial to the possible adoption of Newton's third 
law of motion into the cognitive framework. 
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Fig. 7.13 The agency gestalt as evidenced by Cheung's program. 
Fig. 7.14 The agency gestalt as evidenced by Fong's program. 
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The above mentioned feature of detaching the attribution of agency from a physical entity 
towards an interacting event is not completely accomplished in Cheung's network. There 
are some instances where the force held responsible was not derivable from a visible event, 
e.g. when an object becomes unsupported or when a compressed spring is released. In 
such cases, he attributed the force to be derived from properties of the object or the 
situation. Possibly because of his better grounding in mechanics, Fong had overcome this 
difficulty and been able to attribute different forces to different kinds of interactions. 
Again, there is nothing explicitly deviant from Newtonian mechanics in Fong's program. 
However, in comparison with Wong's program (fig. 7.12), Fong's network (fig. 7.14) is 
a much richer and closer representation of the Newtonian conception of motion. 
7.4.4 Further remarks on the agency gestalts 
It is interesting to note that each of the three agency 'gestalts' was held by students from 
both age groups. The structure of the agency gestalts thus seems to be independent of the 
cognitive maturity of the students or the amount of mechanics instructions they received. It 
is the claim here that the difference between the groups of students lies not in their general 
level of development but in their locus of attention when reflecting on causal events. 
A possible explanation for some of the networks, not to mention mediation at all, could be 
that the students hold different views on what kind of knowledge is valuable. Irrespective 
of the exact contents of the networks, each provides some useful information about the 
world of motion. However, their utility differs depending on the purpose at hand. If the 
knowledge is to be used for solving the pragmatic concerns of everyday locomotion and 
prediction of tendencies, knowledge of the form imparted by the unmediated agency ges-
talts would be the most expedient. This is given support by the rating given to the perfor-
mance of individual programs by the students after they had completed the programming 
task (details of this rating exercise are described and discussed in the next chapter). If we 
define efficiency as the time taken for a goal to be resolved and performance as the number 
of times the results turn out to be the expected (most reasonable) ones, then the best 
program in both respects turns out to be the one belonging to the unmediated agency group 
(Brenda's program, fig. 7.5). This 'objective' rating concurs with the participating 
students' subjective' rating. All but one of the students rated this particular program as the 
best. 
It is thus understandable if the students whose networks belong to the unmediated agency 
group did not express concepts of mediation simply because they did not think that they 
were important. The concepts of mediation would only be important if one wants to do a 
more systematic analysis of motion events in general, venturing out of the pragmatic 
domain into the theoretical. 
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With reference to the notion of reciprocity, it is argued here that this notion as expressed in 
Fong and Cheung's networks is much more sophisticated than the notion of reciprocity 
Piaget discussed with reference to the children's conceptual development, so much so that 
they could justifiably be labelled as qualitatively different. The reciprocity that Piaget 
referred to was just an awareness that the recipient (or the affected) exhibits a resistance to 
the action, while the essence of the networks in fig. 7.13 & 7.14 was detachment of agency 
from the object to the event, thereby creating a symmetrical structure in the causal gestalt. 
This introduction of a symmetrical element is a very important conceptual jump which is 
not a necessary development of maturation. It is closer to the kind of conceptual jumps that 
is characteristic of scientific revolutions. 
One pedagogical hypothesis coming out of this analysis is that one should try to explicitly 
relate Newtonian mechanics to the commonsense gestalt of causation and to anchor the 
relationship onto interacting events rather than the physical objects. This point will be 
discussed further in the final chapter. 
7.5 Levels of Explanation the Programs offered 
As a product of the knowledge elicitation process, what do the programs offer to the 
researcher besides a glimpse of what issues the students concern themselves with when 
considering motion? Is there anything interesting besides the actual contents of the 
programs? The answer to such a question depends on one's view of the nature of the 
programming process as a cognitive task. The process of program development is a 
creative one. It sets up a context very different from that of a problem solving task or the 
classification task described in an earlier chapter. The students have virtually complete 
freedom in deciding what they wish to write down. Even when they were encouraged to 
focus on certain themes, causation and control, in the later part of the programming 
sessions, they were not only free whether to take up that suggestion or not, but they were 
also free to write about these themes in any way they liked. Given such an unstructured 
task, how would the students go about structuring it? It is the view here that the 
programming task is essentially an explanation task. In trying to write down general rules 
about motion, they were in effect trying to offer explanations of how the world of motion 
works in general. 
In explaining how something functions, there is no fixed criterion as to what counts as an 
adequate explanation. Depending on the depth of understanding the explainer has of the 
subject domain and the purpose at hand, the explanation may vary from the very specific to 
very general. For example, to explain how to make an object move faster, the advice given 
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can be very specific such as giving it a push, or a general one, such as to find a means of 
applying a net force to the moving object along the direction in which the object is moving. 
As the programming task was an extended one both in time span and duration, and the 
focus was on writing general rules, one might hope that the resulting programs could 
reflect the deepest level of cognitive understanding the subject has in the domain of every-
day dealings with motion. The analysis in this section tries to examine the PROLOG rules 
written by the students in terms of the degree of generality they offer as an explanation. 
Excluding those offering classifications and definitions, the PROLOG rules written by the 
students can roughly be divided into three levels of explanation along the dimension of 
generality. At the lowest (most specific) level, there are the empirical observations, 
descri bing specific situations or concrete entities. Next are the specific conjectures, 
hypothe sizing the role of abstract entities in specific situations. At the highest (most 
general) level come the general hypotheses, postulating general relationships between 
entities, abstract or concrete, that would be applicable to motions in general. This part of 
the analysis tries to classify the PROLOG rules into these three levels of explanation and to 
examine and compare the performance of the two groups of students according to this 
perspective. 
7.5.1 Empirical Observations 
These are empirical rules describing relationships between concrete entities or attributes for 
specific motions or specific situations. There are no abstract quantities or attributes 
involved. The most frequent candidates for such empirical rules are rules of the following 
formats: 
i) motion type 	 observable physical conditions, 
for example, 
thing will rebounce if 
thing hit other-thing and 
not (thing can stick to other-thing); 
ii) concrete causal agent 	 observable physical conditions, 
for example, 
thing motion caused by wind if 
thing moving unsteadily and periodically in air; 
iii) concrete relations about specific events/situations, 
for example, 
thing may be damaged if 
thing crashed by other-thing. 
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These rules require very little in terms of cognitive processing to be created. They demand 
only direct recall of prominent features of particular events. As these rules are so specific, 
they are of little utility unless those specific types of motion or situation were under 
consideration. Thus the catalogue of motion types described in such rules might be seen as 
important prototypes of motion for the students' everyday processing of motion 
information. As explained in chapter 5, the encapsulated knowledge structures (scripts) for 
such prototypes would play the role of allowing easy recognition and hence facilitate 
analogous handling of the situation once the mapping has been made. The most popular 
types of motion appearing in this category of rules bear a close relationship with those 
appearing in the descriptive D2 schemes in the classification task. These include motion 
types like falling, colliding, flying, bouncing, etc. 
The results shown in Table 7.4 suggest that the younger group of students were much 
more willing to write down rules at this level. Rules in •  this category constitute about one 
third of the total number of rules written by the F.3 students exclusive of classifications and 
definitions, while making up only one fifth of the F.6 students' corresponding total 
"production". But such a gross description is not adequate. The F.3 students also displayed 
a much more uniform tendency towards offering this level of explanation: all the students in 
this group had written some rules in this category, the minimum of which constituted 12% 
of the individual student's total output. The F.6 group's behaviour is extremely diverse. 
Half of the group did not write down any single rule in this category while one of them had 
all of her rules in this category. 
7.5.2 Specific Conjectures 
At the next level, there are rules which postulate the existence or functioning of some 
abstract entities, or possible causal or control agents, but with reference only to specific 
types of motion or specific situations. The most popular formats for such rules are as 
follows: 
i) abstract motion attribute 	 observable physical conditions, 
for example, 
thing affected by tension if 
thing attached to elastic string; 
ii) concrete causal agent 	 observable physical conditions, 
for example, 
thing motion caused by a push if 
thing initially at rest; 
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iii) concrete control agent <- observable physical conditions, 
for example, 
motion is controlled by self if 
object moving is B and 
external force acting on B and 
external force less than maximum force exertable by B and 
B can respond to stimulation and 
B can be aware of occurrence of motion. 
The F.6 group produced more rules belonging to this category than the younger ones. 
57% of the older groups' total rule "production" were in this category, whereas rules at this 
level make up only 32% of the younger group's total production. At this level, there is 
much more uniformity within each of the two groups, though one student in the F.6 group 
did not write any rule in this category. 
A possible explanation for the F.6 group's greater tendency to produce these 'specific con-
jectures' is that the older students are primed to do so through the formal physics instruc-
tion they have received. In dynamics, the students are taught to analyze the nature and 
magnitude of forces acting on different objects in specific settings. They may thus be more 
prone to seeing this as more acceptable and meaningful. Further, they are equipped with a 
better vocabulary for writing specific conjectures, as reflected in the technical jargons they 
employed in these rules. 
7.5.3 General Hypothesis 
The highest level of explanation a stand alone rule can offer is a general hypothesis. Such a 
rule needs to be a generalization that applies to motions in general. To write such a rule, 
there must be some guiding principles or theoretical assumptions that the person holds 
which underlie their whole conception and understanding of motions in general. They thus 
involve a high level of abstraction and structuring of facts and beliefs. The more popular 
formats of rules in this category were: 
i) concrete motion attribute 	 abstract attributes, 
for example, 
thing speed increase if 
thing force increase and 
thing energy increase; 
ii) abstract motion attribute 
	 observable physical conditions, 
for example, 
thing has force if 
thing state moving; 
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iii) abstract relations about theoretical attributes, 
for example, 
thing can produce force if 
thing already has energy, and 
thing can receive force. 
One very curious and important observation to note here is that the older group is 
producing a lot less rules at the general hypothesis level compared with the younger ones: a 
total of 21 rules (14% of total rule production) for the former group to 70 rules (28%) for 
the latter. However, as the subsequent analysis will try to explain, this does not mean that 
the younger group has higher abstraction or generalization ability. Furthermore, at this level 
there is again a large diversity in the performance of the students within the F.6 group, with 
two of them producing nothing at all in this category. 
7.5.4 Comparison of the two Age Groups 
Diversity versus relative uniformity is the main feature when one compares the distribution 
of rules written by the two age groups amongst the three levels of explanation, vis-a-vis 
empirical observations, specific conjectures and general hypotheses. There are two aspects 
to this diversity. Firstly the distribution of the rules among the three levels for individual 
students was much more uniform for the F.3 students than for the F.6 group. Most of the 
rules written by the latter group tend to concentrate at the level of specific conjectures. A 
second diversity lies in the variation in distribution of rule levels across students. Two of 
the students effectively wrote rules at one single level of explanation. It would be useful to 
explore the possible reasons for such a phenomenon. 
The main difference between the two groups of students with respect to the task at hand lies 
in the fact that the older group had received two year's instruction in Physics at 0-Level 
and were still receiving instructions in Physics at A-Level while the younger group had not 
received any instruction on mechanics. Is it possible that the differences in rule level 
distribution between these two groups are due to this difference in the mechanics 
instruction they have received? 
The absence of rules at the empirical observation level is not too difficult to explain and 
could just be an indication of intellectual maturity. It would be understandable if the older 
students saw more value in abstraction and generality. A training in mechanics could have 
helped the older group to find more to write about at the specific conjecture level. The large 
number of technical terms, such as names of specific forces, appearing in this group's rules 
at this level offers support for this argument. The most puzzling feature in the results is the 
fact that the older group wrote a much smaller number of rules at the general hypothesis 
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level, some even to the extent of producing none in this category. If anything, one would 
expect mechanics to be offering a view of motion that is more general than naive physics 
and it is the latter which is commonly characterized as fragmented and inconsistent 
(Claxton, 1985). To explore this phenomenon further, one needs to look at the contents of 
the general hypotheses written by the students. 
At the content level, the general hypotheses written by the younger students are very 
similar, and most of them explicate ideas that would be deeply frowned upon by physics 
teachers. The following is a representative selection of these rules. 
motion can be great if 
object has great force 
thing can start moving if 
thing can produce force 
thing motion direction unchanged if 
thing only change force 
thing has force if 
thing is moving 
thing1 give force to thing2 if 
thing1 is moving and 
thing1 touch thing2 
thing given force by other-thing if 
thing movement helped by other-thing 
thing can receive force 
thing can control own motion if 
thing is living object and 
thing has brain and 
thing brain normal 
thing motion caused by own force if 
not thing is dead object* and 
speed changeable by thing and 
amount of force changeable by thing 
thing motion caused by received force if 
thing receive force from other-thing and 
not other-thing is dead object* and 
force direction changeable by other-thing 
* dead object here refers to inanimate objects 
It seems that the older students have learnt enough Physics to refrain from writing so 
profusely about force as the necessary 'fuel' of motion that can be possessed, passed along 
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and used up, nor do they express such outright animism. Diversity in the performance of 
the F.6 students existed also at the qualitative level. Important individual differences are 
found in the contents of the general hypotheses within this older group. They expressed 
different interpretations and levels of integration of learnt physics concepts into their 
commonsense framework of motion. 
Wong wrote only two rules belonging to this category: 
object will change its direction if 
there is external force applied on object, 
and 
object will change its speed if 
there is external force applied on object. 
These can be interpreted as another form of Newton's first law. However, these two 
propositions have no direct relationship with the other rules in his program and they stand 
alone as isolated statements and would not in fact be called into play in the resolution of the 
other queries. Thus they exist in the program but are never used. Is this also the case in 
his thinking? 
Evon and Lin's general hypotheses were very similar in the ideas they express: classifying 
causes as being due to two broad categories of forces, internal and external. They have 
conflated the scientific terms internal and external forces with their concept of autonomous 
and non-autonomous motions. They thus referred to internal and external sources of 
supply of force as the required ingredients for different kinds of motion. Examples of such 
rules are: 
object cause of motion self if 
not (object needs external force in causing motion) and 
object source of force internal, 
object cause of motion machine if 
object make use of specially designed instrument and 
object source of force external and 
object type of force mechanical, 
object cause of motion animal if 
object source of motion external and 
object type of force biological and 
object source of energy chemical. 
The concern with autonomy, the distinction between animate and inanimate objects, and the 
belief that force is the fundamental cause of motion is still very evident and are very similar 
to that of the F.3 students. However, they are wrapped up and integrated with what they 
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have learnt in their formal physics - some kind of marriage of the two theoretical 
frameworks (there is a discussion of the effect of these two frameworks interacting within 
the context of testing and modification of the PROLOG programs in the next chapter). 
Fong's work is distinctly different from the others and indicates a high level of integration 
of Newtonian concepts into his commonsense framework for the resolution of the 
pragmatic concern of control of motion. His four general hypotheses were: 
object1 has a motion controlled by object2 if 
object1 move along path P and 
object2 plan the path P and 
object2 has the power to influence motion of object1, 
object1 has the power to influence motion of object2 if 
object1 directly influence motion of object2, 
object1 has the power to influence motion of object2 if 
object1 indirectly influence motion of object2, 
object1 indirectly influence motion of object2 if 
object3 directly influence motion of object2 and 
object1 has the power to influence motion of object3. 
The rest of his program was mainly concerned with defining ways in which one object can 
directly influence another object's motion, and that was done through building specific 
rules about the interaction forces in each case. 
7.6 Epistemic Levels of the Elicited Knowledge Bases 
In the previous section, an analysis was made at the level of rules, looking at the level of 
explanation that each of the rules taken independently offered. It is possible to offer a 
deeper level of analysis by looking at each of the programs as an integrated whole. Each 
program, though finite and arguably limited in scope, when taken as a whole may paint a 
picture of a student's world view about motion. If we do see the programming task as 
essentially an explanation task, as suggested in an earlier section, the complete program can 
be taken as an explanation for the kind of questions the student is answering. Implicit in 
this elicited knowledge are the fundamental levels of generality the student was working 
with, and the kinds of questions s/he was answering, and these in turn reflect the kind of 
knowledge the student figured as most important for understanding the world, that is, the 
sort of epistemic questions s/he was concerned with. 
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This section explores the problem of what kind of epistemic questions were tackled by the 
students in the programming task by looking at how the different levels of rules as 
identified in the last section orchestrate together. We may not be able to tell too much about 
the main concerns of the authors of the programs, whether they are mainly interested in 
general issues or specific instances, just from looking at the percentage distribution of the 
different kinds of rules. If the rules in a program in any sense form an integrated 
knowledge base, then it is reasonable to expect that the importance of the individual rules 
are not all the same. Rules that stand in isolation are normally of limited value to the system 
and those whose influence proliferate through other rules would be much more central to 
the cognitive functioning of the whole system. The analysis in this section thus tries to 
look at the program as a complete system in order to find out the level of generality it is 
working at, and from there to the epistemic problems tackled by the students. It is also 
argued here that the different epistemic frameworks identified represent a progression that 
necessarily accompanies different phases of development in a progression towards the 
development of a scientific understanding or model. 
7.6.1 'Specific' epistemic frame 
First, let us start by looking at the level of generality implicit in the different kinds of rules. 
For the category empirical observations, the level of generality is necessarily a specific 
motion or a specific situation since it describes the relations between different concrete 
parameters, e.g. velocity, trajectory shape, motion direction etc., for a specific kind of 
motion event or situation. The category specific conjectures also shares this same level of 
generality since it differs from the first category only in the inclusion of abstract parameters 
into the relations. The focus was still on a specific events or situations. Good examples of 
these are: 
thing move upward if 
thing is living object and 
thing has wings (empirical observation 
on specific situation) 
thing path shape parabola if 
thing has bounce force(specific conjecture 
on specific motion type) 
For a program that contains exclusively empirical observations and/or specific conjectures, 
as Brenda's or Sandra's was (see fig. 7.15 & 7.16), it seems fair to say that the epistemic 
question tackled here was at the level of specific occurrences. Each case was dealt with 
independently. It was a world in which the clue to the pragmatic concerns of predictability 
and regularity was sought from properties and attributes of the particular situation. This is 
not to imply that neither Brenda nor Sandra entertain analyses of a more general nature. 
The claim is that the programs reflect where their priorities, confidence and even values lie. 
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motion-affected-by 
motion-controlled-by- 
motion-caused-by - 
- air resistance 
- spring 
- a-push 
- man 
tension 	 < 	 object is suspended 
friction 	 < 	 obj. in-contact-with rough-surface 
upthrust 	 obj. in water 
gravitational 	  - obj. possess mass 
force 	 `{- obj. path-taken parabolic 
obj. travelling upwards 
	 < obj. travelling parabolically 
-4 obj. falling freely downwards 
centripetal force - obj. travelling in-a-circle 
man 	
obj. in-contact-with man 
- can-be adjusted-by man 
machine 	 obj. uses fuel 
obj.-in-motion 	 obj. gets-tired after-moving 
gravity 
	 < obj. falling freely 
air-current 	 obj. moving in-air 
water-current -< 
	 obj. fluctuating in water 
friction 
	 < 	  obj. moving-by wheels 
wind 
	 < obj. moving unsteadily-in-air 
obj. moving-up-and-down with 
elasticity 	 < 	 decreasing amplitude 
centripetal force -4 obj. moving in a circle 
heat 	 < 	 obj. has-air-expansion when-moving 
tension 	 < 	 obj. suspended when-moving 
wind 
	 < 	 obj. fluctuating in-air 
obj.-in-motion 	 obj. awaring-and-approving motion 
engine 	 < 	 obj. moving after-addition-of-fuel 
	 obj. controlled-by temperature 
< 	 obj. has-air-expansion when-moving 
obj. controlled-by elasticity 
L- in-contact with spring 
remote-control 	 obj. far-away-from control-centre 
< 	 obj. initially at-rest 
controlled-by friction 
controlled-by remote-control 
controlled-by engine 
in-contact-with man 
can-be-adjusted-by man 
controlled-by water-current 
bumping-into-something before 
moving 
heat 
< obj. 
< obj. 
< obj. 
obj. 
obj. 
water-current 4 
	 obj. 
collision --< 	 obj. 
GENERAL 
	
EMPIRICAL OBSERVATION OR 
HYPOTHESIS 
	
SPECIFIC CONJECTURE 
legend: -<- denotes an implication. Thus before ' -<- ' is the goal statement and after that is 
the condition. 
is taken to represent disjunctions. Thus the above figure represents 12 rules on 
	
 'motion-controlled-by and 2 rules on 'motion-caused-by heat' 
-4C- represents a conjunction on the condition side of a rule. 
Fig 7.15 Outline of Brenda's program 
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GENERAL 	 EMPIRICAL OBSERVATION OR 
HYPOTHESIS 	 SPECIFIC CONJECTURE 
— move in gravitational field 
— move downwards 
	
 — not(controlled by obj.-in-motion) 
— affected by mass of obj.-in-motion 
— speed decreasing 
— obj.-in.-motion will reach ground 
f
—obj.-in-motion placed in open area 
	
 — obj. has large-surface-area 
— affected-by weather 
— obj. material light 
— gravity 
— wind 
motion caused-by — 
motion controlled-by 
— motion need heat-energy 
— steam 	 < 	 motion need water 
— causing-agent need high-temp. 
— motion controlled-by obj.-in-motion 
— object-in-motio — energy supplied-by obj.-in-motion 
— motion can-change on-will-of-obj. 
— control-agent need electricity 
— motion can-repeat many-times 
— computer 	  — control-agent can-store programs 
— control-agent has central-memory 
— information input manually 
— not(motion need manual-work) 
— not(controlling-action can last-long) 
— not(motion need electricity) 
— man 	
< — not(able-to keep uniform efficiency) 
— can-change on-will-of control-agent 
— control-agent created-by man 
— not(motion can-be-done-by man) 
— machine 	 < 	 control-agent need electricity 
— not(motion ctrl.-by obj.-in-motion) 
— control-agent can-do only-one-job 
motion deliberately done by obj. 
— obj.-in-motion— 
motion can-change on-will-of-obj. 
Fig 7.16 Outline of Sandra's program 
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The two programs suggest that they feel comfortable about rules and questions framed at 
the specific epistemic level, and that these figure prominently in their rational self-elicitation 
of their knowledge about motion. 
7.6.2 'General' epistemic frame 
For rules belonging to the category general hypothesis, the epistemic question is different. 
The focus is detached from any particular type of motion event and the rules try to look for 
relationships that are invariant for different kinds of motions. For example, the rule 
thing use up force if 
thing is moving 
is proposing a relation that holds true for all motions - an invariance about motion. This 
implies that the author of the rule is asking a question at a qualitatively different epistemic 
level from the ones quoted in the previous section. Regularities and predictability is sought 
as invariances. The focus is no longer upon the specificities of the situation but one of 
abstracting generalities that hold across specific relations. It can be interpreted as a 
generalization where the specifics under consideration are the generalities (relations) for the 
'specific epistemic frame'. 
In the search for generalities applicable to all types of motion, invariances cannot be sought 
from concrete physical attributes like speed or trajectory shape. A system describing motion 
that contains concrete attributes only is essentially a kinematic system and there is simply 
no single kinematic system that is applicable to all motions. To look for invariances across 
all motions thus necessitates the invention of abstract entities and the attribution of roles and 
functions to such entities. The concern expressed by programs at this level is still very 
much that of examining the causal link and predicting possible developments. Many of the 
general hypotheses written by the students were hypothesizing the existence of a mediating 
entity, often referred to as force or energy, as the ultimate underlying cause. They elabora-
ted on the nature and attributes of such an entity: that it is an essential ingredient for motion; 
that it can be passed from one object to another; that the passage of this quantity has to be 
from the agent to the affected in a causal relation; that the more of this entity one has, the 
more the quantity of motion (the parameter used for measuring this may vary); and that it 
would be used up in motions. The essence of the invariance lies in this invented entity. 
However, the ten programs that contain general hypotheses (fig.7.17 to 7.26) do not reflect 
only one level of epistemic framework. The differences lie mainly in the structure and 
inter-relationships within the knowledge. In fig. 7.17 to 7.24 are systemic networks show-
ing three kinds of rules from each of the student's programs: 
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(i) rules that are general hypotheses, 
(ii) rules that are in themselves not general hypotheses but the relations they concern 
do possess some rules in the general hypotheses category, and 
(iii) empirical observations or specific conjectures that have goal statements 
coinciding with the conditions used in the general hypotheses. 
The figures have been laid out so that all the general hypothesis are on the left hand side of 
the page and empirical observations or specific conjectures are on the right hand side. An 
examination of fig. 7.17 to 7.24 reveals striking similarities in the structure of these 
networks. First of all, they are all structurally 'flat' - very few of their rules are hierarchi-
cally related to each other. This means that the general hypotheses, or invariances, stand 
alone from each other as independent generalizations, but that the system includes no 
explanation for why they are as they are, or whether and how they relate to one other. 
Furthermore, just these general hypotheses, unsubstantiated by hierarchically related 
empirical observations and specific conjectures, would not be very helpful in reasoning 
about concrete daily events when specifics of the situation would have to be taken into 
account. Another feature of these networks is that where more than one rule exists for a 
particular relation, these rules do not all pertain to the same level of explanation. An 
example of this can be found in Schan's program (fig. 7.21). He had three rules on the 
relation 'motion caused by', two of which are general hypotheses and one which is an 
empirical observation. Two of these three rules, one from each category, are quoted 
below. 
thing motion caused by own force if 
not thing is dead object and 
moving speed changeable by thing and 
amount of force changeable by thing. 
thing motion caused by magnet if 
thing stick to magnet and 
not thing can separate itself from magnet and 
thing speed uniform. 
Besides the fact that these two rules reflect the employment of two different levels of 
generality, there is another significant difference between them. In the first rule the causal 
agent is an abstract entity, 'own force', while in the second the agent is a magnet, a 
concrete physical object. This suggests an oscillation between the two epistemic frames, 
specific and general. These students were not yet able to exhibit a clear preference for 
either levels of analysis. It is important to note that such a characteristic can be found in the 
work of both groups of students and seems to be independent of the scientific accuracy of 
the rules. For example, there were only two general hypotheses in Wong's program, and 
both of them were about the condition for an aspect of motion to change: 
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object will change its direction of motion if 
there is external force applied on object, 
object will change its speed if 
there is external force applied on object. 
Taken together, these two rules are just paraphrases for Newton's first law of motion. 
However, there were two other rules closely related to these (refer also to fig. 7.17): 
object will change its direction of motion if 
object pass over a friction gradient, 
object will change its speed if 
object pass over a friction gradient. 
These two sets of rules, though both pertaining to the same goal statements, operate on two 
entirely different planes, one.rather specific and the other extremely general, and the know-
ledge base did not offer any clue as to howto traverse between these two planes. 
However, the preceding discussion and the reference to 'oscillation' are not taken to imply 
that the students were conscious of such differences among the rules and trying to make 
choices between levels. The claim here is rather that when trying to explicate the same 
relation, there was an unconscious tension between writing about invariances which may 
be too general to be really helpful and relations which are very specific and thus limited in 
scope. The essence of the tension is between satisfying the pragmatic needs of everyday 
dealings with motion and the subconscious aspiration to provide a more general view of 
motion at a higher epistemic level. 
The two structural characteristics of this group of programs belonging to the 'general' 
epistemic frame may be inter-related. The failure of the knowledge structures to form 
hierarchical structures relating general hypotheses to specific conjectures and empirical 
observations (i.e. the 'flat' structure) diminishes the utility of the invariances constructed. 
This may be an important contributing factor leading to the oscillation between these two 
epistemic levels. 
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GENERAL HYPOTHESIS EMPIRICAL OBSERVATION 
OR 
SPECIFIC CONJECTURE 
<— there is external force 
applied on object 
direction 
object pass over a 
friction gradient 
object will change its 
.E there is external force 
applied on object 
speed 
object pass over a 
friction gradient 
* From this program onwards, empirical observations or specific conjectures are only 
represented if they are linked to a general hypothesis. 
Fig 7.17 Outline of Wong's program 
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EMPIRICAL OBSERVATION 
OR 
SPECIFIC CONJECTURE 
GENERAL HYPOTHESIS 
- not (object needs external 
force in causing motion) 
self 	 < 
- object source of force 
internal 
object make use of 
specially instrument 
- 
machine - object source of force 
I external 
- object type of force 
mechanical 
- object source of force 
external 
- object type of force 
biological 
- object source of 
energy chemical 
- object motion needs instrument 
- object direction has downward 
- object only force along direction 
of motion component of weight 
- object position change to 
lowest level 
- object sources of energy 
potential 
- animal 
- gravity 
object cause 
of motion 
- object source of force external 
- object type of force mechanical 
- not (object control of motion self) 
- object purpose of motion 
animal 	 decided by another object -<-1 
- another object living thing 
machine -EI -  
e - object source of force weight 
object control 
of motion 
- gravity 	 <I object direction of acceleration 
has downward component 
- object has tendency to fall 
Fig 7.18 Outline of Lin's program 
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thing 
movement 
thing 
movement 
helped by 
other-thing 
helped 
GENERAL HYPOTHESIS 
•c— thing has energy 
4-- thing has fuel 
- - thing speed increase 
- thing given force by other-thing  
EMPIRICAL OBSERVATION 
OR 
SPECIFIC CONJECTURE 
     
- thing has fuel 
- fuel producing-energy for thing 
thing casued to move by other-
thing 
- thing state moving 
thing caused to move by itself 
- thing caused to move by 
something 
- something comes from nature 
thing 
possess force 
   
   
   
     
     
     
     
- 	  change movement- thing energy change 
change direction 4 thing use up fuel in diff. direction 
thing can— 
— move 
stop 
thing caused to move by other-
thing 
thing cuased to move by itself 
thing caused to stop by other-
thing 
thing caused to stop by itself 
E- thing use up fuel faster 
increase 
	
- caused to move by great force 
thing caused to move by animal 
decrease —E--- thing use up fuel slower 
Fig 7.19 Outline of Ychan's program 
thing 
speed 
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GENERAL HYPOTHESIS 	 EMPIRICAL OBSERVATION 
OR 
SPECIFIC CONJECTURE 
- thing is living object 
	<c 
- thing has wings 
- thing is living object 
thing carried on object 
- object can move up 
	  object lighter than air 
- thing is a dead object 
	  - thing has engine 
- thing has fuel 
- thing is living object 
- thing has wings 
- thing cari control own motion 
- thing is a dead object 
- thing caused to stop by other object 
- thing is a living object 
- thing caused to stop by itself 
	  thing heavier than air 
— increase speed —4.- thing energy enough 
— decrease speed —<— not thing energy enough 
thing 
stop caused to 
 
 thing is a dead object 
- not thing has energy 
J- thing is a living object 
- not thing has force 
 
thing 	 big 	 < 	 thing force great ---<-- thing has more energy 
movement 
distance E small 	 < 	 thing force little 	 thing has less energy 
Fig 7.20 Outline of Leung's program 
thing can- 
— move up 
- fly 
— stop 
— move down 
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motion force 	 motion caused 
given by — thing — by thing 
motion 
caused by 
GENERAL HYPOTHESIS 
motion has 
great force 
engine 
wind 	  
animal 
EMPIRICAL OBSERVATION 
OR 
SPECIFIC CONJECTURE 
engine give force to motion 
motion occurs in air 
motion type complicated 
motion has 
	
 animal —4— small force 
motion occurs 
thing —4— at the wish of 
thing 
motion 
controlled by 
object 
motion 
can be 
object has 
great 	 great force 
object has 
small 	 -< 	 small force 
object force 
increase 
object speed — increase 
object energy 
increase 
object energy  
object energy 
increase 
object state 
non-zero —(-- moving 
not object state 
not known 
	 moving 
object 
has force 
 
object state 
moving 
 
object direction 
object only 
unchanged 
	 change force 
object 
can start 
object already 
moving 	 object can produce — force —<---- has energy 
object contain machine 
71- object contain fuel 
E.t.— object given energy by animal 
(..1—object given energy by wind 
4_ object given energy by water 
Fig 7.21 Outline of Sch an's program 
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GENERAL HYPOTHESIS EMPIRICAL OBSERVATION 
OR 
SPECIFIC CONJECTURE 
— force 
thing caused — 
to move by 	 — cause 	 < 	 cause is kind of force 
— force 
thing caused — 
to stop by 	 — cause 
	 < 
- cause is kind of force 
thing has 
- not force is concentric-force 
— force 	 < 	 thing is moving 
— stored-force 	  
— weight 
floating-force 
— friction 
- thing in high place 
- there is gravity force 
there is gravity force 
thing is liquid 
thing is air 
thing is moving 
1.- not thing in vacuum 
thing meets 
	 friction 
thing use-up 
	
energy --<— thing is moving 
thing on flat surface 
thing hit other-thing 
Fig 7.22 Outline of Cheng's program 
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— own force 
GENERAL HYPOTHESIS 
- not thing is dead object 
- moving speed changeable 
by thing 
- amount of force changeable 
by thing 
EMPIRICAL OBSERVATION 
OR 
SPECIFIC CONJECTURE 
thing motion 
caused by 
- thing receive force from other 
- not thing is dead object 
- force direction changeable 
— received force 	 by other 
- speed changed by amL of 
force from other 
L - motion duration changed by 
armt of force from other 
— magnet 
- thing given force by other-thing 
thing distance moved — greater 	 < not other-thing is a dead object 
- thing force given greater 
thing use up 	
 force 	 < 	 thing is moving 
thing can receive force 
	‹{ 
- thing stilt to magnet 
- not thing can separate 
itself from magnet 
- thing speed uniform 
thing has 
— weight 
— force 	 not thing is dead object 
— stored energy 
— bounce force 
— floating force 
- thing hit ground 
- not thing has released 
all forces 
- thing can repeat motion 
	 thing is water 
gravity force type attractive 
force direction 
	  downwards —<— force weight of thing 
thing weight izero --<.--- not thing affected by gravity - not thing is dead object heavier 	 K 
1- not thing uses force 
thing1 move faster than — thing2 
 
(
- thingl given same force as thing2 
- thing1 lighter than thing2 
 
Fig 7.23 Outline of Wat's program 
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GENERAL HYPOTHESIS 
-.(-- thing is moving 
thing has — force 
EMPIRICAL OBSERVATION 
OR 
SPECIFIC CONJECTURE 
I 
I 
I - in high place 
- exist gravity pull 
other-thing touch thing 
other-thing hit thing 
other-thing attract thing 
f - thing placed on other-thing 
thing affected 4._ other-thing give 	  
by other-thing 	 force to thing 	 1- thing affected by gravity-pull 
- other-thing placed on thing 
- other-thing affected by gravity 
thing transfer— other-thing E— other-thing 
force to 	 affected by thing 	 thing hit other-thing 
thing speed — decreasing 	  
of motion 
there-exist firction against anything 
slower --< 
	
 
thing motion 
 
[
- not (other-thing give 
force to thing) 
thing is moving 
- there-exist friction 
against thing 
thing friction 
against it 
increase 
force 
transformed — other-force —E— force kind changed 
to 
— released —<— thing is moving 
thing force_ 
state 
thing friction 
faster —<-- against it 
decrease 
	  thing in high place 
thing state compressed 
 	 thing still pressed 
- thing is moving 
— unreleased — 
Fig 7.24 Outline of Cheung's program 
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7.6.3 'Structural' epistemic frame 
Two of the students' programs had a notably different structure. They are the work of 
Fong (fig.7.25) and Evon (fig. 7.26). In these, the number of rules in the category general 
hypotheses was not necessarily large (only 5 in Evon's program), but they were all 
hierarchically related. The appearance of such a hierarchical structure implies a further level 
of abstraction above that required by operating within the 'general' epistemic frame. It 
represents an abstraction from the invariances. The epistemic question that Fong and Evon 
were answering was effectively this: "Is there a unifying framework that can explain the 
whole range of general hypotheses that they held valid?" In the context of the present 
programming task, such a framework should be able to relate the different facets of the 
hypothesized mediating entity(ies), in most cases force and/or energy, as depicted in the 
general hypotheses, and by so doing to highlight their utility for the specific conjectures. 
Thus each of these structured knowledge bases was built around a prominent theme, a 
theme which underlies, relates and explains the range of general hypotheses present. 
Here, membership to the 'structural' epistemic frame is independent of the scientific valid-
ity of the contents of the rules. The theme of Fong's program was that agency has to be 
mediated through interactions between the agent and the affected, different forces being 
involved in different interactions, and the type of interaction for individual cases depending 
on the specificities of the particular situation. This is of course derived from and compatible 
with a Newtonian view of motion. However, Evon's program was built around a different 
theme, one which is a typical case of an alternate framework, a deviant from Newtonian 
mechanics. The theme of her program was built around the distinction between two differ-
ent 'sources of force', internal and external. Internal forces are responsible for 'self-
powered' motion, that is, the autonomous motions. All other motions (i.e. the non-
autonomous ones) would be affected by external forces. She further linked this theoretical 
framework to the solution of the pragmatic concern to predict trajectories: only those 
objects powered by external forces would have predictable trajectories. 
Another feature of these two programs that can be interpreted as a mark of a well-structured 
knowledge base is that at each level of the hierarchy, the entities sharing the same syntactic 
role in a relation are ontologically similar, and the nature of the conditions used for the 
resolution of goals of the same level were also similar. For example, in Evon's program 
(fig. 7.26), the entities that can affect motion are all forces: weight, tension, air current, 
friction, etc. However, in Brenda's program (fig. 7.15), motion can be controlled by 
forces (like tension, friction, gravity), or material properties (like elasticity), or energy (like 
heat), or physical agents (like man, machine, or the object itself). (For a more detailed 
analy-sis of this aspect of the programs, please refer to Law (1988b) in app. 3.) It is 
important to point out here that this is not just a programming feat. It is the consistent 
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application of a central theme, a central hypothesis, to all considerations of motion that 
produces such ontological consistencies. 
A related structural feature of these two programs, one which is hinted at above, is that 
many of the end nodes in the hierarchy of general hypotheses were linked to specific con-
jectures so that the whole set of rules together form an integrated system. In these two 
knowledge bases, the specific conjectures play a very important role - that of providing 
explicit connections between the concrete physical parameters for specific situations with 
the main theoretical theme. These structural links not only give life to the specific conjec-
tures by enhancing their utility, but also provide a means for traversing between the general 
and the specific epistemic planes. These links thus remove the tension between the 
(aesthetic?) quest for generalities and the pragmatic need to cope with specific situations. 
The programs written by Schan (fig. 7.21) and by Cheung (fig. 7.24) deserve special 
mention with reference to the present discussion. Both programs contain small fragments 
that are hierarchically related, and provide links from general hypotheses to specific 
conjectures. These two features are insufficient to claim that they were answering ques-
tions at the 'structural' epistemic level, as the general hypotheses touch on diverse themes 
and they lack a consistent central theme to relate to each other and from which to organize 
the links to the concrete specific situations of daily reasoning. However, these two pro-
grams may indicate the emergence of a progression towards the structural epistemic frame. 
7.6.4 Concurrence with the Piagetian mechanisms for equilibration 
Given the limited number of cases that the present research dealt with, it is remarkable that 
the three epistemic levels identified in the students' programs seem to concur with the 
mechanisms for equilibration proposed by the Piagetian school (Piaget, 1975). As was 
described in chapter 3, Piaget hypothesized that developmental changes in mental schemas 
take place via three "knowing cycles": within-scheme, between-scheme and totality cycles. 
Garcia and Piaget's work on the psychogenesis and sociogenesis of knowledge (Garcia, 
1987, 1983) found that similar mechanisms are also at work in the development of theories 
in general. Garcia's (1987) paper referred to these mechanisms as intra, inter and trans 
mechanisms and the following extract gives a clear outline of their theory. 
"....we found in several fields that the construction of a theory goes, in 
general, through three different moments: a moment when a number of 
isolated facts are known, identified and analyzed independently of each 
other; another moment when these facts are found to be connected by 
transformations that leave something invariant; and a third moment 
when you have a structure that explains the transformations and the 
invariance, and each particular case. We have called these three steps 
'intra', 'inter' and 'trans' 
(Garcia, 1987, p. 139) 
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There seems to be a clear correspondence between the three Piagetian equilibration mecha-
nisms and the epistemic frames identified here. The correspondence goes between specific 
and intra, general and inter, and finally structural and trans. It is pleasing that so general a 
point of view is useful in analyzing such data. It may give one some confidence that the 
method has elicited a real and in some sense profound level of students' thought and that 
the three epistemic levels identified correspond to a progression that necessarily accom-
panies different phases of development in a progression towards the development of a 
scientific understanding (model). 
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Chapter 8. TESTING AND MODIFICATION OF 
PROGRAMS 
8.1 Program Testing and Modification as a Further Process of 
Knowledge Elicitation 
One important advantage of using expert system development as a means of knowledge 
elicitation in the present research is that a subject can explore the logical consequences of 
expressed knowledge by issuing queries to the computer and as a result subsequently be 
led to modify it if necessary. For example, a student held the following interactions with 
the computer after putting in a few rules about the kinds of forces an object may experience: 
Student 	 : apple experience _what? (student asks the computer for possible values for 
the variable "what") 
Computer : is it true that apple is moving in air? 
(computer queries the user for information to determine the value of a 
condition in one of the rules) 
Student 	 : yes. 
Computer : apple experience air resistance. 
Student 	 : why? 
Computer apple experience air resistance because apple is moving in air. 
Student 	 : any more answers? 
Computer : is it true that apple moving downwards? 
(computer attempting to match another rule) 
Student 	 : yes. 
Computer : apple experience gravity. 
no more answers. (no more rules unresolved) 
Student 	 : tape-recorder experience gravity? (student started a new query) 
Computer : is it true that tape-recorder moving downwards? 
Student 	 : no. 
Computer : no, tape-recorder does not experience gravity. 
Student 	 : why? 
Computer : tape-recorder does not experience gravity because it is not moving 
downwards. 
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At this point, the student was dissatisfied because she had learnt that an object placed on a 
table would still experience gravity. She thought about it and added in a new rule to take the 
case of the tape-recorder into account: 
Student : 
Student : 
Computer : 
Student 	 : 
Computer : 
Student : 
Computer : 
_thing experience gravity if _thing has weight and _thing stay still. (student 
typed in a new rule) 
tape-recorder experience gravity? (previous query re-issued) 
is it true that tape-recorder has weight? 
yes. 
is it true that tape-recorder stay still. 
yes. 
yes, tape-recorder experience gravity. 
The researcher encouraged the student to make a new query. 
Student : 
Computer : 
Student 	 : 
Computer : 
Student : 
Computer : 
Student 	 : 
Computer : 
kite experience gravity? 
is it true that kite is moving downwards? 
no. 
is it true that kite has weight? 
yes. 
is it true that kite stay still? 
no. 
no, kite does not experience gravity. 
The answer from the computer was contrary to her expectation and she wanted to modify 
one of the rules. 
Student 	 : edit second rule on " thing experience gravity" 
(she then eliminated the second condition on that rule) 
The edited rule then reads: 
_thing experience gravity if 
_thing has weight. 
The researcher then took this chance to ask her why she put in the second condition in the 
first place. She explained that she wanted to distinguish between things that move from 
those that do not, and to specify that the latter also experiences gravity. 
It can be seen from the above example that the process of program testing offers a valuable 
chance for the researcher to probe deeper into the students' understanding even after the 
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initial elicitation in the form of program development. It was found that the students were 
mostly thinking of very specific situations or 'prototypes' when they were writing down 
the PROLOG rules, so that though the rules took the form of generally applicable 
statements, it was usually not the students' conscious aspiration to do so and the rules 
normally fail to live up to such an expectation. Thus when a student finished writing some 
rules on a certain theme, his/her first test of the program usually used the prototypical 
situations s/he had in mind during the writing process. 
One serious problem in knowledge elicitation is the possible mismatch between the intend-
ed meaning of the subject and the interpretation of the researcher. The explorability of the 
expressed knowledge as a PROLOG program at least offers the researcher a chance to find 
out whether such a mismatch exists, thus providing a qualitative validity check on the 
results. This is especially important as the programming task is new to all the students. 
While the program testing process provides deeper insight into the ideas and concepts 
expressed by the program lines, the program modification behaviour of a student provides 
very valuable information on a variety of his/her cognitive characteristics that are very 
difficult to explore otherwise. When would a student find it necessary to modify a rule (a 
PROLOG statement)? Are there systematic individual differences in the criteria for modifi-
cation? What are the main types of conflict/ dissatisfaction? How do the students face 
these conflicts? What kinds of program modification actually took place? Are there quali-
tatively different modification behaviours, and if so, do they bear any relationship to the 
qualitative differences in program structure discussed in the previous chapter? Answers to 
the above questions shed light on the kinds of possible cognitive conflict one may expect 
when one's beliefs are faced with challenges from daily phenomena, the cognitive 
strategies that may be employed to cope with such conflicts and the possible cognitive 
outcomes for different conflict resolution strategies. 
8.2 Criterion for Satisfaction - Pragmatism v.s. Intellectual 
Aestheticism 
As mentioned earlier, the PROLOG programming environment forced the students to put 
their ideas into the format of generally applicable laws, no matter whether the student 
thought along such lines or not. When the programs were subsequently tested with differ-
ent situations, the only means available to the computer were the explicit rules written by 
students, and the computer will treat all rules literally as true generalizations. As was 
evidenced by the behaviour of the students, this was not the general mode they operated in. 
The testing and modification behaviour of the students thus highlights the mismatch 
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between the functioning of a commonsense system and a formalized logical representation 
of it. 
A variety of qualitatively different standards for satisfactory performance were set by the 
students for their programs. Many of the students had their main attention focussed on the 
acceptability of the answers given by the computer and would not bother to find out the 
reasoning used unless the answer turned out to be unacceptable. Even when the researcher 
purposely exposed the idiosyncrasy of the reasoning process used in the resolution of a 
particular query, most were very reluctant to make any changes as long as the answer was 
deemed correct. Furthermore, not all students demanded that the programs be able to deal 
with all possible cases correctly. There seemed to be a region of tolerance for the perfor-
mance of the programs, and they were only worried if the output answer was outrageously 
wrong. For example, one of the students, Lin, wrote the following rule to decide whether 
a non-autonomous moving object is animate or not: 
object nature living if 
object use specially designed instrument and 
object cause of motion machine and 
object control of motion self and 
object purpose of motion self-decided. 
He then tested the rule with the case of a driver and the computer duly answers that 'it is 
true that driver nature living'. The researcher then asked him to do a second test with the 
case of a passenger, thinking that in this case he would have to answer that the control of 
motion would not be the passenger. However, he obtained the correct answer 'passenger 
nature living' from the computer by saying that the control of motion belongs to the 
passenger because he instructs the driver on where to go. The researcher then tried to put 
him into an even more awkward position by asking him to test the program with the case of 
a baby passenger. However, Lin was not moved at all and calmly responded that there are 
surely exceptions to every rule, and it is very difficult to make one that works for all cases. 
The dissatisfaction with a rule is normally greatest when the answer appears to be far from 
commonsense expectations. For example, Brenda had been working in a way very similar 
to Lin, when she was absolutely shocked and dismayed by one of the responses from the 
computer. She wrote a rule on control of motion: 
object motion controlled by engine if 
object has the ability to move continuously without getting tired 
and had been testing it with objects like car and fish. Then she looked out of the window 
and saw a falling leaf. She used that as a test case: 
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Brenda 	 leaf motion controlled by what? 
Computer : is it true that leaf falling freely downwards? 
Brenda 	 : yes. 
Computer : leaf motion controlled by gravity. 
is it true that leaf fluctuating in air? 
Brenda 	 : yes. 
Computer : leaf motion controlled by air current. 
is it true that leaf gets tired after moving? 
Brenda : no. 
Computer : is it true that leaf has ability to move continuously without getting tired? 
Brenda 	 : yes. 
Computer : leaf motion controlled by engine 
The thought that the leafs motion was controlled by an engine was so absolutely appalling 
that she was totally disappointed and requested to be allowed to go home to review the 
whole program all over. 
However, the pragmatic standard was not employed by all students alike. A few of the 
students were not happy if the reasoning given for the resolution of a particular answer was 
not correct and they wanted to modify the programs. Furthermore, these students tended to 
go beyond just writing down some empirical correlations between the possible actual 
causal/control agents of motion and some describable features of the motion, but wanted to 
express higher principles - to build up some 'theories', i.e. systematic reconstructions, 
about motion, even though they could become very frustrated by serious obstacles while 
attempting to do so. 
Of all the subjects participating in the program development task, Evon met the greatest 
frustration. She was one of those students not satisfied with just meeting the pragmatic 
standard. She wanted to express a 'higher principle' which she strongly believed in: all 
motions are either autonomous or non-autonomous, and the determining criterion for such 
is the supply of force. If the supply of force is from the moving object itself, then it is 
autonomous motion, and if the supply of force is external, then it would be non-
autonomous. However, free fall is a very special case. According to her own conceptuali-
zation, a motion which is neither autonomous nor caused by external agents must be caused 
by gravity (or weight, as she could not quite distinguish the two and both seemed accept-
able). At first she made rules so that any motion not affected by external forces would be 
caused by gravity. However, motion of a stone in free fall will not be caused by gravity if 
weight is classified as an external force. On the other hand, if weight is to be classified as 
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an internal force, then free fall would have to be classified as autonomous motion - a very 
unacceptable result (Law N. 1988). Despite the inability to resolve this dilemma, she did 
not, at any moment during the eight weekly sessions on the programming task, give up 
working on rules relating to this abstract notion of supply of force being internal or external 
and fall back on writing isolated concrete empirical relations. 
Thus we can see in the programming behaviour of the students two different approaches to 
describing the world of motion. One group, which may be called the 'pragmatic' group, 
describes the world in terms of prototypes, broadly categorizing motions according to 
prominent stereotypes and then trying to correlate the features of each stereotype. When 
the rules failed, their immediate response tended to be that the categorization used was not 
fine enough and needed to be tuned further to take into account motions further away from 
the stereotypes. These students did not encounter serious challenges or frustrations even 
when their programs failed. They never anticipated their categorization schemes to be 
infallible. The other group, less numerous in number, may be called the 'aesthetic' group. 
They tried to work out, through the labyrinth of different kinds of motions and characteris-
tics, a systematicity over and above just a flat categorization. They looked for some general 
principles, laws, that would govern all motions. Inherent in such an approach is the belief 
that there are some hidden principles, some grand laws of nature, that govern the world of 
motion and give a systematicity to the myriad manifestations of different motion character-
istics. For a student adopting an aesthetic approach to the programming task, the different 
rules s/he wrote down would then have different level of importance, the most central ones 
being the core hypotheses which give rise to systematicity. During the course of program 
testing, these students have met much greater frustration than that faced by the pragmatic 
students, if it is a core hypothesis that the failure challenges. Frustration originates from a 
basic belief of what the world is like - the describability and generalizability of the world 
around us. 
For the purpose of dealing with everyday motion events, the pragmatic standard is very 
often sufficient and may be more efficient than comprehensive, systematic theories. (One 
empirical source of support for this is the rating of the various expert systems given by the 
students, to be described later in this chapter.) What prompts a person to take up an 
aesthetic approach is thus not pragmatic needs but a personal commitment to intellectual 
passions (Polanyi, 1958). This pragmatic/aesthetic distinction is also one of the fundamen-
tal distinctions between science and commonsense (Nagel, 1961). 
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8.3 Program Modification and Cognitive Strategies 
There are two forms of query a user may put to the expert system developed: 
(i) confirm the validity of a statement, e.g., "Is it true that car's motion caused by 
engine?" 
(ii) give instantiations of a variable that would make a statement valid, e.g., "What causes 
car's motion?" 
In cases where the computer failed to provide a satisfactory answer, there were generally 
three possibilities: 
the test case was wrongly included as an instance of the goal statement; 
the test case was wrongly excluded from being a successful instance of the goal 
statement; 
the computer failed to give the correct answer because no rules pertaining to the 
appropriate goal statement had been entered. For example, a student may think 
that the appropriate answer for question (ii) above should be that the car's motion 
is caused by engine, but no rule of the form 'object motion caused by engine if 
	 ' had been entered. 
In analyzing the modification behaviour of the students, modifications due to typing 
mistakes and syntactic errors were not taken into account as these only reflect on the 
technical features of the programming environment and the programming ability of the 
students, but not on the actual ideas put forward by them. Twelve different types of 
program modification could be identified from the modification behaviour of the students 
(table 8.1a), which relates to five distinctly different cognitive strategies (table 8.1b) being 
employed when facing unsatisfactory outcomes from the computer. 
8.3.1 Maintenance strategies 
This is by far the most popular strategy, accounting for nearly 60% of all modifications 
undertaken by the students. The main characteristic of these strategies is that the 
modifications try to introduce minimum change while maintaining the basic knowledge 
structure. There are five different types of program modification belonging to this strategy 
category. 
8.3.1.1 Addition of conditions 
As was mentioned earlier, most of the students were anchoring onto stereotypical kinds of 
motion when they were drafting rules. Ideally, the rules written down should be necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the goal statements to be valid. However, many of the 
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Table 8.1a Distribution of types of program moairication. 
Subj. Maintenance strategies 
Reph- 	 add 	 del 	 repl 	 comb. 
rase 	 cond. cond. cond. 	 rules 
Evasion 
delete 
rule 
Extension by 
categorization 
add 	 add 
case 	 goal 
conceptual 
reform. 
reformulate 
rule 
Theory 
building 
Syntactic 
restruct Total 
Sand 2 1 3 1 2 1 10 
Bren 2 2 1 3 1 3 12 
Leung 2 1 1 1 2 7 
Schan 4 1 2 4 1 12 
Ychan 1 4 2 6 3 16 
Lin 3 1 2 2 1 9 
Evon 3 1 1 2 2 2 11 
Wat 3 1 3 7 
Cheng 1 1 2 
Ahlun 3 3 1 7 
Wong 8 3 11 
Fong 5 1 1 1 4 12 
Total 36 18 5 6 3 7 15 15  7 4 1 1 6 
Table 8.1b Distribution of modification strategies and epistemic level of the 
programs. 
Subj. 
Maintenance 
Modification Strategy 
Evasion 	 Extension 	 Reformu- 
lation 
Theory 
Building 
Epistemic 
Level 
Sand 7 3 Specific 
Bren 8 4 Specific 
Wong 11- General 
Leung 4 3 General 
Schan 7 5 General 
Ahlun 6 1 General 
Ychan 5 2 9 General 
Lin 4 2 2 1 General 
Cheng 1 1 General 
Wat 4 3 General 
Evon 5 2 2 2 Structural 
Fon 9 6 1 1 4 Structural 
Total 68 7 30 7 4 
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students failed to appreciate the nature of the programming task as such and worked 
according to their own understanding of how best to achieve the task, and different 
outcomes and coping strategies developed according to whichever interpretation of the 
nature of the PROLOG rules they employed. Some of them, e.g. Bren and Ychan, tended 
to use the rules to relate the most prominent feature(s) of the stereotypical motion they had 
in mind. Understandably, these rules very often posed conditions which were too loose, 
leading to the first kind of failure described above - non-instances being wrongly identified 
as satisfying the goal statement. To cope with the situation, the easiest strategy would be to 
add in conditions that would exclude the particular kind of non-instance at stake. The 
following is an example of this type of program modification: 
Ychan had written the following rule about autonomous motion: 
thing motion under control if 
thing is living object and 
thing has brain. 
The program survived his first test successfully when given the query: 
"walking man motion under control?" 
The researcher then suggested another query: 
"falling man motion under control?" 
As is expected, the computer responded that the falling man's motion is under control. 
However, Ychan believed strongly that by definition no falling object can have its own 
motion under control. He modified the rule on motion under control by adding in a further 
condition so that the rule then read: 
thing motion under control if 
thing is living object and 
thing has brain and 
thing move on ground. 
It is evident from the above example that the modification was not made after an overall 
review of the validity of the rule but made just to cope with the failed instance at hand. As 
this is a rather defensive coping strategy, it belongs to the group of maintenance strategies. 
8.3.12 Deletion of conditions 
Another common misinterpretation of the proper functioning of the PROLOG rules was to 
treat them as if these should act as detailed descriptions of the stereotypical cases (Sandra's 
and Lin's program's are typical examples of such a misinterpretation). As such, the rules 
are bound to contain conditions that are typical characteristics of valid instances for the goal 
statements, but which were not necessary for the goal statements to be satisfied. A student 
under such circumstances normally interpreted the failure as arising from conditions being 
too stringent and would thus modify the rules by removing some of the conditions so as to 
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include the appropriate instances. The following is an example of this type of program 
modification. 
Sandra had written the following rule on autonomous motion: 
thing motion caused by itself if 
thing motion controlled by itseff and 
thing energy supplied by itseff and 
thing motion can change on will of itself and 
thing can stop any time by itself. 
The computer had been giving satisfactory answers to several test cases for this rule. Then 
the computer was given the query, 
"high jump motion caused by itself?' 
The answer obtained was that high jump was not controlled by the object in motion because 
the object involved could not stop the motion any time it wanted. To cope with the situa-
tion, Sandra removed the last condition, 'thing can stop any time by itselr, from the above 
quoted rule. 
Again, this kind of program modification was also a coping strategy, just to handle the 
failed case in hand. 
The above two modification methods, addition and deletion of conditions, represent the 
typical failure situation and the nature of the strategies employed in all maintenance strate-
gies. The other three methods, rephrasing of conditions, replacement of conditions and 
combining rules are just minor variations of these two versions. 
8.3.1.3 Rephrasing of conditions 
Sometimes, a student may want to rephrase a condition so as to clarify his ideas. However, 
if such a rephrasing is prompted by a problem test case, the rephrasing would very often 
result in making the condition (and subsequently the rule concerned) more or less stringent, 
as the case may be. For example, Sand wrote the following rule on control of motion by 
gravity: 
object motion controlled by gravity if 
object source of force weight and 
object direction of acceleration downwards and 
object has tendency to fall. 
However, this rule would not be able to classify the motion of a parachutist as controlled 
by gravity as Sandra would want it to. She thus relaxed the second condition to 'object 
direction of acceleration has downward component to cope with the case of the parachutist. 
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8.3.1.4 Replacement of conditions 
When the PROLOG rules were employed to relate a stereotypical motion to the most 
prominent/important feature of the situation, the particular feature chosen was normally one 
that made the strongest subjective impression on them, and may not be a necessary or 
sufficient condition for the goal statement. Sometimes when the test results evidently show 
that this was the case, they decided to give up that particular feature and replace it by a 
completely different one. For example, Brenda wrote several rules about control of motion 
and the following rule about motions controlled by engines was one of them: 
object motion controlled by engine if 
object has ability to move continuously without stopping. 
Later on, she tested these rules with the case of a big balloon (she had mistaken that such 
big balloons need an engine for motion). However, when queried by the computer about 
whether balloons can move continuously without stopping, she replied 'no' as she believed 
that the balloons can only go up to a maximum height. After thinking the situation through, 
she changed the rule to 
object motion controlled by engine if 
object has ability to move continuously without getting tired. 
At a later stage of her program development, she had further problems with this amended 
rule. She then replaced the condition a second time: 
object motion controlled by engine if 
object moving only after addition of fuel. 
This oscillation of the chosen condition from a description of the duration of motion to an 
animistic one of tiredness to a more physical one of energy source cannot be described as a 
reformulation because there is no fundamental belief of the student that is being challenged 
or altered in this process. This is just 'a trial and error process of trying to locate a more 
suitable condition and should thus be classified as a maintenance strategy only. 
8.3.1 .5 Combination of rules 
A combination of rules occurred normally when two rules developed at different times with 
somewhat different wording were later found to be essentially referring to the same situa-
tion. 
8.3.1.6 Maintenance as episodic accommodation for specific situations 
As can be seen from the above description of the five types of modification belonging to 
this strategy category, the students normally started off with rules anchoring closely onto 
specific stereotypical motions, and when the rules fail, the modifications were developed so 
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as to cope with the specific failures, and not as a consequence of inspecting the rule for 
general failures. Thus the knowledge structures as represented by the PROLOG rules were 
modified, (or, using Piaget's terminology, accommodated), to adjust for the local test 
situation, without bringing about any substantial modification to the knowledge structure. 
Furthermore, judging from the nature and context of these adjustments, it is not evident that 
the students have strong commitments to the modified rule and it is reasonable to expect 
similar adjustments (or even modifications in the reverse direction) to take place when 
further failure cases are met. These modifications are probably episodic accommodations -
adjustment of the same knowledge schema to the constantly changing contents to which it 
is applied, rather than permanent changes to the schemas concerned. 
8.3.2 Evasion Strategy 
Of all the rules that the students wrote, only seven rules had been deleted without replace-
ment. One of these was deleted by Fong because he thought it was too trivial after he had 
tested them. Thus this deletion was made because the rule could not satisfy the author's 
own quality standards, though it was nevertheless correct. The other six deletions, two 
each by Ychan, Lin and Evon, were made because they were found to be wrong and no 
viable alternatives could be found. Normally, when a problem arose, the tactic employed 
was to try to patch it up - through one of the maintenance strategies listed above. In these 
six cases no satisfactory maintenance strategy could be located and the authors had to resort 
to an evasive strategy - deleting them altogether. 
8.3.3 Extension of Knowledge by Further Categorization 
When the computer failed to provide a satisfactory answer to a query, it may not necessar-
ily be that any one particular rule was wrong, but just that the rule base developed was too 
small and no rule yet developed could deal with the case appropriately. Under such circum-
stances, the normal course was to further develop the rule base so as to be able to handle 
the failed case in hand. There were two different kinds of program extension, depending 
on the nature of the rule base deficiency found. 
8.3.3.1 Addition of cases 
As mentioned earlier, many of the students wrote the rules with a clear stereotypical motion 
in mind. It may happen that the goal statement can be satisfied by motions very different 
from the stereotype it was originally written for. In such cases, new rules with the same 
goal statement would be put in. For example, Ychan wrote a rule on downward motion 
caused by another object: 
thing caused to move downward by otherthing if 
otherthing change the position of thing to new-place and 
new-place cannot support thing. 
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Obviously he was thinking of the case when something fell to the ground because the 
support it rested on moved away. Later on, it was suggested to him to test the rules with 
the case of a child playing on a slide. Is the child caused to move down by anything? He 
reckoned that the answer was yes the child was caused to move down by himself. 
However, throughout the motion the child is supported by the slide. He resolved this 
dilemma by adding in one more rule: 
thing caused to move downward by otherthing if 
otherthing change position of thing to new-place and 
new-place can support thing and 
new-place sloping downward. 
Thus the difficulty was overcome by creating a tailor-made rule for another stereotype -
sliding motions, motion of objects going down an incline. 
8.3.3.2 Addition of goals 
Program extension may also result when no rule with the appropriate goal statement has 
been written for the test situation. For example, in trying to deal with cases concerning 
causes of motion, Lin had written two rules: 
object cause of motion self if 
not (object needs external force in causing motion) and 
source of force internal. 
object cause of motion machine if 
object make use of specially designed instrument and 
source of force external and 
type of force mechanical. 
Later he asked the computer about the cause of motion for the case of a bicycle and the 
computer failed to give any possible answer. He inspected his rules and decided that he 
should add in a new rule on cause of motion by animals (since bicycles can be ridden by 
men as well as other animals like monkeys and bears): 
object cause of motion animal if 
source of force external and 
type of force biological and 
source of energy chemical. 
This rule thus extended the possible categories of causes for motion. 
8.3.3.3 Extension of knowledge base as accretion 
The above two types of programming activity resulting from failed queries undoubtedly 
lead to an extension of the rule base (or knowledge base implemented on the computer) and 
may thus be classified as learning from failure. However, this kind of learning does not 
result in new conceptual structures being constructed nor existing ones being modified or 
replaced. This was because the rules that were being tested were either empirical observa- 
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tions (as in 8.3.3.1) or specific conjectures (as in 8.3.3.2) which did not set up any general 
model for prediction of behaviour nor explanatory models of why things move in certain 
ways. The rules that were laid down were essentially descriptions of specific situations. 
The failures were thus taken as failures to take note of yet more categories of specific situa-
tions. No dissatisfaction with the initial rules arose from the failures and the new rules 
were just extensions of the original knowledge structure to take more specific cases into 
account. This type of 'learning' activity is similar to what Rumelhart and Norman (1978) 
described as accretion: 
"One basic mode of learning is simply the accumulation of new 
information. We analyze the sensory events of our current experience, 
match them with some appropriate set of schemata, form a 
representation for the experience, 	
 The newly created data 
structures are instantiations of the previously existing ones, changed 
only in that the representations for particular aspects of the current 
situation have been substituted for the variables of the general schema. 
This is learning by accretion: learning by adding new data structures to 
the existing data base of memory, following the organization already 
present." 
8.3.4 Reformulation for better performance 
In a few instances, the program modification involved a complete reformulation of the rules 
concerned. A deeper mode of learning seems to be involved, as the changes evidenced a 
conceptual reformulation, either in terms of taking on a different perspective, or in chang-
ing previous limits of validity. Since these are the more interesting cases from the cognitive 
point of view, and there are only seven of them, a description of each is given below. 
8.3.4.1 Regression back to pragmatic specificity 
Only one of the seven cases falls into this category. Lin started working on rules about 
control of motion and was trying to build up a theoretical model of motion that categorized 
motions into two main types: those that are controlled by animate objects and those that are 
controlled by inanimate objects. Again, in writing down the rules he was thinking of 
specific stereotypical cases - inanimate objects being driven by animate ones, with the latter 
being the source of power for the motions concerned. However, he began by writing down 
a general hypothesis that built on more general concerns, namely source and type of force, 
indicating his intention to build up a more general theoretical model that could transcend the 
specificity of particular situations: 
object control of motion animal if 
object source of force external and 
object type of force biological. 
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When he first tested the rule with the case of a moving bicycle, the outcome was quite satis-
factory. The source of force was considered to be from a cyclist, which was thus external 
to the bicycle and the type of force from the cyclist was biological as the cyclist is animate. 
However, there was a problem when he tested the rule with the case of a moving car. He 
considered the source of control to be undoubtedly animal - the driver. However, the car's 
motion was not powered by the driver, but the car's engine, which is inanimate. He 
immediately saw that none of the maintenance or extension strategies described above could 
be used to retain the basic form of this rule. It required a basic reformulation for it to 
handle the test cases satisfactorily. Instead of attempting another theoretical model for the 
control of motion, Lin actually replaced the rule by an empirical observation: 
object control of motion animal if 
object purpose of motion decided by something and 
something is a living thing. 
This regression from a general hypothesis to a situation specific rule involving animistic 
conditions is actually another form of evasion. As evidenced in the discussion above, there 
is no major conceptual confrontation when an empirical observation or specific conjecture 
fails. On the other hand, it would be much tougher to defend a general hypothesis. 
8.3.4.2 Advancing towards generality 
Two other cases of reformulation took just the opposite bent. Evon was classifying all 
influences on motion as derived from either internal force (basically referring to cases of 
autonomous motion) or external force (for cases of non-autonomous motion). She wrote 
the following rule: 
object under the influence of external force if 
object affected by something•nd 
not (something EQUAL weight). 
She tested the rule and was satisfied with the output from the computer. However, she 
pondered further on the rule and decided to make it a more general one: 
object under the influence of external force if 
object affected by something and 
not (something force-type internal). 
This is a very interesting case because here the modification is not directly prompted by any 
need to handle failure cases. The dissatisfaction seems to be with the specificity of the 
second condition. She seems to value the possibility of classifying forces into internal and 
external types and prefers general statements to singularities. 
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Another similar case was found in Cheng's work. She, like a number of other students in 
the 15-yr-old group, had been quite impressed by an experiment that they saw in the school 
laboratory. This was the rule she wrote about the situation: 
thing take same time to fall as otherthing if 
thing fall from same height as otherthing. 
However, when she was challenged by actually testing the rule out using a pencil and a 
piece of paper, she changed the rule to the following upon seeing the experiment results: 
thing take same time to fall as otherthing if 
thing fall from same height as otherthing and 
not (thing made of paper) and 
not (thing made of feather). 
This modified rule produced results consistent with her observation, but she was not too 
satisfied. She asked if there would be any more exceptions to the rule besides paper and 
feather. She got no hint from the researcher, but this question seemed to worry her a lot. 
She came back the next session and proposed the following replacement for the earlier rule: 
thing take same time to fall as otherthing if 
thing fall from same height and 
thing in vacuum and 
otherthing in vacuum and 
there is gravity force. 
This rule obviously did not come out as a result of intuitive reasoning, and the fact that the 
experiment she saw in the school laboratory was done in a vacuum was not clear to her 
when she wrote the first version of the rule. When asked how she came up with such a 
modification, she said that she was not happy with the rule and wanted to find out more 
about the school experiment. The rule summarizes what she found out from the school 
textbook. Again, the interesting point here is that she consulted the textbooks because of 
dissatisfaction - dissatisfaction with specificities. 
8.3.4.3 Change in limits of applicability 
The other four cases of reformulation were all concerned with a re-definition of the limits of 
applicability of the rules. 
Two kinds of such changes were found. One involved a complete removal of all condi-
tions so that the rule changed from a specific conjecture to a general hypothesis that applies 
to all objects. This normally involved a recognition of the need for rigor and consistency in 
the use of terms. For example, Evon wrote the following rule on weight, intending it to 
mean that weight would only have effect on the motion if the motion has a vertical compo-
nent to it: 
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object affected by weight if 
object has change in height. 
When questioned whether things moving on a level surface, for example a bus, would have 
weight or not, she had to answer in the affirmative. Though intuitively she still thinks there 
is some difference in the effect of weight on motion, she could not explicitly clarify the 
difference. In the end, she proposed to change the rule to: 
object affected by weight. 
This is a significant decision in that she did not try to formalize her intuitive feeling of 
distinction by creating a separate category for horizontal motions. This is in line with her 
preference for generalization as indicated by the discussion about her other rule modifi-
cation in the preceding section. 
One of Wat's modifications was done in a similar vein. She wrote: 
thing can receive force if 
thing is dead object. 
She intended to express the idea that animate objects can move because they possess force, 
while inanimate objects can only move when they 'receive' forces from other objects. 
However, when she came to a test case of an animate object that moved because it was 
pushed, she realized that this distinction which she had hypothesized between animate and 
inanimate objects could not be substantiated. She then decided to reformulate the rule to: 
thing can receive force. 
The other cases of change in limits of applicability actually concerned the incorporation of 
learnt concepts into the program. The two instances were both modifications made by Wat 
concerning the topic of weight. The initial version of the two rules were: 
i) thing weight increased if 
thing affected by gravity. 
ii) thing has weight. 
She believed that all objects have weight, which she saw as an intrinsic property of all 
objects. However, she also believed that gravity has something to do with weight - in 
places where there is gravity, the weight of objects would be increased. It seemed that 
because of the programming task, Wat became more sensitive to the issues she was writing 
about. Neither of the two modifications were made because of failures discovered in 
running the program but were made because subsequent to the writing sessions she met 
materials (TV and books)that were contrary to her initial understanding. She then proposed 
to modify her rules to be in line with the new understanding: 
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i) thing weight zero if 
not (thing affected by gravity). 
ii) thing affected by gravity if 
thing on earth. 
Superficially, Wat's modifications are uninteresting cases of rewriting factual statements 
upon reading/learning about statements to the contrary. However, why was she the only 
student to write about such aspects of weight when all the students in the same group had 
been exposed to the same teaching materials? Furthermore, what prompted her to be so 
aware of these points as to bring them up the next session for modification when she had 
not been challenged about them? The issue of limit of applicability has typically been a 
non-problem in commonsense reasoning (Nagel, 1961). The fact that she was working in 
the PROLOG environment might have helped her see the importance of defining applica-
bility limits by providing a formal syntax for externalizing her ideas. However, she must 
also have placed a high value on rigor, on clear definitions of limits of applicability, a 
quality that is also valued highly by scientists. 
8.3.4.4 Reformulation as fine tuning 
Like modifications in the maintenance strategies category, the reformulations described 
above represent accommodations to the knowledge structures. However, the changes 
brought about by the modifications in this group are more significant. Here, the students 
are concerned about the general performance of the rules - how well the rules would work 
for a variety of situations. The problem with the rules is not that they are wrong, but that 
they need refining. The refining is done by changing the generality of the rules or their 
limits of applicability. It is anticipated that the rules after refinement would produce satis-
factory results for a wider range of situations, with the likely consequence that the modifi-
cations are relatively stable. This category of modifications is similar to Rumelhart and 
Norman's (1978) schema tuning where the basic relational structure of the schema remains 
unchanged and only the constant and variable terms referred by the schema are modified 
8.3.5 Theory building 
As has been pointed out by philosophers of science, one main distinguishing feature 
between science and common sense is in the organizational structure of these two bodies of 
knowledge (Nagel, 1961). Science is an organization and classification of knowledge on 
the basis of explanatory principles. It seeks to discover and to formulate in general terms 
the conditions under which events of various sorts occur. Commonsense, on the other 
hand, is exclusively preoccupied with the immediate consequences and qualities of 
observed events, that is, the pragmatics of the particular situation, and has little interest in 
systematically explaining the facts it notes, nor the range of valid applications of its beliefs. 
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Thus science is typically a well structured body of knowledge which is hierarchically 
organized, with a few most general, widely applicable principles at the top (i.e. being the 
most important) and the local variations and empirical laws at the bottom. 
The analysis of the students' programs in the foregoing chapter showed that their work 
differs from one another in the amount of theorizing involved. However, even in the case 
of the theorizers (those whose programs are hierarchically structured with the general 
hypotheses at the top), the structures only evolved slowly and not as a conscious effort of 
theory building. The program structures reflected the kinds of connections they saw 
amongst the different parameters of motion. There was one exception. Fong, a student 
from the 17-yr-old group, had a clear sense of building a hierarchically structured theory of 
motion. He was the only one who attempted syntactic restructuring of the rules - to 
streamline the relation names so that hierarchically related rules can be fired as such. This 
implies that Fong possessed two important qualities: an appreciation and respect for well 
structured knowledge, and a quickness to pick up the peculiarities of the programming 
language. His first syntactic restructuring attempts started as an effort to streamline his 
rules so as to reduce the amount of typing he had to do. One of the first rules he wrote 
down was 
object will be falling if 
object is initially at rest and 
object is under influence of gravity and 
not (object is supported by something). 
Then he thought about other possibilities for falling to take place and saw that these differ-
ent cases would all involve three conditions. Furthermore, he recognized that two of the 
conditions would be common across all the rules, and the rules only differ from one 
another in the condition concerning initial conditions. He thus modified the above rule to 
object will be falling if 
object is initially at rest and 
object may be falling. 
He then added in the following rule: 
object may be falling if 
object is under influence of gravity and 
not (object is supported by something). 
After this, he made use of the rule on 'may be falling' to build two further rules on 'will be 
falling' with the initial conditions of 'object is initially falling" and 'object is initially moving 
upward'. 
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A later case of syntactic restructuring was in a way purely aesthetic, solely for the purpose 
of highlighting the hierarchical structure he intended for his program. His whole program 
was essentially about the effects of different interactions on motion, and he began his enter-
prise by working on gravitational interactions: 
object-A affected gravitationally by object-B if 
object-A has mass and 
object-A nears object-B and 
object-B has a huge mass. 
After diverging to work on some other rules concerning interactions of object in direct 
contact, he wrote a rule on electrostatic interactions: 
object-A is affected electrostatically by object-B if 
object-A is a charged body and 
object-B is a charged body and 
object-A nears object-B. 
He then very quickly referred back to his earlier rule on gravitation, decided that grammati-
cally the second version is better and modified the previous rule accordingly to: 
object-A is affected gravitationally by object-B if 
object-A has mass and 
object-A nears object-B and 
object-B has a huge mass. 
He subsequently wrote three rules of the form 
object-A is affected 	 ly by object-B if 
object-A 	  
for electrostatic and magnetic interactions between objects. His modification of the program 
line quoted above could thus be understood as his demand that the syntactic structure of the 
program should reflect the hierarchical structure of the 'theory' that he wanted to build. 
Pragmatically, because of the very restrictive syntax of the PROLOG that he was allowed 
to use, he actually had to put in many program lines to highlight the structure, which would 
not have been necessary if all he wanted was for the program to work and answer queries 
according to his ideas (c.f. fig.7.26 for the structure of Fong's program). 
Fong was the only student who was consciously tackling the programming task as one of 
theory building, and his program did deserve to be termed a theory both semantically and 
syntactically. 
8.3.6 Program modification strategies, program structure and learning 
The foregoing analysis of the program modification behaviour of the students is done at an 
individual rule level and yet table 8.1b indicates that there is a high correlation between the 
structure of the program written by a student with the strategies s/he employed in the modi-
fication. Part of this correlation is a feature built into the analysis scheme and so is not at 
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all surprising. By definition, only rules in the category 'general hypotheses' would lead to 
modifications that may qualify to be called 'reformulation' or 'theory building'. Thus 
Sandra's and Brenda's work exhibited employment of the maintenance and extension 
strategies only. However, there are a couple of interesting observations one can make by 
comparing the program structure with the corresponding modification strategies employed. 
First, general hypotheses tended to go unchallenged if they are not related to specific con-
jectures and empirical observations. Wong's program has all the three kinds of rules, but 
the two general hypotheses in his program stand entirely unrelated to other parts of his 
program (c.f. fig. 7.17). This isolation leads to the sterility of these two rules and Wong's 
modification strategies had been rather uninteresting. All his eleven modifications were in 
the category of maintenance strategies. 
Another interesting feature concerning the evasion strategy can be discerned if one tries to 
look at which kind of rules seem to be most prone to the greatest challenges. If one makes 
the assumption that the most serious challenges were posed by failures of those rules that 
led to the employment of the evasion strategy, then these challenges arose only from 
failures of the general hypotheses category. None of the failures of the empirical 
observations or the specific conjectures led to a complete deletion of the rules concerned. 
If we take the program testing and modification process to be representative of the possible 
processes of interaction of a person's knowledge schemas with inputs from the outside 
world, such interactions should lead to learning. It is widely accepted that there are differ-
ent kinds of learning, some more significant than others (c.f. chapter 3). If we take the 
view that more significant learning is necessarily accompanied by structural changes in 
knowledge schetnas, Rumelhart and Norman's (1978) classification of learning in accre-
tion, tuning and restructuring provides a good framework for examining the learning pro-
cesses underlying the program modification activities discussed above. 
The modification strategies of maintenance and evasion as described in the previous section 
do not seem to lead to learning in any real sense. The former probably only leads to tem-
porary modifications in the knowledge schema in order to cope with the specific situation in 
hand and such changes may easily be reverted. As for the latter, it is an indication that the 
student is avoiding the conflict altogether instead of trying to resolve it. Two thirds of all 
the modification activities belong to these two strategies. 
The second most numerous category of modification strategy (accounting for 25% of all 
modifications) is that of extension by further categorization. As explained earlier, these 
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modifications are attempts to extend the existing knowledge structures in order that they be 
applicable to a larger range of specific cases. It is thus appropriate to see them as accretion 
processes in the context of learning. 
The most significant learning process as represented by the modification activities is that 
related to reformulations. These in fact rarely happened - only 7 out of 116 cases, and it is 
expected that they represent relatively stable structural changes in the knowledge schemas. 
It is important to note here that most of these cases could be interpreted as an indirect 
outcome of school learning. Furthermore, with the exception of one case (Lin's case), 
none of the modifications was necessitated by a failure in the testing process, but were 
considered moves after reflecting on the meaning carried by the program lines perse. Both 
Lin's and Evon's rules for conceptual reform involved the notions of internal and external 
forces. Both students had interpreted such a distinction to be the underlying difference 
between autonomous and non-autonomous motions. This interpretation results from their 
conscious efforts to integrate their formal physics learning (terms like internal force and 
external force) into their commonsense framework of reasoning. The modifications made 
by Wat and Cheng, both from the 15-yr-old group, were affected by their school learning 
in another way. The changes made were at a much less theoretical level. They have learnt 
certain facts about weight which were contrary to their commonsense expectations and they 
modified their rules accordingly to take these into account. 
None of the modifications recorded brought about fundamental changes in the knowledge 
schemas. There is no evidence of learning at the restructuring level having taken place. 
This is not altogether surprising given the short time span involved in the administration of 
this programming task. However, a close inspection of all the conflicts and resolution 
strategies involved in the modifications shows that very rarely do the program failures pose 
serious cognitive challenges to the students concerned. There is no indication, with the 
exception of Evon's case which will be detailed below, that any further development in the 
programming activities would lead to structural changes in the knowledge schemas. 
It is reasonable to expect that the nature of the cognitive conflict and what the student may 
gain from the interactions depend very much on whether the programs reflect any core 
theoretical hypothesis and its degree of structuredness. In the case when a program 
demonstrates a strong theoretical hypothesis, very often the failures arise from invalid core 
assumptions/concepts which may not be resolved by temporary local modifications using 
maintenance strategies or by means of fine tuning. Thus failures in programs belonging to 
the structural epistemic frame may bring about more serious conflicts than those in the other 
types of programs. Evon's program failures fall into this category and they are described 
in detail here: 
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Evon had written the following rules for determining the cause of motion: 
object motion caused by itself if 
object force supplied by object. 
object motion caused by machine if 
object force supplied by machine. 
object-1 motion caused by object-2 if 
object-1 force supplied by object-2. 
object motion caused by gravity if 
not(object under the influence of other external force). 
She then set out to test the program with the case of a falling apple (thinking about the 
famous 'Newton's apple'). To her surprise, the computer did not come up with the expect-
ed answer. The reason was that in one of her earlier sessions, she included weight as an 
external (supply of) force, together with forces like friction, air current, etc. Faced with 
such a contradiction, her immediate response was to exclude weight from her list of exter-
nal forces. As a matter of fact, in her scheme of intuitive physics, there was no clear orien-
tation towards classifying weight as internal or external forces since she could find justifi-
cation for either classifications. Weight arises because of attraction from the earth which is 
external to the object, so it makes sense to put weight in the class of external forces. On the 
other hand, weight is related to the mass of the object which is an intrinsic property of the 
object itself, so it also makes sense to classify it as an internal force. However, after 
changing weight to an internal force, the computer did not give her the expected answer -
gravity, because according to one of her other rules, anything placed in air would be 
affected by air-current, and air-current is an external force. Now, excluding air-current 
from the list of external forces seemed to be too much a twisting of facts. She resolved the 
problem by replacing the fourth rule listed above by: 
object motion caused by gravity if 
not (object motion caused by something). 
to avoid the problem with specific instances of internal or external forces. She did not 
review her underlying concepts about sources of supply of force. 
Unfortunately, this was not the end of the problems for her. She again met similar prob-
lems relating to internal and external supplies of force when she explored her rules on 
control of motion, and she could not find a satisfactory solution after patching up various 
parts of the program via maintenance or reformulation. At the end of the programming task, 
she was beginning to raise questions about the more central assumptions. 
Thus though knowledge restructuring has not been recorded, a fair conjecture based on the 
present results is that only when the knowledge about a particular domain is relatively well 
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structured, possibly to the extent of being classifiable as at the structural epistemic level, 
would conflicts possibly lead to restructuring. Restructuring would be used only as a last 
resort when all the other strategies fail to resolve the conflicts. 
Another important observation here is that both Evon's serious cognitive conflicts and the 
fine tuning of schemas pertaining to rule reformulations arise because of students' attempts 
to integrate their commonsense knowledge about motion with the mechanics knowledge 
they learnt in schools. There thus seem to be two pre-requisite criteria for significant 
learning in the sense of changes in knowledge structure to take place. The first concerns 
the learner's epistemology, whether s/he sees value in the theoretical and abstract, and the 
second is the presence of external stimulus that gives rise to cognitive conflicts with the 
learner's original concepts, beliefs. 
8.4 A Matter of Value - Performance Rating Given to the Programs 
In the last chapter, the students' programs were compared in terms of content and structure. 
How would the students themselves compare their own programs? What criteria would 
they be using in such a comparison? Would there be great individual differences between 
students in the criteria they choose? Answers to these questions would provide further 
insight into the epistemological values of the students. 
For the group of F.6 students, their program development work was all completed within 
the first term of the school year. At the end of the school year when the school examina-
tions were over, they were invited back to give a performance rating to all the programs 
developed by the group. In order that their assessment would not be affected by their 
personal relations with and esteems for the respective authors, the authors for the individual 
programs were held anonymous except when they were assessing the performance of their 
own program. 
The fact that all the programs contain large segments about causes and agencies of control 
for motion makes it much easier for a comparison of the programs to be made on their 
performance with respect to these aspects. Each student was asked to pose six queries to 
each of the programs being tested and to record their answers: 
car motion affected by what? 
car motion caused by what? 
car motion controlled by what? 
upward-moving basketball motion affected by what? 
upward-moving basketball motion caused by what? 
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upward-moving basketball motion controlled by what? 
Each student had to give for each program, except his/her own, a rating for each response 
from the computer and the overall performance rating, and these were recorded on a sheet 
of paper (fig. 8.1). At the end of the exercise, each student was interviewed to find out 
how they arrived at the rating scores. The interviews were audiotaped and a translated ver-
sion of the interview was transcribed (as with the classification and programming task, 
these interviews were conducted in Chinese). 
Because of the difficulties in arrangement, only five students from the F.6 group took part 
in this rating exercise. Furthermore, some of them could not complete the rating for all the 
programs. Thus the administration of this task is far from satisfactory and it is not possible 
to make any definite claims on the results. However, some of the initial observations are 
so interesting that they are included here as a corollary. 
Despite the incomplete data, it can still be seen that the program with the highest rating so 
far is the one written by Brenda. With the exception of Fong, all assessed the programs in 
terms of efficiency (how few queries would the computer pose for the user before it can 
come up with an answer) and accuracy (how well the answer matches with their 
expectations). Though they were all allowed to ask the computer for explanations of how it 
has arrived at a particular solution, very rarely (except Fong) would they make use of such 
a facility unless the answer was reckoned to be unreasonable. It was as if how the answer 
was arrived at was of little value, only the actual answer really mattered. Because of the 
pragmatic outlook adopted in the rating exercise, Brenda's program was rated as the best 
by all the others except Fong. This result is very interesting and in a sense illuminating. 
As can be seen from fig. 7.15, one main feature of Brenda's program is that it is an 
essentially flat structure without any hierarchical relations. All the rules were either empiri-
cal observations or specific conjectures, and the whole program operates at the level of the 
specific epistemic frame. Further, the premises for the rules represent the most prominent 
or most highly correlated features of the stereotypical situations the rules were written for, 
and generally bear no causal relations to the goal statements. The following rules from her 
program illustrate these characteristics: 
object motion caused by wind if 
object moving unsteadily and periodically in air. 
object motion caused by a push if 
object initially at rest. 
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Table 8.2 The performance rating given by the students# to the various 
programs.  
program* 	 Rating@ given by 
Brenda Evon Sandra Wong 
PA 
PB 
PC 
PD 
PE 
PF 
5 
4 
3 
3 
3 
5 
3 
4 
3 
3 
4 
3 
3 
4 
3 
4 
3 
@ The students were asked to rate the performance of each program according to a 5 point scale: 1 - totally 
unacceptable, 2 - not reasonable, 3 - may be possible, 4- quite possible, 5 - good answer. 
# Though Fong also participated in the rating exercise, but because he refused to rate them according to 
the five point scale, it cannot be recorded here. 
The authors for the six programs are: pa - Brenda, pb - Evon, pc -Fong, pd - lin, pe - Sandra and pf -
Wong. 
Fong's program is the best in terms of its coherent structure and consistency with the 
Newtonian view of motion. However, it was not well received by the other students. The 
main reason was that because of its concern for logical sufficiency and general applicability 
to all situations, the users have to answer a whole host of apparently irrelevant questions. 
Furthermore, because of the symmetrical relationship between the agent and the affected 
encapsulated by the program, the program easily went into infinite loops while answering a 
query and this was extremely frustrating for the users. The following is an extract from a 
typical rating session for Fong's program: 
Fong 	 : basketball motion controlled by what? 
Computer : basketball move-along-path what? 
Fong 	 : parabola. 
Computer : what plan the path parabola? 
Fong 	 : man. 
Computer : is it true that basketball possesses mass? 
Fong 	 : yes. 
Computer : is it true that basketball nears man? 
Fong 	 : yes. 
Computer : is it true that man possesses a huge mass? 
Fong 	 : no. 
Computer : is it true that basketball is a charged body? 
Fong 	 : no. 
Computer : is it true that man is a charged body? 
Fong 	 : no. 
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Computer : is it true that basketball is a magnetized body? 
Fong 	 : no. 
Computer : is it true that man is a magnetized body? 
Fong 	 : no. 
Computer : is it true that basketball is in contact with man? 
Fong 	 : no. 
Computer : is it true that basketball is in man? 
Fong 	 : no. 
Computer : is it true that man collides with basketball? 
Fong 	 : no. 
Computer : basketball nears what? 
Fong 	 : man, earth, air. 
Computer : is it true that earth possesses a huge mass? 
Fong 	 yes. 
Computer : is it true that earth possesses mass? 
Fong 	 : yes. 
Computer : is it true that earth nears man? 
Fong 	 : yes. 
Computer : is it true that earth is a charged body? 
Fong 	 : no. 
Computer : is it true that earth is a magnetized body? 
Fong 	 : yes. 
Computer : is it true that earth is in contact with man? 
Fong 	 : yes. 
Computer : is it true that man has a rough surface? 
Fong 	 : yes. 
Computer : is it true that earth is in man? 
Fong 	 : no. 
Computer : is it true that man collides with earth? 
Fong 	 : no. 
Computer : earth nears what? 
Fong 	 : man, air, basketball. 
Computer : is it true that air possesses a huge mass? 
Computer : earth is in what? 
Fong 	 : air. 
Computer : is air a fluid media? 
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Fong 	 : yes. 
Computer : Answer is: basketball motion controlled by man. 
Fong 	 : why? 
Computer : basketball motion controlled by man because 
basketball move along path parabola and 
man plan the path parabola and 
man has the power to influence motion of basketball. 
man has the power to influence motion of basketball because 
man indirectly influence the motion of basketball. 
man indirectly influence the motion of basketball because 
earth directly influence the motion of basketball and 
man indirectly influence the motion of earth. 
man indirectly influence the motion of earth because 
air directly influence the motion of earth and 
man directly influences the motion of air. 
air directly influence the motion of earth because 
earth is affected by viscosity of air. 
man directly influences the motion of air because 
air is affected frictionally by man. 
Fong 	 : Any more answers? 
Request for more answers to the question triggered off another burst of similar questions, 
and the program went into an infinite loop of looking for 'indirect influences'. 
Fong himself was aware of the shortcomings of his own program when put to the test for 
pragmatic everyday situations. However, he was not convinced that Brenda's was the 
best. In fact, he was the only one who cared more about how the resolutions were made, 
that is how the computer reasoned in getting the answers, instead of what the actual 
answers were. When he first met Brenda's program in the rating session, he was very sur-
prised at the efficiency of the program and was not satisfied with the reasoning given by the 
computer. His immediate reaction was to reject the way the program works as it was so 
different from his own. He then asked for a listing of all the programs to scrutinize at his 
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own leisure. An interview with Fong was conducted after he had finished reading the pro-
grams several days later. The following is an extract from the interview: 
Fong was commenting on that part of Evon's program dealing with agencies of 
control for motion. (* PA refers to Brenda's program, PB refers to Evon's 
program and PC is Fong's program.) 
Fong: The rules on 'motion controlled by' have great potential of develop-
ment. 
Why do you think that the rules on 'motion controlled by' has potential? 
Fong: I don't know... I had never thought of such a categorization. It is more 
useful, say.... It has practical usage, it helps to anticipate ... 
You find the categorization into external and internal is good? 
Fong: Yes. 
So, you think its potential lies on the distinction between external and 
internal. 
Fong: Yes. It can distinguish the causes of motion, whether the motion is 
determined by internal factors or external factors. It has practical use. 
Besides, if this part is general enough, it can be linked up with the 
other parts. 
In Physics, we have not talked about 'force supplied by', we only talk 
about 'force', and there is nothing concerning 'supplied by'. Isn't that 
right? 
Fong: I don't know. 
In Physics there are internal forces and external forces. Say, the bird 
flies - Is it caused by an internal force? 
Fong: His [referring to author of PB] concept of internal force is different from 
what we are talking about. It talks..about those forces that are 
generated out of its own wishes. 
You mean it is out of its own wishes? 
Fong: Not wish, but his 'internal force' is different from that used in Physics 
because ... they are very different. 
What are the differences? 
Fong: I think internal forces refer to those forces that are generated when the 
object is in motion, i.e., force supplied by object in motion. If the force 
comes from other object, it will be external force. 
Is this concept different from that in Physics? 
Fong: In Physics, internal forces come from the interaction of the particles 
inside the system. 
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If we follow the definition in Physics, say the statement 'force supplied 
is internal', what does it mean? 
Fong: I cannot tell much from this. If there is external force, I can only predict 
what would happen to the centre of mass. What happens to the object, 
I do not know. For internal forces, there is no change in the centre of 
mass, but other things in the surroundings move. I cannot predict what 
will happen. It depends on the system. 
Fong then went on to discuss Brenda's program. He was not entirely happy with 
the rule 'object motion controlled by friction if object move by using wheels'. 
What is wrong with the rule about 'wheel' and 'friction'? 
Fong: Here it says if it uses the wheel to generate motion, it must be affected 
by friction. At first, it seems meaningless but later, after more careful 
thinking, I found that he must have considered the case clearly before 
he wrote these things. His thinking was helped by practical cases. 
The program is not general. So, when there are some general 
questions, it doesn't work. The program becomes meaningless, say, I 
test it with an electron, I asked about the motion of an electron. It gave 
'no more answers'. However, I still found that it is intelligent in some 
parts of the program. 
Where are they? Are they inside specific cases? 
Fong: Yes, like when dealing with the cases car, basketball, 	  it asks a lot 
of questions and they are meaningful too. The answers are exact and 
correct but those in between inferences are jumping too fast. So, I 
rank it as the 3rd in the potential to develop. 
Fong: At first I thought that my program also has greatest developmental 
potentiality, but later, I find that in PB's program, when it is developed, 
it has a lot of practical uses, especially this part. If PB is properly 
developed on the part 'motion controlled by', it will have practical uses. 
Can you give examples? I cannot think of any practical use. 
Fong: Like, to determine whether a particle can control itself or not. 
You mean the division in force supply into internal or external is very 
crucial? 
Fong: Yes. It is very important. The linkage of 'affected by' and 'controlled 
by' in my program is practically useless. Also the arguments are not 
accurate. But they can be linked in my opinion. 
You mean the linkage can be made in his program? 
Fong: No. I mean adding my part into his program to make the linkage. So I 
think it has the greatest developmental potentiality. I ranked it as the 
1st. 
How about yours when compared to this one, PC versus PB? 
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Fong: PB is more accurate and practical. The arguments are acceptable. But 
as for develop-ment, I find that they are not flexible actually. If they can 
allow more areas for themselves, they can change or add things easily 
afterwards. 
• I: 	 So, they are not easy to develop? 
Fong: Not easy to be developed but by using his concept, it can be 
developed still. 
How about reasoning? Not on the whole structure. Are the statements 
logical and acceptable? 
Fong: PA is the most reasonable. Mine is not reasonable at all. 
The answers are not reasonable in your program. But I am interested 
in the statement. 
Fong: He [referring to author of PA] has simplified the statements. His 
performances are good in the case of 'car' and 'basketball'. 
You think his statements are reasonable. 
Fong: Yes. Some parts in PA are better than this one PB. Because in PB, 
some parts on "controlled by" are not correct. His way of thinking is 
good but still there are some mistakes. 
So, in terms of abstract reasoning, PB is the best but in testing results, 
PA is the best. How about yours when compared with PB on 
development potential? 
Fong: It is hard to say. In the short term, PB is better, I think the result will be 
the best when three are combined. You have to find somebody who 
think as accurate as PA, and flexible as PC, the ideas have to be as 
new as PB, so combining the three will be the best. 
You think PB is inventive? 
Fong: Yes, perhaps it is because I have never.thought of these things before. 
The clarity of thought expressed by Fong in this interview is remarkable and his comments 
on the value of the three different programs written by him, Evon and Brenda provide 
important insight for science educators. 
It is evident from the interview that Fong can distinguish clearly the difference in meaning 
for the terms internal and external forces as used scientifically in the Newtonian sense from 
Evon's usage of these two terms. However, he found Evon's intended usage of these two 
terms to stand for sources of power for motion to be of much greater pragmatic value than 
the Newtonian connotation he used them for. He also found the ability of Brenda's 
program to deal with specific cases very impressive. In a way, Fong's criticism of his own 
program is applicable to the way school science knowledge is presented to students. 
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Scientific knowledge as presented (if interpreted correctly) represents an entirely different 
system of looking at the world which does not address important issues and apparent 
distinctions in daily life. Attempts to link up school knowledge with everyday concerns as 
in Evon's case bring about misconceptions. Further, the scientific laws and principles are 
usually so general that they fail to cope reasonably with specific daily situations. 
As Fong pointed out, there is value in general rules in that they can go beyond the specifics 
and handle wider ranges of physical phenomena. In the long run, it is still programs like 
his and Evon's that has long term potentials for development. However, is Fong's propo-
sal to link up the three programs workable? Is it possible to make science learning more 
meaningful and motivating by showing how scientific principles relate to pragmatic con-
cerns and distinctions, and how they can be applied to deal with actual specific (and 
"messy") situations of everyday life? 
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Chapter 9 CONCLUSIONS 
The two tasks in this research have yielded rich data which throw light on a variety of 
issues, theoretical as well as methodological. This final chapter is an attempt to summarize 
the findings for each task before presenting a synthesis of what we can conclude in terms 
of our understanding of commonsense reasoning about motion as well as the techniques 
used for elicitation in this research. 
9.1 The Classification Task 
A classification task was chosen as one of the methods of elicitation because as a cognitive 
activity, categorization is somewhere between perception and thinking (Neisser, 1987). It 
was anticipated that the classification schemes used would be affected both by features of 
the entities classified, in this case motion events, as well as the beliefs held by the subject 
about the domain. 
9.1.1 Types of classification schemes used 
An analysis of the contents of the classification schemes used by the students shows that 
they can broadly be classified into two types of schemes, descriptive ones and causal ones. 
The former accounts for two thirds of all classification schemes produced and these attempt 
to answer the 'what' and 'how' questions about motion, while the later are those that are 
concerned with the 'why' questions. The descriptive schemes are thus concerned with 
issues roughly within the domain of kinematics and the causal schemes broadly dynamical 
ones. 
There are three kinds of descriptive schemes: those classifying the motions according to 
pragmatic concerns and non-physical aspects of the motion, for example the intention or 
feelings of the moving object (D1 schemes); those classifying the motions according to 
holistic descriptions of the physical features of the motion, for example the type of motion 
(i.e. falling, sliding, etc.) or type of trajectory (D2 schemes); and those classifying the 
motion events according to a single physical parameter of the motion, for example speed or 
type of object involved. 
The causal schemes can also be further subdivided into three groups: those classifying 
motion by naming the specific causal agent involved, whether concrete or abstract (Al 
schemes); those classifying according to specific characteristics of the causal agents, for 
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example the nature of the agent and whether the agent is moving (A2 schemes); and those 
classifying according to the mechanisms involved in production of the motion events (A3 
schemes). 
9.1.2 Commonsense reasoning about motion is predominantly concerned 
with pragmatic issues of the immediate situation 
A close inspection of the classification protocols reveals that parameters used in the D1 
schemes concern pragmatic issues and perspectives which permeate through all the other 
schemes, descriptive as well as causal. Issues like the intention or feeling of the moving 
object, whether the moving object has the ability to control the motion, or the motivation 
for the motion are never dealt with nor mentioned in mechanics lessons. They bear no 
definite relationship with the actual physical attributes of motion, and yet they are very real 
and important problems in everyday encounters with them. Parameters used in the D1 
schemes thus define the context for the motions and the ultimate goals for the processing, 
that is, the purpose for reasoning about the motion events in commonsense contexts. The 
D2 schemes, on the other hand, tries to look for prototypical motion labels for each of the 
events. The motivation for such classifications, as revealed by the classification protocols, 
seems to be pragmatic: The ability to assign a label to a motion would allow a person to 
anticipate subsequent developments for that motion, and subsequently to arrive at an 
optimal strategy for dealing with the situation. The D3 schemes are also related to similar 
concerns. The animicity of the moving object and speed are the most popular schemes 
under this category. These two parameters, especially the former, determine largely how 
the motion event is handled. 
All of the subjects, except three, produced causal schemes and these account for one third 
of all the schemes produced. This can be taken as an indication of the strong cognitive 
desire to look for causal explanations,-to fmd out.why a motion is developing the way it is, 
when reasoning about motion in commonsense everyday contexts. However, the level of 
explanation that is sought for is generally very low, mainly at the level of explaining away 
(Schank, 1986) the problem. Al schemes offer explanations to the extent of naming the 
causal agents: falling motions are caused by falling forces, tripping motions by 
obstructions, etc. A2 schemes classify causal agents according to their characteristics, and 
70% of these classified causal agents into animate and inanimate ones. Thus these two 
types of causal schemes do not contribute to deeper understanding of the causal agency for 
the particular situations than the D2 or D3 schemes. This situation is reasonable and 
expected if Schank's hypothesis that one would not try hard to understand deeply unless 
there is a strong need for it is valid. Such explanations are good enough for the pragmatic 
concerns of classifying motion events into prototypes so as to work out the best way to 
handle them in commonsense contexts. 
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Schemes in the A3 category offer deeper levels of causal analysis, classifying motion 
according to the mechanisms responsible for bringing about the motions. Two types of 
explanations were offered in these schemes: analogical models and aggregate effect of 
forces model. The former identifies certain physical components as playing the crucial 
causal role as in some common mechanical devices, for example springs, levers, etc., and 
the whole system is assumed to behave in an analogous fashion. The latter type of 
explanation is based on the belief that motions occur in the direction of the aggregate effect 
of the forces acting, and it is frequently the case that forces acting in opposite directions 
would work in contention, and the 'winning' one would take effect while the 'losing' one 
would remain dormant, producing no effect on the motion. It is believed that these 
schemes provide linkage points to the study of mechanics. 
A comparison of the classification behaviour of the two age groups shows that there is no 
fundamental difference between them except that the older group is able to produce 
significantly more D2 schemes, possibly because their background knowledge in Physics 
enables them to have more ways of describing the motions and giving it a holistic label. 
The same fundamental concern for pragmatic issues is prevalent in both groups, indicating 
that instructions in mechanics have not fundamentally changed the basic outlook in 
commonsense reasoning about motion. 
9.1.3 Commonsense knowledge about motion stored in large complex 
encapsulated units of memory structure based on prototypes 
Another important observation from the results is that the reasoning about motion as 
exhibited in the classification protocols is mainly in the form of pattern matching and not 
logical inferencing according to certain principles. The most fundamental processing seems 
to be to look for prototypes with which to label these motions. Knowing the type of 
motion involved, together with a knowledge of one or two other important parameters like 
the animicity of the moving object, the speed, or the animicity of the causal agents, seems 
to be sufficient to act as indices for determining the value for all other parameters. This 
supports the idea that knowledge about motion events for the purpose of commonsense 
reasoning is stored in units that are larger and more structured than semantic nets. Such 
knowledge structures are likely to be at the level of complexity similar to Schank's (1975) 
scripts or Minsky's (1975) frames. The advantage of using such large and complex 
structures (or scripts in the general sense) for memory storage is that the processing time 
can be much reduced since each unit would hold default values for most of the motion 
parameters (or slots). 
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9.2 Conceptions of Motion as Expressed by the Expert Systems 
Developed 
The students participating in the programming task had no difficulty in writing PROLOG 
rules about motion, despite the fact that most of them had had no previous programming 
experience. However, their interpretation of the task at hand was much less formal than 
may be expected from the logical syntax and the nature of the programming. Very often, 
the students were thinking of very specific situations or 'prototypes' when they were 
writing down the PROLOG rules, so that though the rules took the form of generally 
applicable statements, it was usually not the students' conscious aspiration to do so. 
9.2.1 Important aspects of motion as revealed by a rule level analysis 
At the individual rule level, the kinds of concerns expressed in the rules are very similar to 
those found in the classification task. About half of the rules were about aspects and 
attributes of motion and another one third were about agency of cause or control for the 
motion. The percentage content distribution of the rules for the two age groups of subjects 
are very similar, with the older group showing more interest in issues of agency and the 
younger group relatively more interest in describing motion. 
Of the rules describing attributes of motion, the two most popular subgroups are of the 
format: 
motion type if 
observable physical conditions 
and 
motion attribute (abstract) if 
observable physical conditions. 
It can be seen that the former type of rules are essentially empirical correlations trying to 
determine a holistic label for a motion given a small set of observable features of the 
motion, and as such perform functions very similar to the D2 classification schemes. The 
latter type of rules try to make deductions about some abstract attributes of the moving 
object, like force or energy. These rules provide important links to the next largest group 
of rules, those about causal agency for the motions concerned. 
The rules about causes of motion try to predict the causal agents involved when certain 
physical attributes of the motion are given, or vice versa. Both age groups expressed 
autonomous and non-autonomous motion as one major distinction in relation to agency, 
though the younger group tended to do it much more explicitly in the form of "cause agent 
<- nature of object" whereas the older group did it more subtly in terms of "internal" and 
"external" forces as the agents for the two kinds of motion. There is more diversity in the 
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entities the older students used as labels for the agents: physical objects, forces or 
circumstantial factors such as the actual physical situation for the motion appeared in their 
programs as causal agents. In general, there was a tendency for the older group to label 
force as the immediate cause of motion while the younger group confined causal agents to 
physical objects, and force is seen as the necessary ingredient for motion to take place. 
There is little consensus in the understanding of the term "control". It may be used as a 
synonym for cause, the dominating factor amongst a number of influences, a causal agent 
that can exercise intentions and will-power, or a possible state of a moving object (that is, 
the motion being under control or not). 
9.2.2 Patterns of agency 
The notion of causality is a consistently important theme coming up in both the 
classification task and the programming task. Whilst it is not easy to map out a clear and 
relatively complete picture of a subject's conception of agency from the classification 
protocols, it is possible to construct a more systematic picture of a student's causal 
conception from the expert system written. This is mainly because the programming task is 
a creative task unconstrained by any given motion event, problem situation or concept, as is 
often the case in other techniques of elicitation. 
An analysis of the programs in terms of the "story" or underlying theme of the programs 
with reference to the causal conceptions they tell shows that they differ from each other 
along two important dimensions: mediation and reciprocity. Three out of the twelve 
programs only referred to concrete physical entities as causal agents, with no explicit 
mention of the need for any mediating entities for the causal action to take place. For these 
programs, the agent and the affected necessarily play distinctly different roles, with the 
former being the active party and the latter the passive one. Of those hypothesizing a 
mediating entity, normally force, as playing a crucial role in the causal action, most of them 
still highlighted the "active" role of the agent as opposed to the affected. Only two of the 
programs detached the attribution of agency from an entity to an interacting event. The 
mediating agent for the causal action was no longer derived from the physical agent 
directly, but from an interaction between the agent and the affected. Such a move 
highlights the fact that both parties are affected during such an interaction, making the 
causal action much more symmetrical. 
It is hypothesized here that some programs did not make any reference to mediation not 
because the authors did not hold ideas of mediation, but that they do not see any pragmatic 
value in writing these down. A rating exercise carried out by some of the older students on 
the programs written by others in the same group indicates that a well thought out program 
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written according to a model of unmediated agency can be the most efficient. Thus whether 
mediation is mentioned is related to what the author considers as important knowledge for 
commonsense operations. Those who referred to it did so mainly to satisfy their innate 
desire to express generalizations and abstractions. 
The ability to see a reciprocal reaction in the causal interaction is a crucial step towards a 
more scientific understanding and conceptualization of motion. It is not clear how this 
change was accomplished in the two cases found. However, the teaching of classical 
mechanics might be promoted if the notion of causation can be discussed and linked 
explicitly to an interacting event rather than a physical object. 
9.3 Epistemic Planes of Operation - a Matter of Intellectual Aspiration 
It is the contention here that the programming task, as an unstructured, unconstrained, 
creative task, can be viewed as an explanation task where the author of a program tries to 
explain how the world of motion works in general by answering questions s/he sets up 
herself/himself. Under such circumstances, there is no fixed criterion as to what counts as 
a good explanation and it may vary from the very specific to the very general. The choice of 
questions and the level at which they are answered reflect the kind of knowledge the 
student figures as most important for understanding the world, that is, the sort of 
epistemic questions s/he is concerned with. 
At the individual rule level, three kinds of rules can be distinguished along the dimension of 
generality. On the most specific end, there are the empirical observations which describe 
specific situations or concrete entities. These essentially capture prominent features of 
important prototypes of motion, and as such are descriptions at the level of encapsulated 
scripts for motion. Next are the specific conjectures which hypothesize the role of 
abstract entities in specific situations. Though these rules are also concerned with specific 
phenomena, they represent the first move towards generalization. This is because in the 
search for generalities applicable to all types of motion, invariances cannot be sought from 
concrete physical attributes but must necessitate the invention of an abstract entity, in 
essence the mediating entity for the causal action (there is simply no single kinematic 
system applicable to all motions and invariances only exist at the dynamical level). The 
specific conjectures also play the crucial role of providing possible linkage points between 
specific situations and further generalizations. Last came the general hypotheses which 
postulate general relationships between entities, abstract or concrete, that would be 
applicable to motions in general. 
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To look at each program as an integrated whole, inspecting how the different kinds of rules 
relate to and orchestrate with each other provides a deeper insight into the sort of epistemic 
questions the program is attempting to answer. There are programs that contain only 
empirical observations and specific conjectures. For these, the program taken as a whole 
does not go beyond the specifics of particular prototypes of motion and may justifiably be 
said to operate within a 'specific' epistemic frame. It is hypothesized here that these 
programs do not contain any general hypotheses not because the authors do not entertain 
analyses of a more general nature, but that they do not see much utility in including them. 
This hypothesis is especially reasonable if the problems the authors are concerned with are 
the pragmatic ones of seeking appropriate ways of handling the situation efficiently. The 
programs thus reflect where the authors' priorities and values lie. 
Most of the programs contain some rules in the general hypothesis category. However, in 
a large proportion of these programs, there are often no explicit relationship amongst the 
different general hypotheses, nor links across the general hypotheses, the specific 
conjectures and the empirical observations. This isolation of the general hypotheses from 
the other two categories of rules means that the former would have no utility at all in terms 
of contributing to reasoning about specific situations. Thus such programs though aspiring 
to operate at a 'general' epistemic frame, in fact face the dilemma of not being able to cope 
with specific situations except by operating within the specific epistemic frame alone. This 
dilemma may account for the fact that one can find both general hypothesis and empirical 
observations within the same program written for the same kind of goal statements: this 
indicates an oscillation between the two epistemic frames. 
Two of the programs exhibited much higher levels of structuring as to enable them to 
operate as one integrated system. -Here, the actual number of general hypotheses may be 
very few, but they are hierarchically related to each other as well as linking up with the 
empirical observations via specific conjectures. Each of these two well structured 
programs in fact present a prominent core hypothesis, a theoretical framework for the 
interpretation and processing of motion events, and as such operates at the 'structural' 
epistemic frame. This structuredness is independent of whether the core hypothesis is 
consistent with the Newtonian view or not. Rather, it relates to how committed the person 
is to the value of a generalizable framework as opposed to empirical piecemeal strategies 
when the latter probably perform more efficiently and adequately for commonsense 
situations. This commitment possibly corresponds to what Polanyi (1958) referred to as 
"intellectual passions". 
203 
9.3.1 Epistemic frameworks and learning 
One interesting observation here is that whilst the younger group produced roughly the 
same proportion of rules in all three categories, more than half of the older group's 
production of rules is in the category of specific conjectures, and proportionally less for the 
other two categories. A possible explanation for the F.6 group's greater tendency to 
produce specific conjectures is that they were primed to do so through the formal physics 
instructions they had received: they had been taught to analyze the nature, direction and 
magnitude of forces acting on different objects in specific settings. 
If the specific conjectures do play a crucial role in enhancing the utility of generalizations as 
suggested earlier, then instructions in mechanics should help a person to move towards 
operating in the structural epistemic frame. Furthermore, learning in mechanics (or 
possibly other areas of science) may be made more meaningful if knowledge about the 
particular domain can be more clearly delineated into these three categories according to 
their generality and the issue of links across them be addressed more explicitly in teaching. 
Another remarkable feature of the epistemic frames as elicited from the programs is that 
they correspond closely to the three mechanisms for equilibration , intra, inter and trans, as 
proposed by the Piagetian school (Piaget, 1975). The intra, or within scheme, mechanism 
takes place when a number of isolated facts are known, identified and analyzed 
independently of each other and is thus similar to the specific epistemic frame of operation. 
The inter, or between scheme, mechanism takes place when specific facts are found to be 
connected by transformations that leave something invariant, and is thus very similar to 
operations within the general epistemic frame. The trans, or totality, mechanism takes 
place when a structure is found that explains the transformations and the invariance, and 
each particular case. This last mechanism corresponds to operations within the structural 
epistemic frame. This close correspondence is an unanticipated and pleasing outcome 
which gives one some confidence that the method has elicited a real and in some sense a 
profound level of students' thought. Furthermore, this suggests that the three epistemic 
levels identified correspond to a progression that necessarily accompanies different phases 
of development in a progression towards the development of a scientific understanding. 
9.4 In the Face of Conflicts - Program Testing and Modification 
One important advantage of using expert system development as a task for elicitation is that 
the elicited knowledge is explorable and modifiable. The testing and modification episodes 
give rise to an explicit trace of the thought processes going on when a person tries to apply 
his/her externalized knowledge and meets conflicting situations. These two processes not 
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only allow the researcher to probe deeper into the students' understanding even after the 
initial elicitation in the form of program development, but also provide important insight 
into a variety of issues: the kinds of possible cognitive conflict that may arise when one's 
beliefs are faced with challenges from actual everyday observations, the cognitive strategies 
that may be employed to cope with such conflicts, and the possible cognitive outcomes for 
different conflict resolution strategies. 
9.4.1 Criterion for satisfaction 
An inspection of the program modification behaviour of the students reveals that the 
criterion for satisfactory performance set up for the programs varied greatly across 
individuals. Most of the students took a pragmatic and utilitarian stance in assessing the 
performance of programs: they are concerned only with the acceptability of the answer 
itself so that the reasoning is of no consequence as long as it can give the right answer for 
the case under consideration; there is no expectation that rules should be infallible for all 
cases and answers are judged to be acceptable within a tolerance limit as long as they do not 
differ significantly from commonsense expectations. However, a few of the students went 
beyond the pragmatic and employed more "aesthetic" standards. These students tended to 
be the same group who produced programs at the structural epistemic level. Their 
programs built up a systematic and general explanation for motion, and they not only 
demanded that these produce correct answers, but also that the reasoning used is 
acceptable. Inherent in such an "aesthetic" position is the belief that there are some hidden 
principles, some grand laws of nature, that govern the world of motion and give a 
systematicity to the myriad manifestations of different motion characteristics. 
9.4.2 Program structure and conflict resolution strategies 
As the programs were tested using specific instances of motion, the first rules that would 
be fired would necessarily be the empirical observations or specific conjectures. There is 
little opportunity for the general hypotheses to be challenged except for programs written at 
the structural epistemic level. Most of the modifications that actually took place were made 
to the empirical observations and specific conjectures and were thus concerned with rules 
written for specific stereotypical motion events. 
There were five types of modification strategy as exhibited by the program modification 
behaviour of the students. 
First, there was the maintenance strategy which tried to cope with specific failures by 
adding, deleting or modifying conditions from the premises of rules. This effectively 
retains the same basic knowledge structure while making minor adjustments by relaxing or 
tightening the conditions so as to cope with the specific case in hand. There is no evidence 
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that there were strong commitments to these changes and it is expected that this strategy 
only produced episodic accommodations. 
Sometimes, a program did not produce expected answers not because of the failure of 
certain rules, but the absence of suitable rules to handle the specific cases in hand. Under 
such circumstances, students normally responded by adding more rules that adopted the 
fundamental basic structure as the existing ones in order to cater for these extra cases. This 
strategy is thus one of extension of the existing knowledge structure to account for more 
specific cases. This modification can be interpreted as accretion (Rumelhart & Norman, 
1978) in the context of learning. 
In a few of the cases, the students could not find acceptable alternatives to the failed rules 
and had to resort to deleting the rules altogether. This was actually a case of evasion on the 
student's side to face and resolve the conflict. All the evasion cases involved general 
hypotheses, indicating that failure of rules in this category in fact posed the most serious 
conflicts to the students. 
A few of the modifications brought about more significant changes in the knowledge 
structure. These came about when a student decided to reformulate the statement of a rule 
so as to change the level of generality of the rules (to make it more specific or general), or 
to re-define the limits of applicability. Here, the students were not modifying the rules 
because of failed rules for specific cases. Rather, they were concerned with the general 
performance of the rules, how well the particular rules would work for a variety of 
situations. The rules were not wrong, but need refining. This category of modifications is 
similar to schema tuning (Rumelhart & Norman, 1978) where the basic relational structure 
of the schema remains unchanged and only the constant and variable terms referred by the 
schema are modified. A potentially important observation here is that many of the changes 
in this category were not directly brought about by failures, but came about as a result of 
the students' unprompted reflections on what they have read or heard about the topic in 
scientific contexts. 
Only one student made syntactic modifications to the program in order to streamline the 
relation names to enable hierarchically related rules to be fired as such. This means that the 
student took the programming task as one of theory building, presenting a unified view of 
looking at motion events. The motivation for so doing is unrelated to the immediacy of 
coping with particular situations, but follows from an aesthetic desire and a respect for well 
structured knowledge. Such modifications also imply that this student had the remarkable 
ability to pick up the features and possibilities of the programming language which were 
not introduced to the students. 
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9.4.3 Cognitive conflict and learning 
Results of the present research show that cognitive conflict rarely leads directly to learning 
in a significant sense. Most of the program failures led to episodic accommodation only 
and as such does not qualify to be called learning. A quarter of the rule modifications 
involved application of existing knowledge structures to new cases. These constitute the 
lowest form of learning - accretion. The highest form of learning observed during the 
experimental period was schema tuning. Here the knowledge structures were modified 
slightly to improve their general applicability. There was no observation of restructuring 
taking place. 
A fair hypothesis from the above observations is that there is a general tendency to handle 
conflicts in ways that make the minimum possible changes on the existing knowledge 
structure. Conflicts lead to more serious challenges if the knowledge schemas are better 
structured while less structured ones can cope with failures by patching: piecemeal 
modifications for specific situations. Failures for programs at the structural level posed the 
greatest difficulties to the authors because peripheral modifications very often cannot solve 
all the problems because of the inter-relatedness of the whole program, and such failures 
are the only ones that have the possibility of leading to restructuring. As the structuredness 
of a person's knowledge in a particular domain relates to his/her epistemic values, and 
whether he/she believes in the existence of generalization descriptions, theories for the 
domain, these factors also affect the possibility of significant learning taking place. 
Another important observation from the present research is that there is a general tendency 
to incorporate school science knowledge into existing knowledge structures. Evidence of 
this occurring can be found in the program of every student in the older group. However, 
most of the incorporation was done at the syntactic level - incorporating technical terms into 
the existing knowledge structure. School science instruction may possibly lead to serious 
cognitive conflict if the intuitive conceptions of the learner form a well structured schema. 
However, there is evidence that formal instruction in Physics does play a critical role in 
promoting cognitive changes: It was observed that the schema tuning incidents were 
mostly stimulated by information gathered by students during lessons or while watching 
TV programs. The most serious cognitive conflict came about in the case of Evon when 
she tried to incorporate two incompatible theoretical frameworks: the Newtonian 
framework of internal and external forces and her intuitive framework of differing sources 
of power for autonomous and non-autonomous motion. 
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9.5 Expert System Development as a Knowledge Elicitation 
Technique 
This final chapter cannot evade the responsibility of discussing issues related to the novel 
technique used in this research - expert system development as a knowledge elicitation 
technique. The rationale for developing such a method was that it provides a non-
threatening environment for elicitation, the externalized knowledge is accessible to both 
subject and researcher alike and is explorable and modifiable. Such an elicitation 
environment thus supports reflection, exploration of consequences of the knowledge and 
provides an objective record of all the transactions, including records of how conflicts are 
resolved. 
Results from the present research provide encouraging evidence that such a technique is 
valuable and has potential for further development. Analysis at rule level revealed a 
prominent concern with holistic descriptions for motion and causal attributions that are 
consistent with results of the classification task. Many of the elicited ideas are also 
consistent with what has been reported by others working in this area. For example,the 
ideas of differentiating between autonomous and non-autonomous motion, and that animate 
and inamimate causal agents constitute a major distinction in conceptualizing motion are 
similar to those reported by Bliss, Ogborn & Whitelock (1989); the idea that the causal 
agent acts as the source of force for the affected is also suggested by Andersson (1985). 
These give one confidence that the elicited knowledge is not just an artifact of the 
programming task but that it does reveal important aspects of students' commonsense 
conceptions about motion. 
In addition to yielding elicitations consistent with other methods, it has provided further 
insight into aspects of students' commonsense conceptions about motion as well as more 
general aspects of cognition which have not been exposed by other methods reported in this 
area. 
First of all, the fact that this task allows students to create over an extended period of time a 
representation of their own conceptions without prior conceptual or situational constraint, 
and that such representation is meant to operate as a system for problem solving allows one 
to probe much deeper into the structural aspects of the knowledge schema. The different 
agency gestalts elicited from the students have revealed much finer distinctions in the 
students' notions of causality than has been reported (e.g. Andersson, 1986). Such 
distinctions may indicate a possible progression from the intuitive conceptions to a more 
scientific model. 
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Another special feature of the present method is that it demands that the subjects take up a 
rational and reflective attitude in their attempts to build an explicit and generally applicable 
system about motion. This contrasts greatly with the spontaneity with which responses are 
elicited in most other methods of elicitation. The completion of such a task requires the 
subjects to define their own explanation goals, that is, what knowledge they consider to be 
important for "knowing" about the domain under discussion. This method thus allows the 
researcher to probe into a completely different aspect of a person's knowledge structure: the 
epistemic plane of operation represented by the elicited knowledge, including the level of 
generality the knowledge structure is working at and how well it operates as an orchestrated 
system. This aspect of a person's organization of commonsense knowledge is not 
accessible by other means of knowledge elicitation and thus has not been reported. 
However, this aspect does represent a real and important dimension of knowledge if one 
really believes in knowledge being organized. 
The explorability and modifiability of the programs allow one to study the kinds of conflict 
that may arise when a person's conceptions about a particular domain are tested against 
physical observations and what strategies s/he may use to resolve them. The program 
modification behaviour of students thus provided a chance for us to look into a much 
discussed issue of promoting learning through the setting up of conflicts (Hewson, 1981, 
1984). Analysis of results from the present research suggests that very often conflict 
resolution does not lead to learning, and in the cases when it does, it is still mainly low 
level learning as accretion. Even learning as schema tuning rarely happens. The results 
further suggest that generally strategies leading to minimum structural changes would be 
adopted for conflict resolution, and only when the existing knowledge structure is well 
organized (at the structural epistemic level) would there be a possibility for the seriousness 
of the conflict to escalate to the extent of challenging the validity of the core hypothesis, 
leading to a possibility of restructuring. Such observations with regard to learning are 
consistent with the theoretical predictions of learning theories as proposed by Rumelhart 
and Norman (1978) and to some extent that of Piaget (1975). Such an outcome is very 
pleasing and does give one some confidence that the method has provided some important 
insights into learning. 
9.6 Beyond Elicitation and Understanding 
A better understanding of students' commonsense reasoning about motion should have 
pedagogical implications. At the content level, results from the present research suggest 
that relating the Newtonian framework more explicitly with the pragmatic concerns of 
commonsense reasoning might be a way to promote better understanding of the Newtonian 
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framework, in particular, to address the issue of agency and trying to highlight the role of 
interacting events in the causal action as responsible for the production of the interacting 
forces. This might lead to a gradual diminution of the role differences attached to the agent 
and the affected in motion events. Such an effect might also bring about less differences 
being attached to animate and inanimate objects, or at least clarify the essential differences 
between them. 
At a broader level, an adoption of the Newtonian frame implies a conceptual revolution. 
The superiority of the Newtonian framework cannot be appreciated within the context of 
the pragmatic need for handling specific stereotypical motion which is the predominant case 
in commonsense reasoning about motion. Unless a student can detach himself/herself from 
the pragmatic immediacy of everyday motions and cultivate an aesthetic, intellectual 
perspective in looking at the world, real learning cannot take place. A person needs to 
operate at the level of the structural epistemic frame before the adoption of a Newtonian 
framework can take place. 
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Appendix 1 
A.I. PROGRAMMING ENVIRONMENT AS A KNOWLEDGE ELICITATION 
& COGNITIVE MODELLING TOOL  
Paper presented at the Third International Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence and Education, University of Pittsburgh, 
May 7-11, 1987. 
Nancy Law & Wing Wah Ki 
Dept. of Professional Studies in Education 
University of Hong Kong 
This study attempts to elicit students' commonsense ideas about 
motion and how they structure their learnt physics concepts in 
relation to their commonsense ideas through Prolog programming. 
Prolog is offered as an expressive tool to students to 
externalize and formalize their intuitive ideas about motion. 
The main aim of this investigation is to provide deeper insight 
into the problem of students' misconceptions/alternative 
frameworks in mechanics (see Law N. 1986). 
The important effect of pre-instructional ideas on children's 
learning is now widely recognised and a lot of effort has gone 
into investigating what these ideas are like in various domain 
areas in science in the past few years. In the domain of 
mechanics, we now have accumulated a very comprehensive catalog 
of phenomenological descriptions of various aspects of children's 
reasoning about forces and motion, without much understanding of 
what lies underneath such phenomenological manifestations of 
children's thinking. There is a need for us to really take 
children's ideas seriously, in their own right and not as a 
distortion of the scientific view. We need to find out a child's 
basic cognitive framework and mechanisms of thought when thinking 
about a particular domain area before we can begin to find a 
better way of teaching. 
In this study, the student plays the role of the teacher and the 
computer that of a learner. The idea is that in the course of 
teaching the computer, one is obliged to externalize one's 
ideas. And once these ideas and intuition have been externalized 
in the form of a computer program, they become accessible to 
verification, reflection, and modification. In this way the 
computer serves as a 'mudpie' for the learner to develop his/her 
own understanding. Furthermore, the resulting programs and the 
interaction process of the student with his/her own externalized 
ideas provide rich material for an understanding of the mental 
models and processes of the student. 
One important pre-requisite for such a scheme of work to be 
viable is the availability of a programming environment that is 
amenable to use and effective in representing human knowledge. 
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Prolog, one of the A.I. programming languages that is gaining 
more and more attention, is chosen for this research for several 
reasons: 
(1) It provides a declarative programming environment and the 
user only needs to declare the relevant facts and inference 
rules. There is an in-built inference mechanism so that the 
knowledge base can be put to work without extra programming 
effort. 
(2) It excels conventional languages in its ability to handle 
symbolic and non-numerical relationships. 
(3) The PROLOG programming environment is highly interactive. 
The man-machine interaction can be a continuous and inter-leaving 
sequence of knowledge input and queries. When used with a 
front-end extension that can provide a query-the-user facility, 
the knowledge base can increase incrementally even when the user 
is using the program to answer queries (Law N., Ogborn J. & 
Whitelock D., 1986). 
Methodology 
The main task for the participating students was to build an 
expert system of their own understanding of some aspects of 
motion in micro-Prolog (McCabe F.G. et.al., 1985) using the 
front-end APES (Hammond P. & Sergot M, 1984). Each student 
participate in the design and actual construction of a 
computational model of their own thinking, assess the model built 
(which is the resulting expert system) and then modify it as they 
think fit. A representation of the student's knowledge in the 
form of an expert system has the advantages of being explicit, 
explorable, and capable of offering explanations for deduction 
paths (Law N, Ogborn J. & Whitelock D., 1986). This involvement 
of the students in the programming process forces the students to 
externalize and formalize their thoughts, a lot of which may have 
never been raised to a conscious level. It is thus hoped that 
this method offers an effective tool for probing deeper into 
students' knowledge structures. Furthermore, as an externalized 
entity, the resulting program can be explored, and so offers a 
good opportunity to find out the possible outcomes of confronting 
students with explicit representations of their own knowledge. 
So far, eight sixth form Physics students have participated in 
this study. Each student is treated as a deep case study on its 
own, involving eight programming sessions, each of one and a 
half hour duration. The researcher is with the student 
throughout the programming sessions for data collections purposes 
and as a programming adviser to the student. The data collected 
include the developed programs, as well as screen dumps and diary 
notes taken during the programming sessions. As the aim of the 
research is not to teach programming but to elicit the students' 
knowledge structures, efforts were made to reduce the students' 
efforts spent on mastering the Prolog language. Only a 
restricted subset of the language was introduced, and they were 
only required to write programs in the infix format. 
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From the preliminary results of this study, several interesting 
observations can be made. 
Some Observations on the cognitive processes of the students  
a. Mental models anchoring on one stereotypical example - 
Although the task set to the students was to write up rules 
about some aspects of motion such that the rules can be 
applied in general to all situations, most of the students 
start with one specific instance in mind and write up a rule 
that they think can be satisfied by that particular instance. 
For example, a student made up the following rule about how to 
decide that something is experiencing gravity: 
_object experience gravity if 
_object travelling parabolically 
Evidently the student was only thinking about the cases when 
an object is thrown upwards at an angle, moving in a parabola 
befor hitting the ground. But this is only one set of 
instances when the motion is affected by gravity - what about 
the cases when the object is thrown vertically upwards or just 
moving downwards vertically? 
b. General statements used for a restricted and fuzzy domain of 
reference 
This peculiarity is connected to the imprecise nature of our 
everyday language. Our language would be very dull indeed if 
all its usage is clearly defined without any ambiguity at 
all. Yet when the students are required to formalize their 
thoughts into generally applicable rules as they are required 
in this programming exercise, they operate in the same mode of 
imprecision. As mentioned above, the students normally think 
in terms of a restricted domain of instances. At the same 
time, the boundaries of the domain is not clear even to 
themselves. 
Again using the same example of the student writing the rule 
quoted above, her use of the word 'experience' actually meant 
`during the course of motion of the object, it was being 
affected by'. When the research asked her to apply the rule 
to the case of a tape recorder placed on the table, the result 
was of course that the tape recorder does not experience 
gravity. Because she had her own particular definition of 
experience at that time, she did not think that the response 
from the computer had any problem until I asked her 
specifically whether for the tape recorder on the table, it 
does experience any gravity or not. If she had a clear focus 
for her statement, she could have pointed out that the word 
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`experience' is not used to encompass all the meanings that 
this word would carry in everyday language. Instead, after 
some thinking, she agreed to make an amendment by adding the 
following rule: 
_object experience gravity if 
_object has weight and 
_object is still 
Again this additional rule reflects that she is considering 
only the cases of still objects like the tape-recorders. When 
she tested the rules with the case of the kite which is moving 
and yet not parabolically, the response from the computer was 
that the kite does not experience gravity which is counter to 
the new meaning of the word 'experience'. At that point, she 
very relunctantly edited the last rule above to : 
_object experience gravity if 
_object has weight 
c. Patching up of the model when it doesnot fit expectations 
rather than reconsidering the structure of the whole model - 
It is inevitable that hypotheses set up may be disproved when 
put to the test. There are different courses of action one 
may take when faced with such failures. One prominent feature 
that came up during the course of this investigation is that 
most of the students tend to stick on to the basic structure 
of their first hypothesis and try to make adjustments to it 
to fit the specific cases rather than re-assessing the 
validity of the structure of the whole hypothesis. The 
following is one typical example from the case studies: 
A student was writing up rules to decide what causes the 
motion of an object. Her core hypothesis was that there is a 
`source of supply of force' for every action, and such sources 
can be divided into internal and external ones. She believed 
that the nature of such 'sources of supply of force' is a 
deciding factor in determining the cause(s) and source of 
control for a motion. A bird flies and a motor car runs 
because of an internal supply of force. A basketball starts 
moving because of an external supply of force from the hand. 
Yet there are some forces, like the weight of an object, 
which she was not so sure about the categorization. 
She wrote the following rules for determining the cause of 
motion: 
_object motion-caused-by itself if 
_object force-supplied-by _object 
_object motion-caused-by machine if 
_object force-supplied-by machine 
_objectl motion-caused-by _object2 if 
_objectl force-supplied-by _object2 
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_object motion-caused-by gravity if 
not(_object under-the-influence-of other-external-force) 
She then set out to test the program with the case of an apple 
(thinking about the famous 'Newton's apple). To her dismay, 
the computer did not came out with any answer at all. The 
reason was that in one of her earlier sessions, she included 
weight as an external (supply of) force, together with forces 
like friction, air-current, etc. Faced with such a 
contradiction, her immediate response was to exclude weight 
from her list of external forces. After making this 
modification, the computer still did not give her the expected 
answer of gravity - According to one of her other rules, 
anything placed in air would be affected by air-current, and 
air-current is an external force. Now, excluding air-current 
from the list of external forces seems to be too much of a 
twisting of facts, so she modified her fourth rule above to : 
_object motion-caused-by gravity if 
not (_object motioncausedby _something) 
This alteration did succeed in giving her the expected answer 
for the apple because this set of rules on cause of motion does 
not involve anything concerning whether a force is an external 
or internal one. 
Her next project was to write some general rules to determine 
what controls a particular motion. She began with the rules: 
_object controlled-by itself if 
_object force-supplied-during-motion _something and 
_something force-type internal and 
not(_object under-the-influence-of other-external-force) 
_object controlled-by _something if 
object force-supplied-during-motion _something and 
_something force-type external and 
_object affected-by _something 
These two lines clearly show that the student was still 
building her model up on her core hypothesis of internal and 
external supplies of force . 
She began testing the rules with the case of a falling stone. 
This time, she considered weight to be an external force, and 
so the answer from the computer was acceptable - that the 
falling stone was controlled by an external force. Problem 
arose when she tested the same rules with the case of a bird 
which is flying. Instead of confirming that that 'bird 
motion-controlled-by itself'as she would have expected, the 
answer was negative because according to the data input the 
bird is affected-by weight which is an external force. Again, 
her response was to change weight from 'force-type external' to 
`force-type internal'. 
This tactic of patching up of the rules by modifying a fact is 
very frequently adopted, rather than changing the structure of 
the core hypothesis. 
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d. Change in attitude towards cognitive conflict - 
The students participating in this study differ not only in 
their general ability, but also in their attitudes towards 
cognitive conflict. Some students are very reflective and 
sometimes, even before they finish typing in a rule, they would 
have started doubting or changing what they have typed in. But 
more often, the students tend to be very defensive, and does 
not like to see their rules fail. Prolog programming seem to 
provide an environment that promotes a change in attitude in 
the latter group of students, according to the case studies in 
this research. 
A significant change in attitude was observed in the student 
who was the most defensive and least reflective. At first she 
felt very annoyed when a rule does not work out, and she 
disliked the examples suggested by the researcher for testing 
the program because she felt that they were chosen to fail her 
rules. An incident occurred during her fourth programming 
session that changed her entire attitude. Amongst her rules on 
control of motion was the follwing 
_object motion-controlled-by engine if 
_object has-ability-to-move continuously-without-
getting-tired 
She was rather pleased that the output from the program was 
reasonably acceptable after several testings. The she decided 
to test the program with the case of a falling leaf - and asked 
for the source of control for the leaf. To her surprise and 
dismay, the answer came out that the falling leaf was 
controlled by an engine. This outrageous result shattered her 
so much that she asked for the screen dump of that session to 
study at home and left very depressed. The next session she 
came back armed with a whole lot of amendments and additions. 
After this incident she became much more interested in the 
project. Moreover, she becomes much more adventurous in 
suggesting various novel situations to test her program, ones 
that she evidently had not thought about when she made up her 
rules initially. 
Some Initial Evaluation on the usefulness of the Prolog 
Programming Environment 
 
A preliminary evaluation of the results from the present study 
shows that Prolog is valuable as a knowledge elicitation tool. It 
allows us to uncover the core hypotheses and fundamental 
assumptions held by students. The expert systems that the 
students write tell us about the main considerations they would 
make concerning a specific aspect of the domain they are 
considering. But to find out which beliefs are held most 
strongly, which ideas are acting as the structural organizer of 
their knowledge, we have to observe the students' behaviour when 
their programs fail. Another kind of information we can elicit in 
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such a process is the personal cognitive style of the students. 
We can find out which students are the more reflective ones, and 
also how each differs in their attitude towards cognitive 
conflict. 
Knowing what the student believes in and finding about about 
his/her cognitive styles is of course a valuable information to a 
teacher. But can the Prolog programming environment offer 
anything towards promoting learning? In one of the case studies 
quoted above, the student did have a marked change in her attitude 
towards cognitive conflict which should be valuable for promoting 
structural changes in her knowledge. Yet this change is not 
evident in the other case studies. Probably there are other 
factors besides the Prolog programming environment that is 
producing such a change. Perhaps further research and analysis 
may provide more information on this aspect. 
Another question we may like to ask about such a study is whether 
the cognitive conflicts provided by the Prolog programming 
environment encourage the students to change to a more scientific 
knowledge structure. Unfortunately, the answer from this study is 
negative. There are too many alternatives changes that the 
students can make, patching or otherwise, and the Prolog 
environment per se can tell nothing more than the internal logical 
consistency of the input statements. A set of more logically 
consistent statements does not necessarily possess greater 
physical validity. It seems that suitable intervention on the 
basis of the uncovered core hypotheses would be necessary. But 
what form should such intervention take and whether Prolog 
programming would be of value at this stage are questions that 
warrant further research and investigation. 
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13. Knowing what the student knows: 
a use of APES in science education 
Nancy Law, Jon Ogborn and Denise Whitelock 
Dept of Science Education 
University of London Institute of Education 
Bedford Way 
London WR1H OAL 
UK 
A PROLOG program contains a description of a 'world', and running the program 
generates consequences which follow from the facts and rules in that description. 
Consider what might be told to a PROLOG program in the case of one thing supporting 
another: for example, a book resting on top of a table. Some simple rules about the general 
notion of support might be: 
1. An object which is supported must rest on another object. 
2. If things are piled on one another, the lower ones support those above them. 
3. All supports require sufficient strength to sustain that which they support. 
We can capture this 'real world' picture in a small PROLOG program shown below. 
X rest-on Y if 
X on Y 
X rest-on Y if 
Z on Y and 
X rest-on Z 
X supports Y if 
Y rest-on X and 
X strong-for Y 
X supported if 
Y supports X 
However, how does the deductive capability of PROLOG manifest itself when 
employed in the expert system shell APES? The salient features of the APES shell are 
demonstrated if we engage in a dialogue with our program and ask whether Mary is 
supported. The program has no knowledge about a person named Mary but has been 
given a set of rules about support which should be applied in order to deduce an answer 
to our query. In fact, the system replies with two questions: 
1. Is Mary on anything? and 
2. Is Mary's support strong enough for her? 
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With this extra information which is then added to the database, the system can confirm 
that Mary is supported and will also explain how it reached that conclusion. 
which (X : Mary on X)? 
Answer is chair 
Answer is end 
Is it true that chair strong-for Mary? Yes 
= = = Yes, I can confirm Mary supported why 
To deduce Mary supported I used the rule 
X supported if Y supports X 
I can show chair supports Mary stop 
Execution terminated 
If we add another rule to the database, which elaborates upon our general notion of 
support and suggests that the floor is the ultimate support since it appears to be very 
strong and cannot break, and then consider whether Dave who is sitting on a stool holding 
a pile of books is supported, we are again asked whether the stool is a strong enough 
support for Dave. Even when the reply is a negative one to this query, the program still 
confirms that Dave is supported by reasoning that the floor supports Dave, as is shown 
below. 
which (X : Dave on X)? 
Answer is stool 
Answer is end 
Is it true that stool strong-for Dave? 
which (X Y) : X on Y)? 
Answer is (Mary chair) 
Answer is (books Dave) 
Answer is (Dave stool) 
Answer is (stool floor) 
Answer is end 
= = = Yes, I can confirm Dave supported why 
To deduce Dave supported I used the rule 
X supported if Y supports X 
I can show floor supports Dave. 
Execution terminated. 
This is an answer we would not have expected since we had previously stated that the 
stool could not support Dave, let alone Dave plus a pile of books! Therefore, our program 
demonstrated that a common-sense description of support was not accurate enough to 
convey the subtlety implied by this notion, and revealed flaws in our less-than-rigorous 
definition. However, the description can now be modified since the interaction with APES 
has provided clues as to where our descriptions were incomplete or invalid and will alsd 
quickly provide feedback about the appropriateness and reliability of any new 
representation which is constructed. 
We have demonstrated PROLOG's query-the-user facility employed within APES, 
which enabled the database to expand and acquire more facts, which can in turn be 
manipulated by the system's inferencing rules. Explanation features are of particular 
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interest to researchers in the field of education, for reasons discussed in the remainder of 
this chapter. The dialogue between computer and user can be recorded and noted; APES 
will also report what it has been told in a given session, as in the example below: 
list dialogue 
You told me that Mary on chair 
You told me that books on Dave 
You told me that Dave on stool 
You told me that stool on floor 
You told me that chair strong-for Mary 
You told me that floor strong-for X if X rest-on floor 
You denied stool strong-for Dave 
Two important questions now need to be answered: 
1. Why should science educators be concerned with representing such problems as 
support and movement in a non-scientific way? 
2. How can the pertinent features of an expert system shell be of use in such a task? 
There is a growing body of research interested in pupils' intuitive ideas about science and 
there have been a considerable number of investigations which support the view that 
pupils have their own conceptions about natural phenomena. 
A variety of studies has been conducted in such areas as dynamics, heat, light, and 
many others (Gilbert and Watts, 1983). Although proof of existence of these prior beliefs 
is abundant, it is often difficult to fit a descriptive pattern to the results obtained, and the 
mismatch between pupils' understanding of science and formal science can persist even 
through to undergraduate level (McDermott, 1983). However these 'alternative con-
ceptions' are so strongly taken for granted that they are often not made explicit, and 
need to be purposefully teased from individuals in situations where they feel it is both 
possible and reasonable to explain things which normally need no explanation. 
Therefore, our current research interests lie in attempting to elicit and formalize in a 
computational model pupils' own thinking about dynamics which can capitalize upon the 
explanatory and query-the-user facilities of APES. The idea is to bring tacit knowledge 
into the open, knowledge which otherwise could dominate thinking without the person 
even being aware of the process. That is, if pupils' common-sense notions about dynamics 
can be brought out using this tool, in a way in which the consequences of holding 
incomplete knowledge or an inadequate rule system will cause the system to reach invalid 
answers or to ask unreasonable questions, then this combination could give rise to a new 
level of pupil awareness about their own ideas and could help to provoke a reconsideration 
of their current ways of thinking. The concept area of dynamics is particularly 
appropriate, since Newtonian dynamics does indeed require a fundamental shift in the 
basic concepts used to understand the work. 
This work is at present at a very early stage, with more to show by way of ambitions 
than achievements. The example of 'support' is purely illustrative: other thinking we 
hope to capture would involve ideas of what makes things move, what makes them fall, 
what stops them moving or falling, and so on. The planned research has two essential 
dimensions: first, to explore the idea of formal representations of informal ideas and 
second, to explore the idea of using PROLOG as a mental 'scratch pad' used to 
externalize and so make available for scrutiny thoughts and theories about processes. 
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Over the past ten years, one of the major 
concerns amongst researchers in science education 
has been the problem of learners' pre-instructional 
ideas. It has been widely recognised that before 
students come to the science classroom, they 
already have developed some conception of the 
world around them and that such intuitive ideas 
very often persist despite instruction. Until very 
recently, most of the research has been focussed 
on where these ideas depart from the scientific 
view. Faced with the voluminous data from such 
research, mainly in the form of a catalog of miscon-
ceptions, many research workers in this field are 
recognizing the need to find a more comprehensive 
and deeper understanding of the nature of the 
students' alternative conceptions and different 
hypotheses are put forth for their interpretation. 
Some propose to look for a commonsense 'theory' 
of the content of 'alternative conceptions' which 
are 'more general than a set of rules about particular 
cases', capable of accounting uniformly for the 
various conceptions catalogued (Ogborn, 1985). 
Others, not expecting the students' conceptions to 
be consistent, structured theories, propose more 
pragmatic approaches, ranging from finding' a set 
of correlational descriptions between situations-
and student responses (Viennot, 1985) to looking 
for a set of prototypes, not necessarily coherent, 
which the students would use to handle different 
situations (Guidoni, 1985). 
There is no dispute that scientific knowledge 
is well structured, and so probably is the expert's 
scientific knowledge. What about commonsense, 
intuitive ideas? Are they structured as well? How 
coherent or consistent are they, and how persistent? 
Furthermore, how does the learning of school 
physics interact with their intuitive ideas? Are the 
two domains of knowledge compartmentalized as 
some have alleged (Claxton G., 1985), or are they 
integrated? If it is the latter, what are the different 
modes of integration? These are important ques- 
lions for the understanding of the nature of alter-
nitive concepts, and for providing insight into the 
process of learning in situations where the student 
comes to the classroom with a lot of pre-concep-
tions. The present research tries to look for answers 
to these questions by eliciting students' intuitive 
ideas about motion through asking them to write 
expert systems about motion, and to observe 
their interactions with their own knowledge so 
expressed. 
Method 
The methodology employed in this research is 
essentially one of knowledge elicitation through 
programming. The basic idea is that here the student 
plays the role of the teacher and the computer 
that of a learner. In the course of teaching the 
computer, the student is obliged to externalize 
his/her ideas. Once these ideas and intuition have 
been externalized, they become in some sense 
accessible to reflection. The advantage of having 
such ideas externalized in the form of an expert 
system is that it 'freezes' the students' ideas at a 
certain instant, allowing the student to use it to 
explore the logical consequences of the externalized 
knowledge and at the same time supporting easy 
modification when this is deemed necessary. 
An important prerequisite for such a scheme 
of work to be viable is the availability of a pro-
gramming environment that is amenable to use and 
effective in representing commonsense knowledge. 
PROLOG is chosen for this research as it provides 
a declarative programming environment and a 
built-in logical inference mechanism so that the user 
only needs to declare the relevant facts and 
inference rules and the resulting knowledge base 
can then be put to work without extra programming 
effort. PROLOG also excels conventional languages 
in its ability to handle symbolic and non-numerical 
relationships and this is very important here since 
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FIGURE 1. Network showing the predominant 
framework of reasoning about motion. 
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what needs to be elicited are qualitative intuitive 
ideas rather than mathematical relationships. In 
order to provide better programming support to 
the students, an expert system shell — APES (Ham-
mond P. & Sergot M., 1984— is provided to the 
students on top of PROLOG. This allows the com-
puter to explain how it arrived at a certain result 
based on the rules it has learnt. Further, it allows 
factual information required for getting inference 
results to be entered through the 'query-the-user' 
facility during the course of running the expert 
system developed (Law N, Ogborn J. & Whitelock 
D., 1988). It also records these inputs and thus 
the knowledge base increases even as the expert 
system is being used. 
 
An example dialogue between the student 
and the computer goeslike this: 
Student: object's motion caused by Itself If object 
has force supplied to It by Itself. 
Student: bird's motion caused by what? 
Computer: bird has force supplied to it by what? 
Student: itself. 
Computer: Answer is: bird's motion caused by 
itself. 
Student: Why? 
Computer: Bird's motion caused by itself because 
bird has force supplied to it by itself. 
It can be seen from the above example that a 
student can easily move between putting in new 
rules, editing them and executing the expert system 
at any stage during development very flexibly with. 
out having to explicitly move from one operating 
mode to another. 
This study has been carried out with two 
groups of students. The first group was composed 
of sixth•form science students (17-yr-olds) who 
have just completed a two year 0-Level course in 
Physics, while the second group was made up of 
form three students (14-yr-olds) who have had no 
formal instruction in Physics. Each student worked 
on the programming task for about seven sessions, 
each lasting approximately one and a half hours. 
The data collected include the developed programs, 
as well as screen dumps and diary notes taken 
during the programming sessions. 
Students' Private Physics 
One objection that may be raised against 
using PROLOG as the means of eliciting children's 
ideas is that it places an artificial constraint on 
the students to express their ideas in the form of 
logical statements, whereas one would expect 
In order to keep the syntax of the program simple, 
students are taught to write each clause into three 
terms, and so hyphens are used to link up words to 
reduce the number of terms to that required while 
retaining readability. Words with underscores in 
front denotes a variable name. 
intuitive ideas to be much less structured and 
possibly much less logical. A careful look at the 
programs reveals that the students use the PROLOG 
programming environment as the medium to express 
what they think general rules about motion should 
be like, and the syntax of - PROLOG does not 
seem to have posed too much restriction on express- 
ing their intuitive ideas. A typical rule written by 
a student is as follows: 
-object motion-controlled-by itself if 
_object force-supplied-during-motion 
name-of-force and 
" ' 7  name-of-force force-type internale 
The students wrote their programs individually 
and they were discouraged from discussing their 
program with each other. From the wide difference 
in the overall content as well as structures of the 
programs written, there was strong evidence that 
there had not been much of a collaboration between 
the students in this task. 
At a first level of analysis, one may leave 
the data collected during the process of program 
development aside, and just concentrate on the 
resulting final programs written by the students. 
What do these programs tell us about students' 
conceptualization of motion? - 
If we look at the contents of the programs, 
we find that many of the rules display recurrent 
themes that reveal certain very pertinent patterns 
of reasoning which when taken together form 
a 'mental gestalt' of naive mechanics. Though 
the details of the rules written differ from one 
student to the next, the cognitive primitives used 
and the framework of reasoning are very similar 
amongst the students in both age groups. Fig. 1 
below tries to depict the framework of reasoning in 
the form of a network: 
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This framework (gestalt) of reasoning goes 
as follows: For any motion there needs to be 
a cause. The cause of motion is normally an agent, 
and the agent supplies the force needed for the 
motion. Thus force is seen as an entity that can be 
possessed by an object and can be passed from one 
object to another. Furthermore, the force would be 
dissipated by the moving object during the course of 
motion. In some instances the agent of causation 
can be the moving object itself, e.g. a bird flying in 
the air, and in such cases, the source of force would 
be termed internal, otherwise the source of force 
would be labelled external. 
Knowledge Structures & Intuitive Ideas 
It would be an over-exaggerated claim to 
say that the structures of the students' programs 
are direct representations of the structures of the 
students' intuitive ideas. They nevertheless provide 
us with important information as to how they 
relate their various ideas and conceptions of motion 
together. There are four possible dimensions of 
looking at the degree of structuredness of the 
knowledge expressed in the programs: 
i) whether there exists any prominent 'men-
tal gestalt' as expressed in the program and 
their relative importance within the program, 
ii) whether entitles occupying the same syntac-
tic role in similar relations share the same 
onto-logical status, 
ill) consistency in the nature of the conditions 
used for deciding among the same group 
of goal statements, 
iv) the inter-relatedness of the rules. 
Note here that the point of Interest is the structure 
of the expressed knowledge content per se and not 
the structure of the rules from the point of view of 
the PROLOG programming skill demonstrated by 
the students. 
Existence of Central Mental Gestalts 
It is interesting to note that in the twelve 
programs completed by the students, some clearly 
express strong adherence to some central cognitive 
'gestalts' about motion similar to the ones depicted 
earlier. On the other hand, some of the students' 
programs only consist of ad hoc rules, revealing no 
causal relationships between the goal statements 
and the conditions, and the ideas revealed in one 
rule seldom recur again in other rules. The following 
extract (Fig. 2) taken from one of the students' 
programs gives a clear illustration of the ad hoc 
nature of the rules she has written. 
_object motion-
controlled-by 
 
— tension — _object suspended when-moving 
— friction 4- _object moving-by-using wheels 
— gravity 4- _object falling-freely downwards 
— centripetal force 4- _object moving in-a-circle 
— elasticity 4- _object moving up-and-down 
— heat -4- _object has-air-expansion-inside when-moving 
	  water-current 4- _object fluctuating in-water 
— air-current 4- _object fluctuating in-air 
— wind 4- _object moving unsteadily in-air 
man i 4- _object in-contact-with man 
4- _object can-be-adjusted-by man 
— machine — _object moving after-addition-of-fuel 
— object-in-motion 4-- _object gets-tired after-moving 
 
legend: 4- denotes an implication. Thus before' 	 ' is the goal statement and after that is the condition. 
is taken to represent disjunction/. Thus the above figure 
represents twelve different rules on control of motion. 
represents a conjunction in the condition side of a rule. 
FIGURE 2. A Portion of the Program written by Brenda represented in the form of a Network. 
Fig.3 is a network representation of the work of 
another student in the same group — the 17-yr-old 
group. While Branda's rules are all ad hoc in nature, 
Evon's program demonstrates clearly that she is 
using a central mental 'gestalt' similar to the one 
described earlier in Fig. 1 as the basis for construct-
ing all her rules. In other words, Evon is displaying 
a strong persistent adherence to a framework of 
intuitive physics, while Brenda does not. This 
difference in the structure of the students' programs 
appeared in the work of both age groups, suggesting 
that this feature may not be particularly age 
dependent. 
Ontological Status of Entities Participating 
in the Same Relation 
Another important dimension for analysing 
the degree of structuredness, or perhaps coherence, 
of the programs is the variety in the ontological 
status of entities participating in the same relatiori 
in the programs. Evon's program is quite well 
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structured from this perspective — with the excep-
tion of the relation 'motion-controlled-by' where 
the entities for control of motion were 'itself' 
(which is an agent) and 'external-force', all the 
other relations were used for relating the same 
kind of entities. For example, in her program, the 
entities responsible for causing motion are all 
physical agents, and the entities that can affect 
motion are all different kinds of forces. On the 
other hand, Brenda's program is extremely unstruc-
tured (non-coherent) from this perspective —
motion can be controlled by forces (like tension, 
friction, gravity), or material properties (like elas-
ticity), or energy (like heat), or natural forces 
(like water current, wind) or physical agents (like 
man, machine or the object itself). This unstruc-
turedness in the programs reflects a lack of clarity 
and rigour in the student's analysis of the situation. 
Differences along this dimension of structuredness 
appear in the work of both age groups — there 
are some very well structured programs in the work 
of the younger group as well as some very poorly 
structured programs in the work of the older 
group. 
This kind of difference also gives us important 
insight as to the mode of integration of the 
student's learnt physics concepts with his/her 
intuitive understanding of motion. Both programs 
made reference to tension, a term which they 
picked up in the context of their school physics. 
Evon explicitly placed tension as a force that may 
affect an object's motion. Furthermore, this force 
would be labelled as an external force under her 
scheme of intuitive understanding. For Brenda, 
her program did not put any explicit label to 
classify the ontology of the term 'tension', and as a 
matter of fact it was just.  grouped together with 
a variety of different kinds of entities. It seems that 
she has only some vague impression that tension 
somehow affects the motion of an object, and that 
this happens in cases when an object is suspended. 
The learning of physics has not helped her to build 
up .a theoretical framework for analysing motion, 
and her only gain seems to be the acquisition of a 
new term which is associated with a very specific 
situation. 
In the work of the younger age group, many 
fewer jargons and technical terms like tension and 
upthrust were used. Learned school physics has not 
had an opportunity to add such items to their 
vocabulary. 
Consistency in the Nature of Conditions 
Used for the Same Group of Goal 
Statements 
For Evon's program, basically the same kind  
of conditions would be used for deciding among 
the same group of goal statements. For example, 
what controls motion would be decided by finding 
out what the nature of the source of supply of 
force is — if the source of supply is internal, then 
the control would be itself, and the control would 
be by external force when otherwise. To decide 
what forces affect an object's motion, the criteria 
she uses would be to find out the actual physical 
situation of the object — what medium it moves in 
and what it is in contact with. For Brenda, the 
conditions for deciding what controls a particular 
motion vary a great deal from case to case and 
there is no general principle to guide the decision. 
The conditions may be the physical situation of 
the moving object, or the trajectory of the object, 
or even an animistic criterion of whether the moving 
object would get tired after moving. This lack of 
consistency in the nature of the conditions used 
again pertains very much to whether the student 
has a clear theoretical framework for looking at 
motion, even if it were an intuitive one. 
Inter-relatedness of the Rules 
For the programs which display a definite 
adherence to a theoretical model for the inter-
pretation of motion, the rules tend to fall into 
groups with inter-relationships linking the groups 
together. A careful look at Fig. 3 shows that the 
inter-relationships running between the groups of 
rules follow very closely that of the links between 
key concepts depicted in Fig. I. On the other hand, 
for a program that does not demonstrate any 
adherence to a clear theoretical model, the rules 
still fall into groups, but there are no links between 
the rule groups. It is just a flat structure displaying 
no hierarchical relationship between the concepts 
involved and the rules are all just one level associa-
tions. 
Knowledge Structures and Effects of 
Interacting with Own Knowledge 
The PROLOG programming environment 
together with the expert system shell provided 
readily allows the students to query the knowledge 
bases they developed, and also provides facilities to 
explain how the inferences were arrived at when 
required. This allows students to explore the logical 
consequences of their externalized ideas. During 
the process of development and modification of 
their programs, the students were unavoidably 
confronted with unexpected results. The nature of 
the cognitive conflict and what the student may 
gain from the interactions depend very much on 
whether the programs reflect any core theoretical 
hypothesis and its degree of structuredness. 
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In the case when the programs demonstrate 
a strong theoretical hypothesis, the program nor-
mally fails because the fundamental assumptions/ 
concepts are invalid. The normal strategy employed 
in such cases seems to be that of patching: he/she 
would try to adhere to the same basic theoretical 
framework and try to add in minor adjustments 
to get around the specific instances of failure, 
rather than to review the theoretical framework 
itself. The following episode taken from Evon's 
programming sessions is a typical example of one 
such interactions: 
She had written the following rules for 
determining the cause of motion: 
_object motion-caused-by itself if 
_object force-supplied-by ._object 
_object motion-caused-by machine if 
—object force-supplied-by machine 
_object I motion-caused-by _object 2 if 
_object 1 force-supplied-by _object 2 
__object motion-caused-by gravity if 
not (object under-the-influence-of other 
external-force) 
She then set out to test the program with 
the case of a falling apple (thinking about the 
famous 'Newton's apple'). To her dismay, the com-
puter did not come up with the expected answer. 
The reason was that in one of her earlier sessions, 
she included weight as an external (supply of) 
force, together with forces like friction, air current, 
etc. Faced with such a contradiction; her immediate 
response was to exclude . weight from her list of 
external forces. As a matter of fact, in her scheme 
of intuitive physics, there was no clear orientation 
for classifying weight as internal or external forces 
since she could find justification for classifying it 
as either type of force. Weight arises because of 
attraction from the earth which is external to the 
object, so it makes sense to classify weight as 
external force. On the other hand, weight is related 
to the mass of the object which is an intrinsic 
property of the object itself, so it also makes sense 
to classify it as internal force. After changing 
weight to an internal force, the computer still did 
not give her the expected answer — gravity, because 
according to one of her other rules, anything 
placed in air would be affected by air-current, and 
air-current is an external force. Now, excluding 
air-current from the list of external forces seemed 
to be too much a twisting of facts. She just replaced 
the forth rule listed above by:  
_object motion-caused-by gravity if 
not (_object motion-caused-by _something) 
to avoid the problem with specific instances of 
internal or external forces. She did not review her 
underlying concepts about sources of supply of 
force, but then this was not the end of the problem 
for her. 
She again met similar problems relating to 
internal and external supplies of force when she 
explored her rules on control of motion, and she 
could not find a satisfactory solution after patching 
in various parts of the program. At the end of the 
programming task, she was beginning to raise 
questions about the more central assumptions. 
When the programs fail to give an expected 
answer, the kind of conflict faced by a student 
who do not hold a strong theoretical framework of 
intuitive physics, i.e. one whose program has an 
unstructured knowledge base, is much less serious 
and it was much easier to remedy by local patching. 
For them, the characteristics chosen to be put into 
the premises do not belong to the same ontological 
category. For example, whether something gets 
tired after moving describes the subjective feeling 
of an animate object whereas whether something 
needs fuel for motion is an objective fact. Yet both 
are used as defining characteristics for making 
inferences about the control of motion. When the 
program fails, the student's reaction was either 
that he/she has chosen a less appropriate characteris-
tic, or that he/she has missed out some other 
import ant characteristics. 
Looking at the interactions between the 
students and their own PROLOG programs, there 
is evidence that such explorations with one's own 
externalized knowledge do provide an opportunity 
for inconsistencies'in one's ideas and concepts to 
show up. Further, when the knowledge base 
expressed is well structured, such interactions may 
eventually lead to fundamental restructuring of 
core concepts and hypothesis. 
Conclusions 
	 • 
Results from the preliminary analysis indicate 
that it is possible to find out about a student's 
framework for conceptualization of motion through 
PROLOG programming. The elicited knowledge 
bases indicate that the intuitive ideas are not com-
partmentalized with respect to their learnt physics 
concepts, but rather become woven into their own 
intuitive framework for looking at the world of 
motion. The nature of the integration depends very 
much on how well structured their own knowledge 
bases about motion are. Intuitive ideas may or 
may not be well structured, and the degree of 
structuring seems to pertain to the cognitive style 
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of the individual, and does not bear any relation 
to the age of the student nor is it related to the 
amount of Physics the student has learnt. For the 
17-yr-old group, it is the higher ability students 
who show a much better structuring of ideas than 
the lower ability group; but no such trend can be 
found in the younger group. Most of the students 
found the performance of the program containing 
the ad hoc rules more acceptable than the better 
structured ones. 
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Appendix 5. Handout given to students to introduce PROLOG programming. 
INTRODUCTION TO PROLOG PROGRAMMING 
A. System startup 
1. Put the program disk in drive A. 
Turn on the computer (or if the computer is already on, 
press Ctrl,Alt and Del together and then release). 
2. Type "timer/s". 
3. Type "prolog". 
4. Type "LOAD APES" (note that it must be in uppercase 
characters.) 
5. If you want to load a program from previous sessions, put 
the data disk in drive A and type "LOAD <FILENAME>". 
After the program has been successfully loaded, replace the 
program disk in drive A. 
6. At the end of a session, save the program on the datadisk 
as well as on the data backup disk by putting the 
appropriate disk in drive A and then typing "SAVE 
<FILENAME>". 
B. Rules and facts 
A prolog program may be thought of as made up of facts and rules. 
Facts are statements consisting of three terms expressed in the 
form: 
object 	 relation 	 object 
For example: John isa boy 
Mary is-in-condition happy 
pochai-pills aggravate peptic-ulcer 
Notice that if the fact expressed can only be intelligibly 
expressed in more than three words, some of the words may be 
hyphenated to form a term so as to conform to the above format. 
Rules are stated in the following format: 
statement) if 
statement2 and 
statement3 and 
where each statement is in the same format as a fact statement. 
Statement) is called the goa7 statement or consequence, and the 
rest are condition statements connected by AND. 
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The OR connective is not supported as part of a rule. Instead, 
if a goal can be arrived at by more than one set of conditions, 
this can be expressed by listing each set of valid conditions 
independently. 
That is, a program in the form of 
rulel 
rule2 
rule3 
can be read as rulel OR rule2 OR rule3 OR .. 
C. Adding program lines  
Program lines (both facts and rules) can be added in the 
following format: 
add( program statement) 
For example: add(aspirin suppresses pain) 
D. Querying the knowledge base 
Queries to the knowledge base can be done through two commands: 
confirm - which would get back a response of YES or NO 
find 	 - which would provide a list of appropriate 
answers. 
For example: 
confirm(alcohol suppresses pain) 
find(_thing: _thing suppresses pain) 
You can always ask for the reasons for a result by typing "WHY" 
or "HOW". 
For the find query, you can ask for more answers by typing 
"more". 
You can terminate the dialogue by typing "stop". 
Appendix 6. Summary of the classificatory schemes given to the F.6 students on 
their first programming session. (These classificatory schemes were 
used by their own group during the classificatory task.) 
SUMMARY OF CLASSIFICATION GROUPS 
This is a summary of the classification types as discussed during 
the interviews on the comic strip pictures of motion. As can be 
seen from the summary, the ways of classification are very 
similar. 
BS VW WW CL SH KH CH WF VN KL CW 
Types of motion 
- circular 
- parabolic 
	
* 
- straight line 
	
* 
- rotational 
- bouncing 
Type of positional changes 
- periodic 
- change of height 
- forwards/backwards 
- will return to ground 
Direction of motion 
- upwards and/or downwards 	 * * * * * 	 * * 
- horizontal 
Purpose of motion 
- on purpose 	 * 
- tricked by other people 
- to maintain balance 
- to jump across obstacle 
Cause of motion 
- self 	 * 
- external object 	 * * 
- machine 
- gravity 
- whether the cause itself 	 * 
is in motion or not 
- direct or indirect 
- reduced friction (slip-
periness) 
Control of motion 
- self * * * * * 
- external * * * * * 
- gravity * 
Whether external object/ 
instrument is needed 
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BS VW WW CL SH KH CH WF VN KL CW  
Factors affecting motion 
- gravity * * 
- tension * 
- floatation * * 
- air current * 
- water current * 
Source of force 
- self-supplied * * * 
- external force * * * * * * 
- whether in direct 
contact with object 
* 
Sudden changes 
cause: 
* * * * 
- slipperiness * 
- friction * 
- blocked by another object * 
Type of force 
- springy, elastic 	 * 
- moment 	 * 
- biological 	 * 
Forces acting 
- number 
	
* 
- relative directions 
	
* 
Speed 	 * 	 * * 
Nature of object 
- living/non-living 	 * * 	 * 
- whether capable of chang- 	 * 	 * * 	 * 
ing its own cause of motion 
- elastic, springy 	 * 
Consequence(effect) of motion 
- change of shape 	 * 
- carry something else along 	 * 
- only affect itself 	 * 
"Naturalness" of motion with 	 * * 	 * 
	
* 
respect to the type of object 
Whether motion makes use of 
specially designed instruments 
- to change (increase or 	 * 
decrease air reistance) 
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BS VW WW CL SH KH CH WF VN KL CW  
Whether the motion can be 
anticipated or not 
Whether moving object is attached 
to another object 
Whether the motion can be 
sustained or is only short lived * 
Whether the motion is safe 
Whether motion is possible 
Key to the initials: 
BS 	 Brenda Siu 
VW Vince Wong 
WW 	 Wong Wai Ling 
CL 	 Lin Chu Chang 
SH 	 Sandra Hui 
KH 	 Ho Kai Wing 
CH 	 Charmaine Hon 
WF 	 Fong Wai Leung 
VN 	 Vivian Ng 
KL 	 Li Kit Yung 
CW Wong Chi Wai 
* * * 
* 	 * 
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